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2 ABSTRACT 
Wallace  Stevens  was  profoundly  affected  by  Nietzsche's  declaration  of  the  death 
of  God  and  his  poetry  reflects  an  ongoing  struggle  to  understand  what  it  means  to 
be  a  poet  in  an  age  of  disbelief.  Although  Stevens'  early  poetry  suggests  that  this 
loss  of  belief  created  a  sense  of  crisis  in  the  poet,  his  later  work  indicates  a  full 
acceptance,  even  an  embracing,  of  this  loss,  recognising  it  as  the  inspiration  for 
poesis.  The  thesis  considers  Stevens  alongside  of  such  thinkers  as  Nietzsche  and 
(the  later)  Heidegger  and  shows  how  the  poet  came  to  regard  the  shaking  of  the 
metaphysical  foundations  as  a  gift  offering  the  possibility  for  poetry. LIST  OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The  following  abbreviated  titles  are  used  throughout  the  thesis  to  refer  to  the 
works  of  Wallace  Stevens. 
CP  The  Collected  Poems  (1990) 
OP  Opus  Posthumous:  Poems,  Plays,  Prose  (1990) 
NA  The  NecessaryAngel:  Essays  on  Reality  and  the  Imagination  (1951) 
L  Letters  of  Wallace  Stevens  (1967) Fore-Thoughts 
Throw  away  the  lights,  the  definitions, 
And  say  of  what  you  see  in  the  dark 
That  it  is  this  or  that  it  is  that, 
But  do  not  use  the  rotted  names. 
from  The  Man  with  the  Blue  Guitar  (CP 183) 
Little  existed  for  him  but  the  few  things 
For  which  a  fresh  name  always  occurred... 
from  "Local  Objects"  (OP  137) 
The  death  of  one  god  is  the  death  of  all. 
Let  purple  Phoebus  lie  in  umber  harvest, 
Let  Phoebus  slumber  and  die  in  autumn  umber, 
Phoebus  is  dead,  ephebe.  But  Phoebus  was 
A  name  for  something  that  never  could  be  named. 
There  was  a  project  for  the  sun  and  is. 
There  is  a  project  for  the  sun.  The  sun 
Must  bear  no  name,  gold  flourisher,  but  be 
In  the  difficulty  of  what  it  is  to  be. 
from  Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction  (CP  381) Preface 
"The  lack  of  foundations  is  the  way  of  love...  " 
John  Caputo' 
"And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love?  " 
Stevens  (CP  380) 
Is  Stevens  still,  as  Harold  Bloom  suggested  in  his  monograph  of  1977,  the  poet  of 
our  climate?  Or  has  there  been  a  dramatic  change  in  climate  since  then?  It  was 
also  in  the  1970s  that  Robert  N.  Bellah  claimed  Stevens  to  be  the  greatest 
American  `theological  poet'  of  the  twentieth  century  and  argued  that  his  poetry 
offered  meditations  on  living  without  belief-indeed,  living  "beyond  belief'-in 
an  age  characterised  by  disbelief.  But  the  question  is  do  we  share  the  anxiety  of 
disbelief  that  so  pervaded  the  twentieth  century  or  has  time  brought  something 
else?  And  if  Stevens'  poetry  is  centred  on  a  crisis  of  faith  that  we  no  longer  share, 
can  the  poems  still  speak  to  us  in  some  way?  Perhaps  we  have  gotten  better  at 
living  with  our  disbelief  in  more  recent  years,  embracing  it,  understanding  it  as  a 
good  thing.  Having  overthrown  our  certitude  we  have  found  freedom  in  not 
`knowing'  and  in  not  needing  to  `know'  in  some  final  way.  The  shift  from 
Modernism  to  Postmodernism  is  characterised  by  this  gradual  movement  from  a 
sense  of  crisis  and  anxiety  to  one  of  calm  acceptance. 
Over  the  last  couple  of  decades,  there  have  been  those  who  have  wanted  to  fix 
Stevens  in  time,  to  place  him  on  the  shelf  of  High  Modernism  and  look  upon  his 
poems  as  relics  of  a  bygone  era.  But  is  this  right?  Do  Stevens'  poems  belong 
only  to  the  past?  The  poet  himself  thought  there  would  come  a  day  when  his 
poems  would  be  nothing  but  dry  bones  left  over  from  another  time: 
1  John  Caputo,  The  Mystical  Element  in  Heidegger's  Thought  (New  York:  Fordham 
University  Press,  1986  ),  p.  xxi. 
6 Children  picking  up  our  bones 
Will  never  know  that  these  were  once 
As  quick  as  foxes  on  the  hill; 
And  that  in  autumn,  when  the  grapes 
Made  sharp  air  sharper  by  their  smell 
These  had  a  being,  breathing  frost....  (CP  158-59) 
I  would  argue,  however,  that  Stevens'  poems  are  not  yet  ready  to  be  handed  over 
to  those  literary  archaeologists  excavating  Modernity.  They  still  have  some  life 
left  in  them  for  the  contemporary  reader  who  would  respect  them  enough  to  allow 
them  not  to  be  `toe-tagged'  with  the  label  `Modernism'. 
Although  he  lived  in  an  age  that  saw  the  shaking  of  the  metaphysical 
foundations,  Stevens  did  not  cry  out  against  the  inevitable  changes  that  were 
brought  about  by  this  `earthquake',  as  Nietzsche  called  it.  In  fact,  he  gradually 
came  to  understand  this  loss  of  belief  to  be  a  good  thing  and  his  poetry  points  to 
the  liberation  he  experienced  in  living  without  a  `doctrine'.  Though  Stevens  has 
been  hailed  as  the  poet  who  best  captures  the  climate  of  the  mid  to  late  twentieth 
century,  I  believe  he  can  also  be  a  poet  for  our  Postmodem  age  (if  we  must  use 
labels)  inasmuch  as  he  allows  the  question  of  belief  to  remain  open-ended. 
Much  has  been  made  of  Stevens'  alleged  deathbed  conversion  to  Roman 
Catholicism  in  recent  years,  a  subject  I  have  chosen  not  to  address  in  the  chapters 
that  follow.  I  have  chosen  not  to  address  it  not  because  I  think  that  it  is 
implausible-on  the  contrary,  I  think  it  quite  likely.  Rather,  I  do  not  wish  to  do 
what  others  who  have  written  on  the  religious  in  Stevens  have  done,  that  is,  read 
the  experience  into  the  poetry.  Charles  M.  Murphy  (Wallace  Stevens:  A  Spiritual 
Poet  in  a  Secular  Age,  1997)  and  Janet  McCann  (Wallace  Stevens  Revisited:  The 
Celestial  Possible,  1995)  are  both  guilty  of  doing  precisely  this.  They  appear  to 
read  Stevens  backwards:  they  take  as  their  starting  point  the  conversion 
7 experience  and  read  the  poetry  with  it  in  mind,  doing  a  disservice  to  Stevens' 
ouvre.  McCann  states  at  the  beginning  of  her  monograph  that  "the  desire  for 
transcendence  [...  ]  runs  from  his  first  to  his  last  poems  and  is  a  part  of  the 
impulse  in  him  that  made  him  join  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  during  his  last 
illness.  "  And  she  makes  the  further  mistake  of  asserting  that  the  "nostalgia  for  lost 
truths  and  the  desire  for  a  replacement  metaphysic  are  the  motive  for  the  entire 
work,  from  Harmonium  onward,  "2  an  idea  that  I  argue  firmly  against  in  the  pages 
that  follow. 
So  what  are  we  to  make  of  Stevens'  alleged  conversion  experience?  It  seems 
to  me  that  a  responsible  way  of  thinking  about  it  is  to  consider  it  his  last  great 
`poem',  or  rather  his  last  great  experience  of  poetry,  the  only  poetic  act  of  which 
he  was  capable  as  he  lay  incapacitated  in  his  hospital  bed  unable  to  read  and 
write.  I  cannot  help  but  think  that  Stevens  had  Blaise  Pascal  in  mind  when  he 
partook  of  the  sacrament  as  death  encroached.  In  his  essay  "Imagination  as 
Value"  Stevens  writes  of  Pascal's  own  deathbed  experience  and  claims  that  "in 
the  very  act  of  dying,  he  had  clung  to  what  he  himself  had  called  the  delusive 
faculty",  the  imagination  (NA  135).  Stevens  quotes  Pascal's  sister  who  gives  an 
account  of  her  brother's  last  hours  when  he  experienced  a  violent  convulsion. 
She  writes, 
God,  who  wished  to  reward  a  desire  so  fervent  and  so  just,  suspended  this 
convulsion  as  by  a  miracle  and  restored  his  judgment  completely  as  in  the 
perfection  of  his  health,  in  a  manner  that  the  parish  priest,  entering  into  his 
room  with  the  sacrament,  cried  to  him:  `Here  is  he  whom  you  have  so  much 
desired.  '  These  words  completely  roused  him  and  as  the  priest  approached  to 
give  him  communion,  he  made  an  effort,  he  raised  himself  half  way  without 
help  to  receive  it  with  more  respect;  and  the  priest  having  interrogated  him, 
following  the  custom,  on  the  principal  mysteries  of  the  faith,  he  responded 
distinctly:  `Yes,  monsieur,  I  believe  all  that  with  all  my  heart.  '  Then  he 
received  the  sacred  wafer  and  extreme  unction  with  feelings  so  tender  that  he 
2  Janet  McCann,  Wallace  Stevens  Revisited:  The  Celestial  Possible  (New  York:  Twayne 
Publishers,  1995),  p.  1. 
8 poured  out  tears.  He  replied  to  everything,  thanked  the  priest  and  as  the  priest 
blessed  him  with  the  holy  ciborium,  he  said,  `Let  God  never  forsake  me.  ' 
(NA,  135) 
Clearly  Stevens  was  struck  by  the  power  of  this  scene,  and  it  may  well  be  that  he 
remembered  it  in  his  last  days,  as  he  clung  to  that  faculty  that  had  sustained  him 
all  his  life,  the  imagination. 
Stevens,  I  argue,  was  religious  without  a  definitive  object  of  religion,  unless 
that  object  was  poetry.  Poetry,  with  its  "intricate  evasions  of  as",  was  the  one 
constant  in  his  life  and  it  was  to  poetry  that  he  was  whole-heartedly  devoted  even 
in  the  days  leading  up  to  his  death.  In  the  pages  that  follow,  I  explore  Stevens' 
life-long  love  affair  with  poetry  and  consider  how  this  love  affair  was  able  to 
flourish  in  an  age  of  disbelief. 
9 Chapter  One:  An  Earth-Bound  Poetics 
To  live  in  the  world  of  creation-to  get  into  it  and  stay  in  it-to  frequent  it 
and  haunt  it--to  think  intensely  and  fruitfully-to  woo  combinations  and 
inspirations  into  being  by  a  depth  and  continuity  of  attention  and  meditation- 
this  is  the  only  thing. 
Henry  James,  as  quoted  by  Stevens  (L  506) 
...  the  great  poems  of  heaven  and  hell  have  been  written  and  the  great  poem  of 
the  earth  remains  to  be  written. 
from  "Imagination  as  Value"  (NA  142) 
...  content,  /  At  last,  there,  when  it  turns  out  to  be  here. 
from  "Crude  Foyer"  (CP  305) 
Wallace  Stevens  was  one  of  the  great  `religious'  poets  of  the  twentieth  century, 
though  not  in  the  conventional  sense.  He  was,  we  might  say,  religiously  agnostic, 
whole-heartedly  devoted  to  the  question  of  the  possibility  for  belief  and  to  the 
writing  of  poems  that  were  "Hymns  of  the  struggle  of  the  idea  of  god".  Such 
hymns  were  written  in  celebration  of  the  difficulty  of  living  in  the  everyday  world 
and  of  the  struggle  to  find  "God  in  the  object  itself'  (CP  475).  Like  "Professor 
Eucalyptus  of  New  Haven"  who  sought  God  "in  New  Haven  with  an  eye  that  does 
not  look  beyond  the  object",  Stevens'  search  for  God  did  not  stretch  beyond  his 
immediate  habitation.  Either  God  could  be  found  there  in  New  Haven  under  the 
roof  of  his  own  home  or else  not  at  all. 
Living  `locally'  as  he  did  in  "a  world  without  heaven  to  follow",  Stevens 
developed  an  earthly  poetics  reflecting  a  desire  to  find  in  the  everyday  world  of 
his  habitation  the  miraculous  in  the  mundane.  3  That  is  not  to  say,  however,  that 
3Charles  M.  Murphy,  Wallace  Stevens:  A  Spiritual  Poet  in  a  Secular  Age  (New  York:  Paulist 
Press,  1997),  p.  84.  Murphy  writes,  "It  is  a  perennial  human  tendency  to  confuse  the  divine  with 
the  extraordinary  and  miraculous,  those  exceptional  moments  when  God  'intervenes'  in  human 
10 he  rejected  notions  of  heaven  altogether;  rather  he  found  a  way  of  including 
heaven  as  a  part  of  earth.  In  a  journal  entry  dated  August  1902  when  he  was  yet  a 
young  man  in  his  early  twenties,  Stevens  wrote, 
Last  night  I  spent  an  hour  in  the  dark  transept  of  St  Patrick's  Cathedral  where 
I  go  now  and  then  in  my  more  lonely  moods.  An  old  argument  with  me  is  that 
the  true  religious  force  in  the  world  is  not  the  church  but  the  world  itself:  the 
mysterious  callings  of  Nature  and  our  responses.  What  incessant  murmurs  fill 
that  ever-laboring,  tireless  church!  But  to-day  in  my  walk  I  thought  that  after 
all  there  is  no  conflict  of  forces  but  rather  a  contrast.  In  the  cathedral  I  felt 
one  presence;  on  the  highway  I  felt  another.  Two  different  deities  presented 
themselves....  The  priest  in  me  worshipped  one  God  at  one  shrine;  the  poet 
another  God  at  another  shrine. 
Already  in  these  early  reflections  is  a  hint  of  what  would  become  Stevens'  poetic 
motif:  how  to  find  religious  satisfaction  in  "the  world  itself'.  To  experience  such 
satisfaction  for  Stevens  required  overcoming  this  perception  of  division  between 
the  forces  of  heaven  and  earth,  a  division  that  is  overcome  when  he  eventually 
acknowledges  that  "the  idea  of  heaven  is  [...  ]  merely  an  idea  of  the  earth"  (L 
464). 
Charles  M.  Murphy  believes  that  "heaven  could  not  be  heaven  for  [Stevens] 
unless  it  included  earths4  but  perhaps  it  is  more  accurate  to  say  that  earth  could 
not  be  earth  for  him  unless  it  included  heaven.  Only  by  incorporating  the  two 
could  the  poet  find  the  religious  satisfactions  of  the  everyday  as  he  experienced 
them  at  home  on  ordinary  evenings  in  Connecticut.  5  For  it  was 
affairs.  There  is  beneath  this  tendency  a  great  alienation--from  oneself  and  from  the  world  we 
inhabit  every  day.  'Real'  life,  our  true  home,  is  perceived  to  be  somewhere  else,  literally  'out  of 
this  world.  '  It  was  this  distortion  of  religion  that  Wallace  Stevens  explicitly  rejected.  'I  am  a 
native  in  this  world  /  And  think  in  it  as  a  native  thinks,  '  Stevens  declares.  Somehow  God  must  be 
found  in  the  ordinary  events  of  everyday  life,  in  a  'nice  shady  home'  'and  daughters  with  curls'  as 
Crispin  [the  protagonist  of  one  of  Stevens'  poems]  discovered  at  the  end  of  his  journey  around  the 
world  in  the  deliberately  homely  description  Stevens  chooses.  Every  day  must  be  miraculous. 
4  Ibid,  p.  38. 
s  "For  Wallace  Stevens,  the  imagination,  after  its  most  adventurous  and  extravagant  flights,  always 
returned  to  its  natural  home  in  the  ordinary  setting  of  Hartford,  Connecticut.  The  ordinary, 
Stevens  believed,  is  always  what  one  makes  of  it,  and  Stevens'  poetic  energy  was  released  in  his 
response  to  an  ordinary  world,  "  writes  Robert  Pack  in  Wallace  Stevens  (New  Jersey:  Rutgers 
University  Press,  1958),  p.  xiii. 
11 Here  in  his  house  and  in  his  room, 
In  his  chair,  the  most  tranquil  thought  grew  peaked 
And  the  oldest  and  the  warmest  heart  was  cut 
By  gallant  notions  on  the  part  of  night- 
Both  late  and  alone,  above  the  crickets'  chords, 
Babbling,  each  one,  the  uniqueness  of  its  sound. 
There  was  no  fury  in  transcendent  forms. 
But  his  actual  candle  blazed  with  artifice.  ("A  Quiet  Normal  Life",  CP  523) 
In  leading  a  quiet  normal  life  among  the  actual  objects  of  home,  Stevens  sought 
the  religious  fulfilments  available  merely  in  living  as  and  where  he  lived. 
And  yet  being  at  home  in  the  everyday  world  was  not  always  easy  for  a  man 
who  could  not  escape  "The  swarm  of  thoughts,  the  swarm  of  dreams  /  Of 
inaccessible  Utopia"  (CP  179).  For  although  he  claimed  that  "It  was  in  the  earth 
only  /  That  he  was  at  the  bottom  of  things  /  And  of  himself'  (CP  236),  he  was  still 
filled  with  desire  for  the  inaccessible  utopias  of  his  imagination.  How  to 
reconcile  this  longing  for  utopian  perfection  with  an  insistence  on  the  sufficiency 
of  the  quotidian?  Stevens  manages  this  by  insisting  that  the  abstractions  of  the 
imagination  are  themselves  a  part  of  earth  and,  as  such,  are  mutable,  subject  to  the 
changing  emotional  climates  of  the  mind.  In  his  poetry,  Stevens  often  expresses  a 
longing  to  reach  utopian  perfection,  to  arrive  at  a  point  of  completion  where 
everything,  including  the  mind,  is  still;  nevertheless,  he  recognises  and  even 
celebrates  the  impossibility  of  ever  arriving  at  some  idealised,  motionless  `still- 
point'. 
Stevens'  struggle  to  be  `at  home'  in  an  endlessly  changing  world  is  ultimately 
a  struggle  for  place.  Throughout  his  life  Stevens  was  involved  in  a  turbulent  love 
affair  with  place,  an  all-consuming  affair  from  which  he  could  not  extract  himself. 
In  an  astonishing  admission  regarding  his  love  of  place,  Stevens  revealed  that, 
12 "Life  is  an  affair  of  people  not  of  places.  But  for  me  life  is  an  affair  of  places  and 
that  is  the  trouble"  (OP  185).  That  Stevens  considered  this  love  affair  to  be 
`trouble'  is  particularly  interesting.  One  wonders  if  it  was  an  obsession  that 
interfered  with  other  areas  of  his  life. 
The  on-going  quest  to  be  at  home  in  the  world  was  for  Stevens  a  religious 
pursuit  as  he  struggled  to  find  a  way  of  inhabiting  this  ever-changing,  imperfect, 
contingent,  `centerless'  world  without  resorting  to  doctrines  that  attempt  to  still 
the  motion.  This  struggle  for  `place'  in  a  perpetually  changing  world  that  has  no 
centre  is  something  Stevens  grapples  with  over  and  over  in  his  poems.  Sometimes 
it  is  expressed  as  a  yearning  for  an  impossible  centre-point,  a  yearning  that 
borders  on  despair,  and  at  other  times  it  is  expressed  as  a  celebration  of  transience 
and  motion.  Either  way  it  provides  him  with  endless  material  for  poetry. 
We  have  only  to  note  the  titles  of  the  poems  to  see  the  importance  that  `place' 
and  `placelessness'  hold  for  Stevens:  "The  Hermitage  at  the  Center,  "  "Life  is 
Motion,  "  "Nomad  Exquisite",  "Description  Without  Place",  "The  Search  for 
Sound  Free  from  Motion",  to  mention  but  a  few.  In  one  of  his  earlier  poems, 
"The  Place  of  the  Solitaires",  Stevens  insists  on  the  necessity  of  motion, 
especially  the  ceaseless  motion  of  thought: 
Let  the  place  of  the  solitaires 
Be  a  place  of  perpetual  undulation. 
Whether  it  be  in  mid-sea 
On  the  dark,  green  water-wheel, 
Or  on  the  beaches 
There  must  be  no  cessation 
Of  motion,  or  of  the  noise  of  motion, 
The  renewal  of  noise 
And  manifold  continuation; 
And,  most,  of  the  motion  of  thought 
And  its  restless  iteration, 
13 In  the  place  of  the  solitaires, 
Which  is  to  be  a  place  of  perpetual  undulation.  (CP  60) 
Many  have  commented  on  the  emphasis  on  `place'  in  Stevens,  as  Barbara  M. 
Fisher  does  in  her  chapter  "Love  of  Place"  in  Wallace  Stevens:  The  Intensest 
Rendezvous.  She  writes, 
Apart  from  the  romantic  value  accorded  to  particular  locations-at  times  to 
the  planet  itself-one  finds  aspects  of  place  multiplying  on  every  page  of  the 
poetry.  The  notion  of  place  is  all  over  the  place  in  Stevens,  and  it  becomes 
infinitely  interpretable  if  place  can  be  defined  as  `here  and  now  /  And  where 
we  live  and  everywhere  we  live.  '6 
`Place'  is for  Stevens  "everywhere  we  live",  whether  it  be  in  the  familiar  rooms  of 
home  or  in  the  imaginative  recesses  of  the  mind.  With  his  nomadic  imagination, 
Stevens  covered  vast  distances,  explored  unknown  worlds  and  faraway  places, 
always  to  return  to  the  familiar  comforts  of  home: 
How  good  it  was  at  home  again  at  night 
To  prepare  for  bed,  in  the  frame  of  the  house,  and  move 
Round  the  rooms,  which  do  not  ever  seem  to  change... 
For  him  all  places  had  something  to  offer,  whether  they  provided  the  ecstatic 
enlargements  experienced  in  a  "world  washed  in  his  imagination"  (CP 179)  or  the 
quieter,  more  sedate  pleasures  he  found  wandering  round  the  rooms  of  his  house. 
The  sense  of  inward  and  outward  places  is  intentionally  blurred  in  Stevens' 
poems  so  that  we  are  often  unsure  whether  he  is  describing  an  adventure  of  the 
imagination  or  merely  "a  walk  around  a  lake".  In  fact,  Stevens  comes  to 
recognise  that  all  places  are  part  of  the  geography  of  the  mind  and  that  no  place 
can  remain  untouched  by  the  imagination.  Even  `home'  is  often  described  as  a 
hotel  rather  than  a  permanent  residence  because  it  is  ever-changing  through  the 
transformations  of  the  imagination. 
6Barbara  M.  Fisher,  Wallace  Stevens:  The  Intensest  Rendezvous  (Charlottesville:  University  Press 
of  Virginia,  1990),  p.  108. 
14 The  quest  for  place  in  our  world  of  perpetual  motion  has  long  been  understood 
to  be  a  religious  pursuit.  Mircea  Eliade  states  that,  "Religious  man,  has  always 
sought  to  fix  his  abode  at  the  `center  of  the  world.  ""  7  For  Christianity,  the 
tradition  in  which  Stevens  grew  up,  that  centre  is  imaged  in  Christ.  But  leaving 
his  Christian  heritage  behind,  claiming  its  irrelevance  for  the  modern  world, 
Stevens  is  interested  not  in  fixing  a  centre  point,  but  in  living  with  the  desire  for 
an  impossible  centre.  The  desire  for  an  elusive  middle  point,  the  yearning  for  a 
place  in  which  to  dwell  perpetually,  is  often  a  subject  for  his  poems. 
It  would  be  enough 
If  we  were  ever,  just  once,  at  the  middle,  fixed 
In  This  Beautiful  World  of  Ours  and  not  as  now, 
Helplessly  at  the  edge,  enough  to  be 
Complete,  because  at  the  middle,  if  only  in  sense, 
And  in  that  enormous  sense,  merely  enjoy  (CP,  430). 
His  poetry  expresses  a  restless  desire  to  be  at  home  in  the  world,  a  desire  that  he 
acknowledges  can  never  be  satisfied;  for  this  supreme  fiction  of  an  eternal  home 
or  central  dwelling  place  for  which  Stevens-and  perhaps  all  of  us-yearns  is 
unattainable. 
This  inability  to  be  finally  situated,  to  be  finally  `in  place',  in  a  world  that 
never  comes  to  rest,  is  the  subject  of  "Somnabulisma": 
On  an  old  shore,  the  vulgar  ocean  rolls 
Noiselessly,  noiselessly,  resembling  a  thin  bird, 
That  thinks  of  settling,  yet  never  settles,  on  a  nest. 
The  wings  keep  spreading  and  yet  are  never  wings. 
The  claws  keep  scratching  on  the  shale,  the  shallow  shale, 
7  Mircea  Eliade,  The  Sacred  and  the  Profane:  The  Nature  of  Religion,  trans.  Willard  R.  Trask 
(New  York:  Harcourt,  1957),  p.  22  as  cited  by  Fisher,  p.  115.  Fisher  explains,  "...  for  Eliade  the 
plane  of  human  existence  suffers  precisely  from  `homogeneity,  '  while  sacred  space  implies  a  fixed 
point,  or  center,  that  serves  to  orient  man  to  his  cosmos.  It  is,  however,  Eliade's  focus  that  casts 
some  light  on  Stevens's  repeated  references  to  `the  centre  that  I  seek.  '  `Religious  man,  '  says 
Eliade,  `has  always  sought  to  fix  his  abode  at  the  `center  of  the  world.  '  If  the  world  is  to  be  lived 
in,  it  must  be  founded-and  no  world  can  come  to  birth  in  the  chaos  of  the  homogeneity  and 
relativity  of  profane  space.  The  discovery  or  projection  of  a  fixed  point-the  center-is 
equivalent  to  the  creation  of  the  world,  "'  pp.  114-115. 
15 The  sounding  shallow,  until  by  water  washed  away. 
The  generations  of  the  bird  are  all 
By  water  washed  away.  They  follow  after. 
They  follow,  follow,  follow,  in  water  washed  away  (CP  304). 
Nothing  stays.  All  is  in  motion,  subject  to  the  decay  of  time.  "In  describing  the 
bird's  vain  attempts  to  settle  on  a  nest  precariously  located  by  a  turbulent 
seashore,  the  text  [...  ]  underscores  life's  lack  of  repose.  "8  There  is  a  sadness  in 
such  impermanence  and  yet, 
Without  this  bird  that  never  settles,  without 
Its  generations  that  follow  in  their  universe, 
The  ocean,  falling  and  falling  on  the  hollow  shore, 
Would  be  a  geography  of  the  dead:  not  of  that  land 
To  which  they  may  have  gone,  but  of  the  place  in  which 
They  lived,  in  which  they  lacked  a  pervasive  being, 
In  which  no  scholar,  separately  dwelling, 
Poured  forth  the  fine  fins,  the  gawky  beaks,  the  personalia, 
Which,  as  a  man  feeling  everything,  were  his. 
This  bird  that  never  settles  is  a  "type  of  the  ideal  scholar,  who,  too,  has  not 
retreated  to  a  separate  dwelling  inland  but  has  affirmed  the  pervasiveness  of 
being's  lack"  experienced  there  on  the  "boundary  between  sea  and  land.  "9  Here 
on  the  edge,  in  a  place  somewhere  in  between  being  and  non-being,  life  and 
death,  wakefulness  and  sleep  (as  the  title  suggests),  the  scholar  /  poet  "has  been 
able  to  withstand,  indeed  to  thrive  in,  existential  indeterminanc  "10 
To  be  able  to  thrive  in  existential  indeterminancy,  to  allow  the  question  of 
place  to  be  just  that-a  question-there  must  be  a  shift  away  from  an  aggressive 
epistemological  pursuit  of  place  to  a  more  open-ended  phenomenological  inquiry 
8  David  Jarraway,  Wallace  Stevens  and  the  Question  of  Belief.  "  Metaphysician  in  the  Dark  (Baton 
Rouge:  Louisiana  State  University,  1993),  p.  181. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
16 of  the  world.  That  is  to  say,  there  must  be  an  openness  to  discovering  the 
environment  through  the  senses  rather  than  imposing  an  order  upon  the  world.  In 
"Landscape  with  Boat""  Stevens  demonstrates  the  futility  of  striving  `to  know' 
and  reveals  the  greater  satisfactions  experienced  in  engaging  with  the  world 
through  sensory  perception. 
An  anti-master  man,  floribunda  ascetic. 
He  brushed  away  the  thunder,  then  the  clouds, 
Then  the  colossal  illusion  of  heaven.  Yet  still 
The  sky  was  blue.  He  wanted  imperceptible  air. 
He  wanted  to  see.  He  wanted  the  eye  to  see 
And  not  be  touched  by  blue.  He  wanted  to  know, 
A  naked  man  who  regarded  himself  in  the  glass 
Of  air,  who  looked  for  the  world  beneath  the  blue, 
Without  blue,  without  any  turquoise  tint  or  phase, 
Any  azure  under-side  or after-color.  Nabob 
Of  bones,  he  rejected,  he  denied,  to  arrive 
At  the  neutral  centre,  the  ominous  element, 
The  single-colored,  colorless,  primitive. 
It  was  not  as  if  the  truth  lay  where  he  thought, 
Like  a  phantom,  in  an  uncreated  night. 
It  was  easier  to  think  it  lay  there.  If 
It  was  nowhere  else,  it  was  there  and  because 
It  was  nowhere  else,  its  place  had  to  be  supposed, 
Itself  had  to  be  supposed,  a  thing  supposed 
In  a  place  supposed,  a  thing  that  he  reached 
In  a  place  that  he  reached,  by  rejecting  what  he  saw 
And  denying  what  he  heard.  He  would  arrive. 
He  had  only  not  to  live,  to  walk  in  the  dark, 
To  be  projected  by  one  void  into 
11  In  this  poem  and  in  the  later  "Prologues  to  What  is  Possible"  from  The  Rock,  Stevens  may  be 
alluding  to  sections  from  Descartes'  The  Principles  of  Philosophy  concerning  ideas  of  internal  and 
external  place.  In  section  13  of  Principles,  Descartes  notes,  "as  we  regard  different  bodies  we 
may  find  that  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time  changes  its  place,  and  does  not  change  it.  For 
example,  if  we  consider  a  man  seated  at  the  stern  of  a  vessel  when  it  is  carried  out  to  sea,  he  may 
be  said  to  be  in  one  place  if  we  regard  parts  of  the  vessel  with  which  he  preserves  the  same 
situation:  and  yet  he  will  found  continually  to  change  his  position,  if  regard  to  be  paid  to  the 
neighbouring  shores  in  relation  to  which  he  is  constantly  receding  from  one,  and  approaching 
another.  And  further,  if  we  suppose  that  the  earth  moves,  and  that  it  makes  precisely  the  same 
way  from  west  to  east  as  the  vessel  does  from  east  to  west,  it  will  appear  to  us  that  he  who  is 
seated  at  the  stern  does  not  change  his  position,  because  that  place  is  determined  by  certain 
immovable  points  which  we  imagine  to  be  in  the  heavens.  But  if  at  length  we  are  persuaded  that 
there  are  no  points  in  the  universe  that  are  really  immovable,  as  will  presently  be  shown  to  be 
probable,  we  shall  conclude  that  there  is  nothing  that  has  a  permanent  place  except  in  so  far  as  it 
is  fixed  by  our  thought"  (emphasis  added).  The  Essential  Descartes,  edited  by  Margaret  D.  Wilson 
(New  York:  Meridian,  1976),  p.  341.  In  "Landscape  with  Boat"  Stevens  denies  this  idea  of  ever 
be  able  to  arrive  at  a  permanent  place  fixed  by  the  mind,  for  even  the  simplest  acts  of  living- 
sitting,  watching,  observing-make  such  an  epistemological  arrival  impossible. 
17 Another.  (CP  242) 
The  "anti-master  man"  may  well  be  Stevens  himself,  a  parody  of  his  own  desire 
to  see,  to  know,  and  to  `arrive'.  He  would  arrive  at  the  longed-for,  transparent, 
"neutral  centre".  It  was  easy-"he  had  only  not  to  live.  "  He  had  only  to  reject 
what  he  saw,  to  deny  what  he  heard.  In  short,  to  reach  the  point  of  arrival,  he  had 
only  to  stop  living  in  a  physical  world.  Above  all  else,  Stevens  wants  to  find  a 
way  to  live  in  the  ever-revolving  physical  world  and  to  make  himself  at  home 
there  among  the  changing  seasons.  But  how  to  make  oneself  at  home  in  a  place 
that  never  stands  still,  how  to  satiate  the  need  for  `arrival'?  The  "anti-master 
man,  floribunda  ascetic"  in  spite  of  all  his  efforts  to  arrive  at  a  neutral  centre  is 
doomed  to  fail  because,  as  Bonnie  Costello  says,  his  "`supposed'  space  is  not 
habitable.  " 
In  his  preoccupation  with  intellectually  `arriving'  (his  journey  at  sea  supported 
by  a  boat  he  will  not  acknowledge),  he  refuses  to  `live'  and  refuses  the 
emotional  arrivals  available  to  him.  2 
It  is  only  at  the  end  of  the  poem  that  Stevens  provides  us  with  an  alternative  to  the 
strivings  of  the  "anti-master  man". 
Had  he  been  better  able  to  suppose: 
He  might  sit  on  a  sofa  on  a  balcony 
Above  the  Mediterranean,  emerald 
Becoming  emeralds.  He  might  watch  the  palms 
Flap  green  ears  in  the  heat.  He  might  observe 
A  yellow  wine  and  follow  a  steamer's  track 
And  say,  "The  thing  I  hum  appears  to  be 
The  rhythm  of  this  celestial  pantomime.  "  (CP  243) 
Rather  than  searching  for  a  centre  beyond,  above  or  beneath  the  earth,  the 
protagonist  of  this  final  stanza,  a  better  `supposer'  than  his  predecessor,  looks  to 
the  earth  itself  and  finds  satisfaction  in  the  landscape  surrounding  him.  Sitting  on 
18 a  sofa  on  a  balcony  above  the  Mediterranean,  this  figure  admires  "the  empire  of 
his  eye  in  which  description  becomes  revelation,  adjective  noun,  `emerald  / 
Becoming  emeralds.  ""3  Writes  Costello, 
Appearances  alone  (not  nature  or  metaphysics)  declare  the  legitimacy  of  his 
reign.  If  the  ascetic  was  the  anti-master  man,  this  latter  figure  is  no  Old 
Master  but  a  different  kind  of  modernist.  His  empire  of  the  eye  has  an  ironic 
element  as  `the  palms  /  Flap  green  ears  in  the  heat.  '  But  he  is  imaginatively 
engaged  with  his  surroundings.  The  boat  (perhaps  carrying  the  baseless  anti- 
master-man)  enters  the  landscape  of  this  beholder  to  break  his  solipsism.  It 
reminds  us  of  another  perspective,  another  form  of  engagement,  its  wake 
another  impression  of  reality.  The  two  figures  in  `Landscape  with  Boat,  '  then 
represent  a  choice  not  between  objectivism  and  solipsism,  but  between  the 
deluded  quest  for  transparence  that  leaves  us  at  sea  and  a  creative  involvement 
with  environment  that  affords  aesthetic  satisfaction  but  owns  up  to  its  limits.  14 
The  "deluded  quest  for  transparence"  is but  an  intellectual  pursuit  for  an  absolute 
that  necessitates  the  denial  of  what  can  be  seen,  heard  and  felt.  And  though 
Stevens  at  times  catches  himself  desiring  that  "single-colored,  colorless, 
primitive",  he  admits  that,  "We  never  arrive  intellectually.  But  emotionally  we 
arrive  constantly.  "  (OP  198)  The  emotional  arrivals  that  provide  aesthetic 
satisfaction  come  about  through  an  on-going  engagement  with  one's  environment. 
There  are  times  when  Stevens  feels  that  he  has  `arrived'  and  writes  of  the 
satisfaction  he  experiences  in  this  sense  of  having  reached  the  unattainable 
middle,  as  he  does  at  the  start  of  "Credences  of  Summer"  (CP  372): 
Now  in  midsummer  come  and  all  fools  slaughtered 
And  spring's  infuriations  over  and  a  long  way 
To  the  first  autumnal  inhalations,  young  broods 
Are  in  the  grass,  the  roses  are  heavy  with  a  weight 
Of  fragrance  and  the  mind  lays  by  its  trouble. 
12  Bonnie  Costello,  "Wallace  Stevens:  The  Adequacy  of  Landscape",  The  Wallace  Stevens 
Journal  17.2  (Fall  1993):  214. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
19 Reflection  ceases  and  the  mind  is  stilled,  or  so  it  seems.  "Change  is  not  arrested 
but  forgotten,  though  the  mind's  acquiescence  in  brief  fixity  is  real.  "  15  It  is  a 
religious  moment,  this  `now'  of  midsummer,  as  he  feels  himself  released  from  the 
restlessness  of  thought  and  perceives  himself  to  have  arrived  at  the  `centre', 
between  spring's  "infuriations"  and  autumn's  "inhalations".  This  perceived 
middle-point  is  a  state  of  (seeming)  emotional  blankness,  the  same  state  conveyed 
in  "A  Clear  Day  and  No  Memories"  (OP  138-139). 
No  soldiers  in  the  scenery, 
No  thoughts  of  people  now  dead, 
As  they  were  fifty  years  ago: 
Young  and  living  in  a  live  air, 
Young  and  walking  in  the  sunshine, 
Bending  in  blue  dresses  to  touch  something- 
Today  the  mind  is  not  part  of  the  weather. 
Today  the  air  is  clear  of  everything. 
It  has  no  knowledge  except  of  nothingness 
And  it  flows  over  us  without  meanings, 
As  if  none  of  us  had  ever  been  here  before 
And  are  not  here  now:  in  this  shallow  spectacle, 
This  invisible  activity,  this  sense. 
The  word  "Today"  is  positioned  purposefully  in  the  middle  of  the  poem  and 
functions  much  like  the  "Now"  of  "Credences".  Time  seems  to  have  come  to  a 
halt.  All  is  suspended.  The  mind  at  this  moment  is  not  "part  of  the  weather",  that 
is,  it  is  as  if  it  were  not  susceptible  to  the  ever-changing  climates  of  emotion. 
But  this  sense  of  having  `arrived'  is  fleeting.  The  first  stanza  of  "Credences" 
ends  with  "the  mind  lays  by  its  trouble"  indicating  a  cessation  of  thought,  but 
already  by  the  beginning  of  the  second  stanza  the  mind  is  once  again  engaged  in 
reflection:  "Now  the  mind  lays  by  its  trouble  and  considers.  /  The  fidgets  of 
remembrance  come  to  this.  "  The  meditative  or  mystical  state  is interrupted  by  the 
"fidgets  of  remembrance.  "  For  Stevens  the  "mind  can  never  be  satisfied.  Never.  " 
15  George  S.  Lensing,  Wallace  Stevens  and  the  Seasons  (Baton  Rouge:  Louisiana  State  University 
20 Therefore,  he  is  destined  to  continue  to  seek  that  centre  that  is  "a  state  of  mind,  / 
Nothing  more,  like  weather  after  it  has  cleared"  (OP  138)  all  the  while  knowing 
that  the  "fidgets  of  remembrance"  will  always  return  bringing  with  them  a  change 
in  emotional  climate. 
In  Wallace  Stevens  and  the  Seasons,  George  S.  Lensing  argues  that 
"Credences"  is  Stevens'  "happiest  poem"  and  believes  that  his 
entire  poetics  rests  upon  `Credences  of  Summer'  because  all  the  autumnal  and 
wintry  austerities  and  all  the  prologues  of  spring  were  undertaken  precisely  for 
l  the  pleasure  of  this  moment. 
There  is,  however,  little  evidence  to  support  these  claims.  First,  a  close 
examination  of  the  language  of  the  poem  indicates  that  this  is  not  at  all  a  happy 
poem;  in  fact,  it  would  seem  to  be  quite  the  opposite.  We  consider  the  second  and 
third  stanzas  from  the  first  canto: 
Now  the  mind  lays  by  its  trouble  and  considers. 
The  fidgets  of  remembrance  come  to  this. 
This  is  the  last  day  of  a  certain  year 
Beyond  which  there  is  nothing  left  of  time. 
Press,  2001),  p.  279. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  273.  Lensing  appears  to  have  neglected  to  notice  the  profound  irony  that  can  be  found 
throughout  "Credences".  Even  the  title  of  the  poem  with  its  intentional  use  of  the  plural 
undermines  Lensing's  idea  that  Stevens'  "entire  poetics  rests  upon  `Credences  of  Summer"'.  The 
whole  point  of  "Credences"  is  to  demonstrate  the  impossibility  of  arriving  at  a  final  creed  or 
belief-or  even  at  a  final  poem  upon  which  all  the  others  might  rest.  For  a  more  insightful 
consideration  of  the  poem,  we  turn  to  David  Jarraway  who  takes  note  of  the  poem's  position  in 
Transport  to  Summer.  He  comments,  "One  of  the  most  curious  aspect  of  Wallace  Stevens'  longer 
'Credences  of  Summer'  is  the  way  the  poet  has  chosen  to  position  the  text  in  the  fifth  book  of  his 
Collected  Poems.  Titularly  the  poem  is  a  rousing  invocation  to  belief  celebrated  in  credences' 
plural,  but  upon  closer  inspection  its  affirmations  become  slightly  unhinged  when  we  notice  that 
'Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction'  is  the  poem  Stevens  elected  to  close  out  that  book.  By 
installing  a  gaping  hole  (notes  toward  some  nontruth)  where  we  might  have  expected  a  sum  of  the 
parts  to  have  been  lodged,  Stevens  not  only  problematizes  severely  the  transcendence  promised  in 
the  volume's  title,  Transport  to  Summer,  but  undercuts  even  further  the  orthodox  season  naturally 
subtending  those  credences,  turning  belief  itself  into  somewhat  of  a  paradox.  "  See  Jarraway, 
p.  224.  That  Lensing  and  Jarraway  should  offer  such  distinctly  different  readings  of  this  poem  is 
not  surprising.  For  as  Bloom  notes,  "Credences"  has  always  "been  much  in  dispute  among 
critics....  "  He  says,  "there  is  something  equivocal  about  the  poem  that  stimulates  sharp 
disagreements  among  its  readers.  "  After  considering  several  readings  of  the  poem,  Bloom  informs 
us  that  he  favours  Isabel  MacCaffrey's  reading:  "Stevens  has  [...  ]  established  conditions  of 
maximum  difficulty  in  which  to  assert  the  imagination's  power.  Winter,  'the  nothing  that  is,  ' 
cannot  satisfy  us  for  long,  however  scrupulously  we  submit  to  it;  its  perfect  ineloquence  invites 
the  imagination's  additions.  But  summer  offers  a  rival  rhetoric;  its  richness  'must  comfort  the 
heart's  core,  '  its  eloquence  silences  our  speech.  "  In  Harold  Bloom's  Wallace  Stevens:  The  Poems 
of  Our  Climate  (Ithaca,  New  York:  Cornell  University  Press,  1977),  p.  243. 
21 It  comes  to  this  and  the  imagination's  life. 
There  is  nothing  more  inscribed  nor  thought  nor  felt 
And  this  must  comfort  the  heart's  core  against 
Its  false  disasters-these  fathers  standing  round, 
These  mothers  touching,  speaking,  being  near, 
These  lovers  waiting  in  the  soft  dry  grass. 
The  phrases  "last  day",  "it  comes  to  this",  "there  is  nothing  more"  and  "false 
disasters",  do  not  convey  a  positive  sense.  All  indications  are  that  having 
(seemingly)  `arrived'  at  the  longed  for  `midsummer',  Stevens  is  already 
experiencing  the  fidgets  of  discontent,  and  in  a  futile  attempt  to  grasp  the  moment 
and  hold  it  `in  place'  he  proposes  to  "Postpone  the  anatomy  of  summer",  to  put 
off  any  intellectual  analysis  of  the  moment. 
Just  like  the  anti-master  man  who  wanted  to  see  the  sky  without  the  eye  being 
"touched  by  blue",  here  Stevens  insists  on  seeing  "the  very  thing  and  nothing 
else"  without  the  evasions  of  metaphor17: 
Postpone  the  anatomy  of  summer,  as 
The  physical  pine,  the  metaphysical  pine. 
Let's  see  the  very  thing  and  nothing  else. 
Let's  see  it  with  the  hottest  fire  of  sight. 
Bum  everything  not  part  of  it  to  ash. 
Trace  the  gold  sun  about  the  whitened  sky 
17  In  a  further  blow  to  Lensing's  reading  of  this  as  Stevens'  happiest  poem,  Jarraway  writes,  "The 
poem's  quite  militant  intention  to  do  away  with  the  annoying  evasions  of  metaphor  in  order  to  get 
at  the  essential  meaning  represented  by  the  locus,  to  fix  it,  as  the  canto  goes  on  to  say,  in  'an 
eternal  foliage,  '  and  an  'arrested  peace,  '  ought  to  strike  the  reader  as  extraordinarily  contradictory 
in  a  poem  about  the  douceurs  of  summer.  Such  an  excessively  violent  reaction  given  out  by  all 
the  imperatives  (postpone,  burn,  trace,  look,  and  so  forth)  might  seem  to  be  antithetical  to  the 
pastoral  ethos  until  we  realize  that  Stevens'  text  is  not  really  about  the  pastoral  at  all,  "  in  Jarraway, 
p.  236. 
The  Nietzschean  overtones  of  much  of  Stevens'  work  (which  we  shall  examine  more  closely 
later)  is  considered  here  by  Leonard  and  Wharton  who  comment,  "Although  the  third  line 
proposes  that  we  `see  the  very  thing  and  nothing  else,  '  the  first  two  lines  have  specified  that  we 
are  not  to  `anatomize'  summer  by  breaking  it  into  `physical'  and  'metaphysical'-that  is, 
empirical  and  theoretical  /  theological,  or,  from  these,  the  'thing-in-itself'  nd  `consciousness,  '  or 
ordinary  language's  `reality'  and  `imagination'  The  'very  thing'  we  are  to  see  is  `summer,  '  which 
is  not  the  'thing  itself,  '  nor  a  literal  season,  but  a  seasonable  complex  of  thought  and  feeling  much 
like  the  `great  noon'  which  compels  Nietzsche's  Zarathustra  to  proclaim:  `Gone  is  the  hesitant 
gloom  of  my  spring!  Gone  the  malice  of  my  snowflakes  in  June!  Summer  have  I  become  entirely, 
and  summer  noon!  "'  In  J.  S.  Leonard  and  C.  E.  Wharton,  The  Fluent  Mundo:  Wallace  Stevens 
and  the  Structure  of  Reality  (Athens,  Georgia:  The  University  of  Georgia  Press,  1988),  p.  23. 
22 Without  evasion  by  a  single  metaphor. 
Look  at  it  in  its  essential  barrenness 
And  say  this,  this  is  the  centre  that  I  seek. 
Fix  it  in  an  eternal  foliage 
And  fill  the  foliage  with  arrested  peace, 
Joy  of  such  permanence,  right  ignorance 
Of  change  still  possible.  Exile  desire 
For  what  is  not.  This  is  the  barrenness 
Of  the  fertile  thing  that  can  attain  no  more. 
The  emotional  satisfactions  of  midsummer  have  already  begun  to  pass  as  the 
intellectual  faculty  attempts  to  fix  the  moment,  to  suspend  the  inevitable  change 
in  climate.  With  the  paradox  of  these  last  lines-"the  barrenness  /  Of  the  fertile 
thing"-Stevens  undoes  the  optimism  of  the  very  first  stanza  of  the  poem.  The 
lush  greenery  of  midsummer,  once  something  to  be  desired,  is  now  overgrown 
with  weeds.  It  no  longer  satisfies. 
Lensing's  argument  that  all  the  "wintry  austerities  and  all  the  prologues  of 
spring"  merely  lead  up  to  this  midsummer  moment  is  questionable  in  the  light  of 
the  fifth  canto.  Here  Stevens  wonders,  is  it  this  moment  that  makes  the  others 
significant  or  is  it  all  the  other  humdrum  days  that  make  this  one  worthwhile?  He 
first  announces, 
One  day  enriches  a  year.  One  woman  makes 
The  rest  look  down.  One  man  becomes  a  race, 
Lofty  like  him,  like  him  perpetual. 
But  then  interrupting  himself,  he  reconsiders, 
Or  do  the  other  days  enrich  this  one? 
Should  this  momentary  sense  of  `arrival'  be  privileged  over  all  other  moments? 
What  of  the  days  when  the  desired  object  remains  out  of  reach?  Are  they  not  also 
of  value?  For  a  poet  who  once  admitted  that  he  preferred  the  emotional  climates 
of  the  windy  season  of  autumn,  the  idea  of  valuing  midsummer above  the  other 
seasons,  does  not  ring  true.  In  his  repeated  affirmations  of  the  everyday  world  in 
23 which  we  live,  Stevens  demonstrates  an  appreciation  for  all  the  days  of  our  lives, 
whether  they  offer  the  joy  of  plenitude  in  lush  midsummer  or  the  sorrow  of 
vacancy  in  bleak  midwinter.  That  is  to  say,  Stevens  does  not  venerate  the 
emotional  arrivals  of  summer,  but  places  them  alongside  all  the  other  ordinary 
moments  of  our  experience.  How  different  his  attitude  is  from  that  of  his 
contemporary,  T.  S.  Eliot,  who  clearly  values  "the  still  point",  or  what  he  calls 
"Zero  summer",  over  and  above  those  everyday  moments. 
At  the  still  point  of  the  turning  world.  Neither  flesh  nor  fleshless; 
Neither  from  nor  towards;  at  the  still  point,  there  the  dance  is, 
But  neither  arrest  nor  movement.  And  do  not  call  it  fixity, 
Where  past  and  future  are  gathered.  Neither  movement  from  nor  towards, 
Neither  ascent  nor  decline.  Except  for  the  point,  the  still  point, 
There  would  be  no  dance,  and  there  is  only  the  dance.  '8 
Eliot's  assertion  that  at  "the  still  point,  there  the  dance  is"  is  indicative  of  his 
belief  in  a  world  beyond  this  one.  For  him,  there  is  a  place  where  all  is  free  from 
motion,  a  place  that  is  greater  than  the  time-bound  world  in  which  we  live.  For 
Stevens,  however,  there  is  no  outside  or  beyond.  Any  sense  of  having  arrived  at  a 
centre  point  is  just  that,  a  sense. 
Many  have  noted  an  affinity  between  Stevens'  descriptions  of  these  meditative 
states,  in  "Credences"  described  as  the  'now  of  midsummer',  and  Christian 
mysticism,  and  William  Bevis  has  even  suggested  that  Stevens  was  an  unwitting 
'$  T.  S.  Eliot,  "Burnt  Norton"  from  The  Four  Quartets.  It  must  be  acknowledged  that  there  are 
many  interpretations  of  and  attitudes  towards  Eliot's  mysticism.  In  his  preface  to  T.  S.  Eliot: 
Mystic,  Son  and  Lover  (London:  The  Athlone  Press,  1997)  Donald  J.  Childs  offers  an  excellent 
discussion  on  the  topic  and  demonstrates  how  Eliot's  mysticism  has  been  received  by  various 
critics  including  Bloom  and  Eagleton.  Perhaps  most  interesting,  however,  is  John  Guillory  and 
Perry  Meisel's  critical  response  to  Eliot's  "radical  hermeneutic  posture"  of  aphasia,  "a  mystical 
aphasia  before  'the  still  point  of  the  turning  world"'.  Meisel  believes  that  the  consequence  of 
adopting  such  a  stance  is  "less  responsibility  towards  language,  more  toward  belief  in 
unquestioned  ground,  "  p.  xi.  As  we  shall  see,  Eliot's  mystical  aphasia  is  directly  opposed  to 
Stevens'  idea  that  "The  poem  is  the  cry  of  its  occasion,  /  Part  of  the  res  itself  and  not  about  it"  (CP 
473). 
24 practitioner  of  Zen  Buddhist  meditation.  19  Certainly  there  are  allusions 
throughout  the  poems  to  meditation  and  mysticism,  perhaps  most  clearly 
demonstrated  in  "Solitaire  Under  the  Oaks": 
In  the  oblivion  of  cards 
One  exists  among  pure  principles. 
Neither  the  cards  nor  the  trees  nor  the  air 
Persist  as  facts.  This  is  an  escape 
To  principium,  to  meditation. 
One  knows  at  last  what  to  think  about 
And  thinks  about  it  without  consciousness, 
Under  the  oak  trees,  completely  released.  (OP  137) 
"The  man  who  asks  questions  seeks  only  to  reach  a  point  where  it  will  no  longer 
be  necessary  for  him  to  ask  questions"  (OP  200),  writes  Stevens  in  "Adagia",  and 
here  in  "Solitaire  Under  the  Oak  Trees"  he  seems  finally  to  have  reached  that 
point  where  he  is  released  from  those  nagging  questions.  Knowing  "at  last  what 
to  think  about"-nothing-he  experiences  a  moment  of  meditative  detachment;  it 
is  as  if  he  has  `arrived',  as  if  he  has  been  released  from  the  restlessness  of  a  mind 
that  is  never  satisfied.  To  think  without  consciousness,  that  is,  to  be  unaware  that 
one  is  thinking,  or  unaware  of  oneself  while  thinking,  is  a  kind  of  meditative 
experience.  It  is  in  this  moment,  a  moment  of  emotional  arrival,  that  the 
19  See  chapter  four  of  Lensing's  Wallace  Stevens  and  the  Seasons.  See  also  William  W.  Bevis' 
Mind  of  Winter:  Wallace  Stevens,  Meditation,  and  Literature  (Pittsburgh:  University  of  Pittsburgh 
Press,  1988).  In  chapter  five  of  this  project,  we  look  at  Bevis'  ideas  as  outlined  in  Mind  of  Winter. 
Bevis  takes  an  experiential  rather  than  philosophical  approach  to  Stevens'  poems,  arguing  that, 
"One  of  Stevens'  most  distinguishing  and  pervasive  characteristics,  his  detachment,  is  meditative 
and  therefore  experiential  in  origin,  and  difficult  to  perceive  from  within  our  culture.  "  He  goes  on 
to  say  that,  "meditative  consciousness  exists  as  a  possible  mode  of  operation  of  the  central  nervous 
system  with  fairly  stable  characteristics  across  cultures;  reports  of  meditative  consciousness  repeat 
certain  qualities,  points  of  view,  and  psychological  assumptions;  the  meditative  model,  once 
defined,  fits  very  well  a  number  of  Stevens'  poems,  passages  and  attitudes-precisely  those  which 
have  most  puzzled  or  dismayed  readers  and  which  have  spawned  the  least  convincing 
interpretations.  Many  of  Stevens'  problem  passages,  his  enigmatic  interest  in  nothing,  and  indeed 
an  entire  tendency  of  his  mind  toward  distance  without  irony,  are  very  well  explained  by  a 
meditative  paradigm.  His  life,  and  especially  his  long  walks,  offer  plausible  evidence  of 
meditative  experience,  "  p.  7. 
25 perceived  distance  between  one's  self  and  one's  surroundings  is  temporarily 
overcome. 
In  "Credences  of  Summer"  Stevens  at  times  mocks  the  desire  for 
transcendence  yet  recognises  that  the  yearning  for  perfection  is  part  of  the  human 
condition.  20  Vendler  rightly  comments  that,  "Hunger,  for  Stevens,  is  our  eternal 
condition:  famished  for  fulfilment,  we  achieve  it  uncertainly  and  not  for  long,  but 
radiantly  nonetheless.  "21  "Credences"  demonstrates  just  how  fleetingly  desire  is 
satisfied  before  it  returns  in  search  of  a  new  object.  22  This  eternal  hunger  that 
plagues  us  is  neither  good  nor  evil  for  the  poet,  but  rather  a  part  of  what  it  means 
to  be  alive.  In  order  to  live  in  a  world  that  never  stops  revolving,  our  desire  must 
also  be  in  continuous  motion,  ever  deferred,  ever  renewed.  And  though  we  may 
relish  in  the  short-lived  emotional  'arrivals'  when  we  occasionally  feel  ourselves 
'transported  to  summer',  we  must  not  devalue  all  the  other  times  when  we 
experience  the  hungry  desire  of  'winter'. 
In  canto  seven  of  "Credences"  the  satisfactions  of  summer  having  reached  their 
peak  begin  to  wane.  There  is  a  shift  away  from  the  confident  proclamations  of 
canto  six-"The  rock  cannot  be  broken.  It  is  the  truth  ... 
/ 
... 
It  is  the  rock  of 
20  In  his  book  outlining  Kantian  philosophy,  Roger  Scruton  explains,  "We  must  not,  as  Kant  puts 
it,  aspire  to  'unconditioned'  knowledge.  At  the  same  time,  it  seems  inevitable  that  we  should  do 
so.... 
"The  effort  of  transcendence  is,  Kant  argues,  inevitable.  Not  only  do  we  seek  to  transcend  the 
conditions  contained  in  the  possibility  of  experience.  We  also  seek  to  know  the  world'as  it  is', 
free  from  the  conditions  to  which  it  may  be  subject  by  such  categories  as  substance  and  cause.... 
Reason  always  aims  to  view  the  world...  from  no  point  of  view.  "  In  Roger  Scruton,  Kant  (Oxford: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1982),  pp.  46-47. 
21  Helen  Vendler,  Wallace  Stevens:  Words  Chosen  out  of  Desire  (Knoxville:  University  of 
Tennessee  Press,  1984),  p.  30 
22"For  as  soon  as  a  man  satisfies  his  desire  by  obtaining  what  he  wants,  he  starts  to  desire 
something  else  and  finds  himself  empty  again;  and  if  he  satisfies  his  desire  with  this,  he  becomes 
empty  once  again  and  ready  for  another.  And  this  never  stops  until  we  depart  from  this  material 
world.  "  St  Gregory  of  Nyssa  as  cited  in  Beverly  J.  Lanzetta's  The  Other  Side  of  Nothingness: 
Toward  a  Theology  of  Radical  Openness  (New  York:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  2001), 
pp.  31-2. 
26 summer,  the  extreme...  "-to  the  realisation  that  there  is  little  joy  in  longing  for 
something  that  one  already  has. 
Far  in  the  woods  they  sang  their  unreal  songs, 
Secure.  It  was  difficult  to  sing  in  face 
Of  the  object.  The  singers  had  to  avert  themselves 
Or  else  avert  the  object.  Deep  in  the  woods 
They  sang  of  summer  in  the  common  fields. 
They  sang  desiring  an  object  that  was  near, 
In  face  of  which  desire  no  longer  moved, 
Nor  made  of  itself  that  which  it  could  not  find... 
The  singers  are  the  Romantics,  and  perhaps  Stevens  himself,  who  continue  to  sing 
for  an  object  of  desire  that  is  already  exhausted  in  terms  of  the  satisfaction  it  has 
to  offer.  The  singers  sing  a  song  "of  summer  in  the  common  fields"  desiring  "a 
near  object  that  stops  desire",  fearing  the  "self-generated  delusions  of  ungratified 
desire.  03  The  canto  continues: 
Three  times  the  concentred  self  takes  hold,  three  times 
The  thrice  concentred  self,  having  possessed 
The  object,  grips  it  in  savage  scrutiny, 
Once  to  make  captive,  once  to  subjugate 
Or  yield  to  subjugation,  once  to  proclaim 
The  meaning  of  the  capture,  this  hard  prize, 
Fully  made,  fully  apparent,  fully  found. 
The  repetition  in  lines  seven  and  eight  are  reminiscent  of  a  witch's  incantation, 
and  we  note  that  the  word  choice  in  the  remaining  lines-savage,  captive, 
subjugation-suggests  violence.  This  is  the  violence  the  poet  inflicts  on  his 
object  of  desire  in  order  to  win  his  "hard  prize",  the  elusive  present  which  he  then 
captures  in  the  poem.  24  Stevens  here  is  talking  about  reducing  the  ecstatic 
23  Bloom,  p.  251. 
24  Vendler  explains,  "This  hard  prize,  so  grasped  and  so  exhibited,  over  and  over,  is  the  ever 
elusive  present,  so  likely,  like  the  ghost  of  Anchises,  to  evade  embrace.  "  In  Helen  Vendler,  On 
Extended  Wings:  Wallace  Stevens'  Longer  Poems  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University  Press,  1969),  p.  232.  Similarly,  Bloom  understands  "This  hard  prize,  /  Fully  made,  fully 
apparent,  fully  found"  to  be  "the  First  Idea  as  reimagined  thing...,  "  p.  251. 
27 enlargements  of  summer  in  order  to  tame  them,  to  shape  them  into  poetry.  Poesis 
is  here  described  as  a  violent  activity,  and  the  emphasis  is  on 
'capture,  '  on  appropriation  of  the  'object'  as  materia  poetica,  or,  more 
generally,  as  material  for  the  imagination-congruent  with  'The  poet's  native 
sphere...  is  what  he  can  make  of  the  world'  (OP,  198).  The  captured  thing, 
both  'fully  found'  and  'fully  made'  is  known  in  and  through  integrative 
transformations.  25 
The  poem,  fully  found  and  fully  made  through  the  imagination's  rendezvous  with 
'reality',  is  not  merely  about  the  experience  but  is  itself  a  part  of  the  experience. 
"The  poem  is  the  cry  of  its  occasion,  /  Part  of  the  res  itself  and  not  about  it"  (CP 
473),  Stevens  insists.  That  is  to  say,  the  poem  does  not  point  to  a  past 
transformative  experience  or  explain  it  or  even  give  it  meaning.  It  is  not  about 
something  that  lies  outside  itself.  Tony  Sharpe  explains, 
...  the  reader  may  suppose  that  there  is  a  'meaning'  behind  the  words  on  the 
page  which  they  themselves  obstruct,  so  that  this  desire  is  to  transcend  them 
and  thereby  gain  access  to  some  paradise  of  noumenal  immediacy,  yet  Stevens 
insists  that  the  words  of  the  poem  are  the  poem,  and  any  attempts  to  rise 
above  them--as  if  they  were  merely  the  foyer  to  some  grander  structure-end 
when  we  see  that  there  is  no  'beyond',  and  that  there  is  really  here.  26 
Stevens'  poems  are  not  only  "hymns  appropriate  to  /  The  complexities  of  the 
world"  (CP  447),  they  are  a  part  of  the  world,  fully  made  and  fully  found,  locally, 
as  the  poet  experiences  the  extraordinary  'transports  to  summer'  at  home  on 
ordinary  evenings  in  Connecticut. 
In  the  penultimate  canto  of  "Credences",  the  ecstatic  enlargements  of  summer 
have  come  to  an  end.  "Salacious  weeds"  have  taken  over  and  the  "gardener's  cat 
is  dead,  the  gardener  gone.  "  "A  complex  of  emotions  falls  apart,  "  and  the  garden 
of  summer  is  finally  abandoned. 
Fly  low,  cock  bright,  and  stop  on  a  bean  pole.  Let 
Your  brown  breast  redden,  while  you  wait  for  warmth, 
25  Leonard  and  Wharton,  p.  89. 
26  Tony  Sharpe,  Wallace  Stevens:  A  Literary  Life  (  London:  Macmillan  Press,  2000),  pp.  175-6. 
28 With  one  eye  watch  the  willow,  motionless. 
The  gardener's  cat  is  dead,  the  gardener  gone 
And  last  year's  garden  grows  salacious  weeds. 
A  complex  of  emotions  falls  apart, 
In  an  abandoned  spot.  Soft,  civil  bird, 
The  decay  that  you  regard:  of  the  arranged 
And  of  the  spirit  of  the  arranged,  douceurs, 
Tristesses,  the  fund  of  life  and  death,  suave  bush 
And  polished  beast,  this  complex  falls  apart. 
And  on  your  bean  pole,  it  may  be,  you  detect 
Another  complex  of  other  emotions,  not 
So  soft,  so  civil,  and  you  make  a  sound, 
Which  is  not  part  of  the  listener's  own  sense. 
There  is  a  pervasive  sense  of  sorrow  at  the  passing  of  the  once  fertile  season 
throughout  the  canto,  and  yet  the  last  lines  offer  the  slightest  glimmer  of  hope. 
We  are  told  that  the  sound  made  by  the  bird  "is  not  a  part  of  the  listener's  own 
sense",  indicating  that  it  seems  to  be  coming  from  elsewhere,  from  outside  the 
mind.  As  the  satisfaction  of  summer  wanes,  the  sound  brings  hope  of  some  new 
satisfaction  not  yet  experienced,  the  satisfaction  promised  by  a  coming  change  of 
season.  For  summer  is  not  the  only  season  capable  of  offering  a  fulfilment.  In 
fact,  Stevens  appears  to  have  been  least  inspired  by  "Zero  Summer",  preferring 
instead  to  create  in  colder  climates.  27 
27  Vendler  aptly  comments,  "Though  he  did  write  Credences  of  Summer,  Stevens'  most  congenial 
seasons  ranged  from  October  through  March....  In  Stevens'  autumn,  a  cold  wind  chills  the  beach, 
and  the  northern  lights,  with  their  fiery  cold  sublimity,  have  replaced  the  sun  as  illumination.  In 
his  region  November,  things  are  dead;  as  a  snow  man,  he  inhabits  the  January  moment  when  one 
listens  and  beholds,  but  can  utter  nothing;  later,  he  discovers  `at  the  antipodes  of  poetry,  dark 
winter,  '  that  there  exists  a  Keatsian  hint  of  inception  and  possible  utterance,  `the  cricket  of 
summer  forming  itself  out  of  ice'  (A  Discovery  of  Thought);  still  later,  he  sees  that  the  natural 
world  (and  he  is  included,  even  reluctantly,  given  the  apathy  of  old  age,  in  that  world),  inevitably 
begins  its  almost  invisible  spring  life-the  first  fly,  the  `babyishness  of  forsythia,  '  `the  spook  and 
makings  of  the  nude  magnolia,  '  the  comic  turn  after  the  tragic  burial. 
"In  short,  Stevens'  most  authentic  insights  are  those  of  a  minimalist  poet;  his  art  is,  he  realizes, 
fully  as  laden  with  feeling  as  that  of  any  other  poet  (and  therefore  not  fleshless  and  skeletal);  but 
the  feelings  are  often  the  powerful  wintry  feelings  of  apathy,  reduction,  nakedness  and  doubt.  " 
From  Words  Chosen  Out  of  Desire,  pp.  36-37. 
29 In  "The  Motive  for  Metaphor"  (CP  288),  also  included  in  Transport  to 
Summer,  Stevens  makes  what  sounds  like  a  very  personal  confession.  He  writes, 
"You  like  it  under  the  trees  in  autumn  /  Because  everything  is  half  dead.  "  And, 
In  the  same  way,  you  were  happy  in  spring, 
With  the  half  colors  of  quarter-things, 
The  slightly  brighter  sky,  the  melting  clouds, 
The  single  bird,  the  obscure  moon- 
The  obscure  moon  lighting  an  obscure  world 
Of  things  that  would  never  be  quite  expressed, 
Where  you  were  never  quite  yourself 
And  did  not  want  nor  have  to  be, 
Desiring  the  exhilarations  of  changes: 
The  motive  for  metaphor,  shrinking  from 
The  weight  of  primary  noon, 
The  ABC  of  being, 
The  ruddy  temper,  the  hammer 
Of  red  and  blue,  the  hard  sound- 
Steel  against  intimation-the  sharp  flash, 
The  vital,  arrogant,  fatal,  dominant  X. 
For  the  poet  "desiring  the  exhilarations  of  changes",  spring  and  autumn,  seasons 
of  in-betweens,  are  to  be  preferred  over  stagnant  summer's  "arrogant,  fatal, 
dominant  X".  Stevens  recognises  the  freedom  in  change  and  motion  and 
welcomes  the  joy  and  sorrow  that  comes  from  living  in  a  world  in  constant  flux. 
Summer's  `arrivals'  do  bring  satisfaction,  but  her  satisfactions  are  fleeting.  In 
order  to  live  in  the  everyday  world,  to  "get  into  it  and  stay  in  it",  requires  that 
Stevens  place  his  faith  not  in  the  momentary  arrivals  of  summer,  but  in  all  the 
other  days  when  an  arrival  appears  to  be  out  of  reach. 
30 Chapter  Two:  Faith  in  the  Question 
the  question  of  religion  is  first  of  all  the  question  of  the  question.  s28 
Jacques  Derrida,  Acts  of  Religion 
"If  the  day  writhes,  it  is  not  with  revelations.  /  One  goes  on  asking  questions"  (CP 
429).  In  the  absence  of  final  'revelations',  Wallace  Stevens  spent  his  life  asking 
questions.  One  question  in  particular  lies  at  the  heart  of  his  poetry,  one  that  he 
articulates  clearly  in  the  eighth  canto  of  Part  III  of  one  of  his  best  known  poems, 
Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction.  The  canto  begins  by  asking  simply,  "What  am 
I  to  believe?  "  Indeed,  what  to  believe  beleaguered  this  poet  who  was  "ill  of  a 
question  like  a  malady,  /  ill  of  a  constant  question  in  his  thought"  (CP331). 
This  nagging  question  is  what  made  Stevens'  poetry  possible;  for  Stevens' 
question  of  belief  was  largely  concerned  with  the  poetic  process.  He  wondered 
what  it  meant  to  be  a  poet  in  "an  age  of  disbelief'  and  much  of  his  poetry  is  a 
reflection  on  the  possibility  for  creative  inspiration  in  a  time  "after  the  death  of 
the  gods.  "  Traditionally  notions  of  inspiration  have  been  connected  with  the 
divine.  But  what  if  belief  in  divine  inspiration  is  no  longer  tenable  for  the  modern 
poet?  Where,  then,  lies  creativity?  29  Many  of  Stevens'  poems  are  a  reflection  on 
the  whereabouts  of  creative  inspiration.  If  there  is  nothing  'out  there',  no  divinity 
to  lend  its  creative  powers,  then,  the  poet  muses,  does  the  capacity  for  poesis  lie 
within?  Moreover,  does  it  matter  if  it  is  the  poet  himself  rather  than  some  divinity 
who  is  responsible  for  the  'making'  of  the  world?  Will  the  satisfactions  of  belief 
Z$  Jacques  Derrida,  Acts  of  Religion  (London:  Routledge,  2002),  p.  76. 
29  In  his  essay,  "Society,  Culture,  and  Person:  A  Systems  View  of  Creativity,  "  in  The  Nature  of 
Creativity,  edited  by  Robert  J.  Sternberg  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1988),  Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi  argues  that  the  most  fundamental  question  regarding  the  psychology  of 
creativity  is  not  'What  is  creativity?  '  but  'Where  is  creativity?  ',  p.  325.  Cited  in  Timothy  Clark's 
The  Theory  of  Inspiration  (Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  1997),  p.  26. 
31 be  different  somehow  if  they  come  from  'below'  rather  than  from  'on  high'? 
Returning  to  the  eighth  canto,  Stevens  asks 
What  am  Ito  believe?  If  the  angel  in  his  cloud, 
Serenely  gazing  at  the  violent  abyss, 
Plucks  on  his  strings  to  pluck  abysmal  glory, 
Leaps  downward  through  evening's  revelations,  and 
On  his  spredden  wings,  needs  nothing  but  deep  space, 
Forgets  the  golden  centre,  the  golden  destiny, 
Grows  warm  in  the  motionless  motion  of  his  flight, 
Am  I  that  imagine  this  angel  less  satisfied? 
Are  the  wings  his,  the  lapis-haunted  air? 
Is  it  he  or  is  it  I  that  experience  this? 
Is  there  a  difference,  wonders  the  poet,  between  the  gifts  of  the  'given'  and  those 
of  the  'made'?  Is  grace  contingent  upon  some  heavenly  angel  existing  over  and 
above  the  realm  of  the  earth,  or  are  the  gifts  of  the  earth  and  the  fruits  of  the 
imagination  not  enough  to  bring  satisfactions?  3°  Stevens'  question  of  belief  is 
twofold:  first,  it  is  a  question  of  place-from  where  does  creativity  come?  Is  it 
internal  or  external  to  the  poet?  Second,  he  wonders,  does  it  matter  whether 
divinity  lies  within  himself  or  in  some  external  region? 
But  it  is  not  a  resolution  to  these  questions  that  Stevens  seeks;  rather,  he 
wishes  to  suspend  the  answer,  allowing  the  question  itself  to  provide  the  source  of 
inspiration  for  the  poem.  As  David  Jarraway  has  pointed  out, 
Belief,  in  the  theological  or  religious  sense,  has  always  been,  and  no  doubt 
will  continue  to  be,  a  favorite  crux  in  any  complete  reading  of  Wallace 
Stevens'  poetry.  Yet  despite  the  canonical  disagreement  surrounding  this 
issue,  we  have  it  on  the  poet's  own  authority  that  matters  of  faith  were  a 
perpetual  source  of  creative  inspiration  throughout  his  lifetime.  31 
30  In  a  similar  vein,  B.  J.  Leggett  asks,  "Is  not  the  earthly  and  attainable  experience  of  imagining 
an  angel  the  equivalent  of  the  state  we  imagine  that  angels  enjoy-a  state  in  which  we  forget 
worldly  need  and  are  satisfied  for  the  moment  without  the  consolation  of  some  external  power?  ' 
In  B.  J.  Leggett's  Wallace  Stevens  and  Poetic  Theory  (Chapel  Hill:  University  of  North  Carolina 
Press,  1987),  p.  106. 
31  Jarraway,  p.  1. 
32 In  a  letter  to  Hi  Simons  written  in  1940,  Stevens  wrote, 
It  is  a  habit  of  mind  with  me  to  be  thinking  of  some  substitute  for  religion.... 
My  trouble,  and  the  trouble  of  a  great  many  people,  is  the  loss  of  belief  in  the 
sort  of  God  in  Whom  we  were  all  brought  up  to  believe.  (LWS  348) 
It  was  this  loss  of  belief  in  the  God  of  his  heritage  that  opened  up  for  Stevens  the 
question  that  led  to  the  writing  of  his  best  poems.  Commenting  on  the  above 
passage,  Adalaide  Kirby  Morris  says,  "His  substitute  [for  religion]  is  finally  the 
search  itself:  poetry  and  the  theory  of  poetry.  02 
The  question  of  faith  and  the  possibility  for  belief  are  at  the  heart  of  Stevens' 
poetry.  The  words  'question'  and  'possibility'  are  key  here;  for  Stevens  was  not 
interested  in  the  certainties  and  easy  assurances  offered  by  "the  sort  of  God  in 
Whom  we  were  all  brought  up  to  believe";  rather,  he  was  concerned  with  the 
uncertainties  and  anxieties  which  prevailed  in  the  "age  of  disbelief'  (his  own 
words)  in  which  he  lived.  Some  of  Stevens'  earlier  poems,  most  notably  "A  High- 
Toned  Old  Christian  Woman"  and  "Sunday  Morning",  which  David  Daiches  calls 
"the  great  agnostic  poem  in  the  English  language,  03  offer  a  critical  perspective  on 
Christianity,  questioning  its  relevancy  in  the  modern  world.  Pronouncing  the 
Christian  religion  "an  exhausted  culture"  (CP  202),  Stevens  deems  it  necessary  to 
throw  off  the  "holy  hush  of  ancient  sacrifice"  where  divinity  comes  nought  but  in 
"silent  shadows  and  in  dreams"  in  favour  of  the  vibrant  "comforts  of  the  sun"  and 
the  voluptuous  "beauty  of  the  earth"  as  they  are  perceived  by  the  senses.  34 
32  Adalaide  Kirby  Morris,  Wallace  Stevens:  Imagination  and  Faith  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1974),  p.  10. 
33  David  Daiches,  God  and  the  Poets  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1984),  p.  170.  It  is  also  worth 
noting  that  William  Hamilton  begins  his  chapter  "The  Death  of  God  Theologies  Today"  in 
Radical  Theology  and  the  Death  of  God  by  quoting  two  stanzas  from  "Sunday  Morning".  Thomas 
J.  J.  Altizer  and  William  Hamilton,  Radical  Theology  and  the  Death  of  God,  (New  York:  The 
Bobbs-Merrill  Company,  1966). 
34  Joseph  Carroll  remarks  that  the  "unsettled  state  of  Stevens'  early  religious  views  manifests  itself 
most  clearly  in  one  of  the  most  seemingly  self-assured  of  his  early  poems.  In  "Sunday  Morning,  " 
Stevens  depicts  an  exchange  between  himself  and  a  female  companion,  presumably  his  wife.  The 
subject  of  this  exchange  is  religious  need,  and  in  responding  to  his  companion's  expressions  of 
33 In  the  first  stanza  of  "Sunday  Morning"  the  protagonist  is  depicted  lounging  in 
her  dressing  gown  on  a  Sunday  morning,  lingering  over  "late  /  Coffee  and  oranges 
in  a  sunny  chair.  "  She  who  would  normally  be  found  sitting  upright  in  a  pew  on 
this  day  relishes  the  freedom  of  reclining  in  lazy  indulgence,  enjoying  the 
freedom  of  the  scent  of  over-ripe  oranges  and  the  sight  of  a  green  cockatoo.  But 
this  sense  of  freedom  is  soon  interrupted  by  a  twinge  of  guilt: 
She  dreams  a  little,  and  she  feels  the  dark 
Encroachment  of  that  old  catastrophe, 
As  a  calm  darkens  among  water-lights. 
The  pungent  oranges  and  bright,  green  wings 
Seem  things  in  some  procession  of  the  dead, 
Winding  across  wide  water,  without  sound. 
The  day  is  like  wide  water,  without  sound, 
Stilled  for  the  passing  of  her  dreaming  feet 
Over  the  seas,  to  silent  Palestine, 
Dominion  of  the  blood  and  sepulchre.  (CP  67) 
The  thoughts  threaten  to  undermine  her  pleasures  of  the  flesh  as  the  decadent 
sights  and  alluring  smells  suddenly  seem  to  her  to  be  condemning  in  their 
worldliness.  The  stern  words  of  St.  Paul  resound  here:  "do  not  gratify  the  desires 
of  the  flesh.  For  the  desires  of  the  flesh  are  against  the  Spirit...  "  (Galatians  5:  16- 
17). 
And  then  just  as  suddenly  she  is  struck  with  a  thought:  "Why  should  she  give 
her  bounty  to  the  dead?  " 
What  is  divinity  if  it  can  come 
Only  in  silent  shadows  and  in  dreams? 
Shall  she  not  find  in  comforts  of  the  sun, 
In  pungent  fruit  and  bright,  green  wings,  or  else 
In  any  balm  or  beauty  of  the  earth, 
Things  to  be  cherished  like  the  thought  of  heaven? 
need,  Stevens  both  directs  a  polemic  against  the  Christian  myth  and  attempts  to  provide  an 
alternative  to  this  myth  in  his  own  lyric  utterance.  "  In  Joseph  Carroll's  Wallace  Stevens'  Supreme 
Fiction:  A  New  Romanticism  (Baton  Rouge:  Louisiana  State  University,  1987),  p.  48. 
34 With  the  onslaught  of  these  questions,  she  turns  her  attention  away  from  silent 
Palestine,  "Dominion  of  the  blood  and  sepulcher",  to  the  warm  comforts  of  the 
sun  and  the  everyday  things  of  the  earth  which  give  pleasure.  Daiches  comments, 
She  goes  in  imagination  to  ancient  Palestine  and  thinks  of  the  crucifixion. 
Then  she  recoils.  Why  should  she  involve  herself  in  a  death  that  happened 
two  thousand  years  ago?  And  anyway,  what  reality  has  that  'divinity'  which 
one  can  know  'only  in  silent  shadows  and  in  dreams'?  Should  she  not  forget 
all  that  and  rejoice  in  the  colour,  beauty,  variety  of  the  physical  world  at  the 
present  moment?  Are  there  not  here  'things  to  be  cherished  as  much  as  there 
are  in  thoughts  of  heaven'?  35 
In  her  new  found  freedom,  she  makes  the  boldest  of  assertions,  that  "Divinity 
must  live  within  herself'  in 
Passions  of  rain,  or  moods  in  falling  snow; 
Grievings  in  loneliness,  or  unsubdued 
Elations  when  the  forest  blooms;  gusty 
Emotions  on  wet  roads  on  autumn  nights; 
All  pleasures  and  all  pains,  remembering 
The  bough  of  summer  and  the  winter  branch. 
These  are  the  measures  destined  for  her  soul.  36 
Thus,  divinity,  if  it  can  be  spoken  of  at  all,  is  reliant  upon  the  self  and  the  ever- 
changing  passions,  moods,  grievings  and  elations  that  are  the  everyday  emotional 
responses  to  the  world  around  us.  It  is  the  changing  weather  of  human  emotion, 
the  varied  climates  of  joy  and  sorrow  that  bring  satisfactions  to  the  soul. 
Connecting  the  internal  and  external  climates--"passions  of  rain",  "moods  in 
falling  snow"--,  Stevens  believes  that 
35  Daiches,  171. 
36  Of  this  passage,  Harold  Bloom  comments,  "From  the  ethos  of  Christ  as  an  absence,  though  a 
longed-for  presence,  we  pass  to  the  pathos  of  an  internalized  divinity,  whose  representatives  are 
passions,  moods,  grievings,  elations,  emotions,  pleasures,  pains,  remembrances,  all  of  them 
measures,  parts  of  a  greater  music.  But  this  synecdochal  stanza,  though  it  opens  with  three 
rhetorical  questions,  addresses  its  largest  question  implicitly  to  itself.  What  is  a  divinity  that  is 
this  discontinuous,  this  reliant  upon  seasonal  cycle?  The  ominous  word  in  the  stanza  is  'destined' 
in  its  last  line,  which  reintroduces  the  limitations  of  character  and  incident.  There  is  no  wholeness 
to  this  divinity,  but  only  an  aggregate  of  passions,  and  where  there  is  an  aggregate  there  is  no 
closure,  not  even  an  illusion  of  closure,  "  in  Wallace  Stevens:  The  Poems  of  Our  Climate  (London: 
Cornell  University  Press,  1977),  p.  31. 
35 We  are  physical  beings  in  a  physical  world;  the  weather  is  one  of  the  things 
that  we  enjoy,  one  of  the  unphilosophical  realities.  The  state  of  the  weather 
soon  becomes  a  state  of  mind.  (LWS,  348-9) 
The  "Ecstatic  identities  /  Between  one's  self  and  the  weather"  (CP,  258)  offer 
"ambiguous  marriages  between  mind  and  environment.  07  The  internal  is  affected 
by  the  external  and  it  does  not  matter  whether  the  state  of  mind  is  one  of  elation  at 
the  sight  of  a  clear  blue  summer  sky  or  one  of  sullen  introspection  at  the  scene  of 
a  bleak  mid-winter  day;  pleasure  and  pain  are  to  be  cherished  equally.  Jarraway 
states  that 
If  faith  is  to  be  at  all  viable  in  the  modern  era,  it  must  recognize  a  divinity 
within  the  lady  of  the  poem  herself,  as  the  second  section  argues,  that  is, 
within  the  quotidian  of  'pungent  fruit  and  bright,  green  wings'  or  of  'any  balm 
or  beauty  of  the  earth,  '  but  a  quotidian  that  may  also  be  a  malady:  'All 
pleasures  and  all  pains,  remembering  /  The  bough  of  summer  and  the  winter 
branch'.  38 
Like  the  "anti-master-man"  of  "Landscape  with  Boat"  (CP  241-3),  the  speaker 
in  "Sunday  Morning"  never  before  supposed  "That  [she]  might  be  truth,  [herself], 
or  part  of  it.  " 
[She]  never  supposed  divine 
Things  might  not  look  divine,  nor  that  if  nothing 
Was  divine  then  all  things  were,  the  world  itself, 
And  that  if  nothing  was  the  truth,  then  all 
Things  were  the  truth,  the  world  itself  was  the  truth. 
The  world  itself  was  the  truth,  the  way  it  looked,  the  way  it  smelled  on  a  Sunday 
morning.  The  pungent  fruit  and  bright  green  wings  of  a  cockatoo  must  not  be 
cherished  less  than  the  thought  of  heaven;  for  the  things  of  the  earth  and  the 
pleasures  (and  pains)  that  they  give  offer  the  paradisal  fulfilment  she  desires. 
But  these  pleasures  are  fleeting,  she  soon  discovers.  They  do  not  satiate  in  a 
final  way  her  yearnings  for  religious  fulfilment.  In  the  fourth  stanza  she  says, 
37  Richard  A.  Macksey,  "The  Climates  of  Wallace  Stevens,  "  in  Roy  Harvey  Pearce  and  J.  Hillis 
Miller  (eds)  The  Act  of  the  Mind:  Essays  on  the  Poetry  of  Wallace  Stevens  (Baltimore:  The  Johns 
Hopkins  Press,  1965),  p.  187. 
36 'I  am  content  when  wakened  birds, 
Before  they  fly,  test  the  reality 
Of  misty  fields,  by  their  sweet  questionings; 
But  when  the  birds  are  gone,  and  their  warm  fields 
Return  no  more,  where,  then,  is  paradise?  ' 
Beauty's  impermanence  comes  initially  as  a  disappointment  as  she  realises  that 
paradise  is  unsustainable,  and  in  her  desire  for  a  constant  sublime  it  follows  that 
in  the  next  stanza  she  should  say,  "But  in  contentment  I  still  feel  /  The  need  of 
some  imperishable  bliss.  "  As  others  have  remarked  there  is  an  affinity  here  with  a 
passage  from  Wordsworth's  The  Recluse:  39 
What  want  we?  have  we  not  perpetual  streams, 
Warm  woods,  and  sunny  hills,  and  fresh  green  fields, 
And  mountains  not  less  green,  and  flocks  and  herds, 
And  thickets  of  songsters,  and  the  voice 
Of  lordly  birds,  an  unexpected  sound 
Heard  now  and  then  from  morn  to  latest  eve, 
Admonishing  the  man  who  walks  below 
Of  solitude  and  silence  in  the  sky?  (11.126-33) 
With  the  abundance  of  beauty  around  us-perpetual  streams,  fresh  green  fields, 
and  the  voices  of  lordly  birds-what  more  do  we  want?  More.  We  want  an 
enduring  sublime,  one  that  will  not  fail.  Though  the  streams  may  be  perpetual, 
the  joy  they  give  is  not;  for  "Beauty  is  momentary  in  the  mind"  (CP,  91).  4° 
But  "Death,  "  argues  Stevens  boldly,  "is  the  mother  of  beauty.  "  It  is  the  very 
fact  that  these  things  do  change  that  allows  for  the  possibility  for  beauty.  For  that 
which  is  ever-lasting,  impervious  to  change  and  death,  will  never  be  valued  in  the 
38  Jarraway,  34. 
39  J.  V.  Cunningham  notes  the  Wordsworthian  character  of  parts  of  "Sunday  Morning"  in 
"Tradition  and  Modernity,  "  in  The  Collected  Essays  of  J.  V.  Cunninham  as  cited  by  Joseph  Carroll 
in  Wallace  Stevens'  Supreme  Fiction,  pp.  49-50.  Also,  Carroll  remarks  that  "Stevens  draws  on  a 
Wordsworthian  range  of  sensibility  but  detaches  this  sensibility  from  its  transcendental  base,  "  p. 
50. 
40  Bloom  purports  to  hear  "something  of  the  voice  of  Walter  Pater"  echoing  in  both  "Sunday 
Morning"  and  another  poem  by  Stevens  written  around  the  same  time,  "Peter  Quince  at  the 
Clavier.  "  Bloom  quotes  from  Pater's  "Conclusion"  to  The  Renaissance:  "Every  moment  some 
form  grows  perfect  in  hand  or  face;  some  tone  on  the  hills  or  the  sea  is  choicer  than  the  rest;  some 
mood  of  passion  or  insight  or  intellectual  excitement  is  irresistibly  real  and  attractive  for  us,  --for 
that  moment  only.  "  Cited  in  The  Poems  of  Our  Climate,  p.  36. 
37 same  way  as  that  which  is  finite.  If  "there  were  no  change  of  death  in  paradise",  if 
"ripe  fruit"  never  fell  but  hung  "always  heavy  in  that  perfect  sky",  what  then? 
We,  like  the  lady  in  the  poem,  would  not  be  content.  Eventually  leaves  fall,  ripe 
fruit  shrivels  and  rots,  and  joy  turns  to  sorrow,  as  humanity's  inconstant  emotional 
climates  are  intimately  connected  with  this  cycle  of  life  and  death.  Charles  M. 
Murphy  comments, 
Death,  the  finality  of  it,  seems  to  intensify  the  feeling  of  how  precious  is  our 
earthly  life.  Maybe  this  is  all  the  paradise  we  need,  so  sensuously  evoked  in 
the  stanzas  of  the  poem  through  sight,  sound  and  smell.  There  is  more  tragic 
beauty  in  the  ripe  fruit  falling  than  in  fruit  forever  frozen  in  a  perfect  sky.  41 
In  "Sunday  Morning"  Stevens  celebrates  death,  even  the  death  of  the  gods,  and 
especially  the  death  of  that  one  god,  the  "God  in  Whom  we  were  all  brought  up  to 
believe".  By  arguing  that  "Death  is  the  mother  of  beauty,  "  Stevens  calls  upon  the 
lady  in  the  poem  to  give  up  her  graveside  vigil  at  the  tomb  in  Palestine  and  to 
accept  the  inevitable  changes  brought  about  by  time. 
What  happened  in  ancient  Palestine  occurred  in  a  particular  time  and  place, 
part  of  the  great  procession  of  events  which  is  life  in  motion.  We  must  accept 
this  procession  of  events,  this  inevitability  of  change,  she  concludes.  We  must 
accept  Time.  The  wide  world  of  nature,  the  whole  universe,  exists  in  time  and 
space,  and  as  our  imagination  ranges  over  it  we  can  sense  the  sad  beauty  of  a 
time-bound  reality.  The  sadness  is  part  of  the  beauty.  42 
Losing  faith  in  the  God  of  her  heritage  may  bring  this  lady  grief,  but  Stevens 
believes  that  if  she  is  willing  to  endure  the  sadness  of  such  loss,  it  will  eventually 
yield  a  sense  of  joyful  liberation.  For  "Loss  of  faith  is  growth"  (OP,  198),  or 
perhaps  more  accurately,  loss  of  faith  in  an  Absolute  is  growth. 
With  this  shift  away  from  the  Absolute  of  heaven,  the  "Dominion  of  the  blood 
and  sepulcher"  which  prevailed  for  the  past  two  thousand  years  comes  to  an  end 
and  the  "tomb  in  Palestine",  proclaims  the  poet,  is  no  longer  "the  porch  of  spirits 
41  Murphy,  p.  42. 
42  Daiches,  p.  174. 
38 lingering.  /  It  is  the  grave  of  Jesus,  where  he  lay"  (CP  70).  Echoes  of  Nietzsche's 
Madman  are  evident  here.  Asks  the  Madman,  "What  are  these  churches  now  if 
they  are  not  the  tombs  and  sepulchres  of  God?  ,  43  For  Stevens  like  Nietzsche,  it  is 
time  to  leave  the  graveyard  of  Christianity  with  the  security  of  its  assurances  and 
step  out  into  the  uncertain  "chaos  of  the  sun".  Here,  as  inhabitants  of  the  earth, 
Deer  walk  upon  our  mountains,  and  the  quail 
Whistle  about  us  their  spontaneous  cries; 
Sweet  berries  ripen  in  the  wilderness; 
And,  in  the  isolation  of  the  sky, 
At  evening,  casual  flocks  of  pigeons  make 
Ambiguous  undulations  as  they  sink, 
Downward  to  darkness,  on  extended  wings.  aa 
The  sights,  sounds,  and  smells  of  the  earth  as  they  are  perceived  by  the  senses 
provide  the  satisfactions  of  belief  that  were  formerly  the  domain  of  Christianity. 
The  amount  of  activity  in  this  final  stanza  is  indicative  of  the  importance  Stevens 
places  on  change  and  changingness  in  humanity's  quest  for  what  will  suffice. 
Here,  all  is  in  motion:  deer  walk,  quail  whistle,  berries  ripen...  nothing  is  stagnant 
or  permanent,  nothing  is  fixed  or  finished.  The  phrase  "casual  flocks  of  pigeons" 
suggests  an  order  not  quite  complete  or  exacting,  and  the  "ambiguous 
undulations"  the  birds  make  in  the  sky  at  twilight  as  they  sink  downward  to 
darkness  reinforce  this  sense  of  incompleteness  or  inbetweeness.  Hovering  on 
outstretched  wings  between  heaven  and  earth,  in  a  sky  no  longer  light  but  not  yet 
dark,  the  birds  give  no  indication  of  setting  down.  They  are  suspended  but  not 
fixed  and  contribute  to  the  sense  of  open-endedness  of  the  poem. 
Embracing  change  and  death  and  accepting  the  impermanence  of  all  earthly 
and,  in  this  case,  heavenly  things,  is  what  it  means  to  have  faith  for  Stevens.  45 
But  to  find  faith  in  impermanence  is  difficult  indeed.  In  the  words  of  Nietzsche, 
43  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Gay  Science.  Translated  by  Josfine  Nauckhoff  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  2001),  p.  120. 
39 The  eternal  and  exclusive  becoming,  the  complete  impermanence  of 
everything  actual,  that  constantly...  becomes  but  never  is...  is  a  terrible  and 
paralyzing  thought.  Its  impact  on  us  may  be  compared  to  the  feeling  in  an 
earthquake  when  one  loses  confidence  in  a  firmly  grounded  earth.  It  takes 
amazing  strength  to  transform  this  effect  into  its  opposite:  sublimity  and 
blessed  astonishment.  46 
B.  J.  Leggett  in  his  book  Early  Stevens:  The  Nietzschean  Intertext  has  made 
much  of  the  Nietzschean  undertones  in  "Sunday  Morning.  j,  47  He  claims  that 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  poem  there  is  a  dichotomy  between  two  states, 
between  being  and  becoming.  As  the  day  of  Christian  celebration  and 
remembrance,  Sunday  is  traditionally  given  over  to  an  other-worldly  ideal,  or  the 
"world  of  being".  But  this  day,  this  particular  day,  is  also 
The  day  of  the  sun,  of  'Coffee  and  oranges  in  a  sunny  chair,  '  and  for  a  moment 
the  world  of  actual  sun-always  in  Stevens  and  Nietzsche  associated  with 
becoming,  the  purely  physical-manages  to  'dissipate  /  The  holy  hush  of 
ancient  sacrifice.  '  48 
The  woman  of  "Sunday  Morning"  finds  herself  between  these  states,  between 
dreaming  of  that  state  which  exists  only  as  an  abstraction  in  the  mind,  as  a 
44  Helen  Vendler  Part  of  Nature  see  p.  23. 
as  It  is  worth  noting  that  Stevens  was  well-read  in  process  thought  and  the  works  of  A.  N. 
Whitehead  were  to  be  found  on  the  shelves  of  his  library.  Describing  process  thought,  David 
Pailin,  a  contemporary  scholar  working  in  this  area,  writes:  "the  defining  principle  of  process 
thought  is  that  to  be  actual  and  hence  to  be  a  concrete  reality  is  to  be  in  process....  Positively,  this 
means  in  terms  of  the  process  of  becoming  that  for  anything  to  be  actual  is  for  it  to  be  at  the  point 
where  the  indeterminate  becomes  determinate-to  be  where,  that  is,  a  previously  yet-to-be- 
determined  range  of  possibilities  at  that  moment  ends  in  the  realization  of  one  particular  state  of 
being  now  that  actual  entity.  "  David  Pailin,  God  and  the  Process  of  Reality  (London:  Routledge, 
1989),  p.  51.  Grace  Jantzen  notes  the  implications  of  process  thought  for  theology.  She  says  that 
"part  of  what  this  amounts  to  is  that  the  divine  is  in  process;  hence  traditional  attributes  like 
timelessness  and  changelessness  cannot  be  predicated  of  God.  The  divine  is  not  static  but 
Becoming,  not  aloof  but  feeling  and  responsive.  "  Grace  Jantzen,  Becoming  Divine:  Towards  a 
Feminist  Philosophy  of  Religion  (Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  1998),  p.  257. 
a6  Complete  Works  (see  Stack,  p.  84  for  ref.  ) 
47  B.  J.  Leggett,  Early  Stevens:  The  Nietzschean  Intertext  (Durham:  Duke  University  Press, 
1992),  pp.  88-ff.  In  the  first  chapter  of  this  work,  "Nietzsche  Reading  Stevens,  "  Leggett  begins  by 
asking,  "In  what  sense,  if  any,  is  Wallace  Stevens  a  Nietzschean  poet?  "  Recognising  the  role  of  the 
reader  in  the  production  of  texts,  he  argues  that  it  is  not  so  much  that  Stevens  is  a  Nietzschean  poet 
per  se  but  that  "Nietzsche's  new  presence  in  Stevens  criticism  is,  in  part,  a  result  of  the  dominance 
of  neo-Nietzschean  critical  theory...  "  (p.  1).  Furthermore,  Leggett  claims  that  "Stevens'  reading  of 
Nietzsche  is  of  less  consequence  than  Nietzsche's  reading  of  Stevens,  "  (p.  7)  and  that  "the  reader's 
activity  in  producing,  say,  a  Nietzschean  intertext  for  "Sunday  Morning"  completes  something 
otherwise  incomplete  in  the  poem"  (p.  21). 
49  Ibid.,  p.  92. 
40 "thought  of  heaven",  and  living  in  the  actual,  ever-changing  world  that  never  is 
but  is  always  on  the  way  to  becoming.  It  is  difficult  for  her  to  choose  which  of 
these  to  inhabit;  the  ideal  is  powerfully  tantalising,  so  much  so  that  it  threatens  to 
render  the  actual  insignificant  by  comparison.  Says  Leggett, 
...  the  'thought  of  heaven,  '  a  mere  concept  as  opposed  to  the  actuality  of  the 
world  of  becoming,  has  the  power  to  devalue  the  actual,  and  it  does  so  through 
a  process  of  idealization.... 
There  is  some  irony  in  Nietzsche's  assumption  that  a  mere  figment  of  the 
Christian  imagination  should  have  such  a  profound  effect  on  that  which  so 
powerfully  exists...  49 
The  motive  of  "Sunday  Morning"  is  at  least  in  part  an  attempt  to  expose  this 
devaluing  effect  that  Christianity  has  on  the  world  of  the  senses  and  to  re-affirm 
the  value  of  the  sensate.  "Nietzsche's  and  Stevens'  indictments  of  Christianity  are 
based  in  large  part  on  its  denigration  of  the  passions,  i50  something  which  they 
both  strive  to  overturn  by  asserting  the  divinity  within.  These  passions,  which  at 
times  bring  pleasures  and  at  times  bring  pains,  are  inconstant,  unpredictable,  even 
chaotic;  yet  they  are  connected  with-and  connect  us  to-the  place  in  which  we 
live,  the  becoming  world  where  "Deer  walk  upon  our  mountains  and  the  quail  / 
Whistle  about  us  their  spontaneous  cries.  "  The  world  as  we  experience  it,  in  all  of 
its  imperfection  and  in  its  wanting,  is  all  that  we  have;  it  is  an  imperfect  paradise, 
full  of  possibility.  The  task  of  "Sunday  Morning"  argues  Leggett,  is 
not  to  redefine  the  human  spirit  as  something  god-like  and  transcendent  but  to 
convince  the  woman  that,  just  as  it  is-mortal,  earth-bound,  ambiguous, 
ephemeral-the  life  of  becoming,  the  life  that  we  have  in  fact  been  given,  is 
exactly  what  we  would  choose  if  we  were  able  to  rid  ourselves  of  Christian 
valuations  of  life.  Insofar  as  the  poem  succeeds  in  doing  this,  it  could  be 
called  the  first  post-Nietzschean  poetry  of  amor  fati....  5' 
Writes  Nietzsche,  "If  [man]  had  required  a  God  in  the  past,  he  now  delights  in 
cosmic  disorder  without  a  God,  a  world  of  accident,  to  the  essence  of  which 
49  Ibid.,  pp.  92-3. 
50  Ibid.,  p.  97. 
41 terror,  ambiguity,  and  seductiveness  belong.  02  But  the  dissolution  of  the  gods 
does  not  strike  terror  in  Stevens;  quite  the  opposite.  As  David  Daiches  points  out, 
"Sunday  Morning"  "is  a  poem  of  calm  agnostic  acceptance.  03  Though  Nietzsche 
longed  to  turn  the  terror  of  impermanence  into  "sublimity  and  blessed 
acceptance,  "  he  never  quite  managed  it.  Stevens,  however,  comes  closer  to 
achieving  it,  finding  faith  in  the  ever-changing  universe  and  the  alternating  states 
of  human  emotion  that  it  inspires.  54 
Having  faith  in  the  here  and  now,  in  the  transience  of  all  things,  means  finding 
ecstasy  in  the  fleeting  pleasures  the  earth  provides  and  also,  and  this  is  key, 
finding  a  kind  of  sweet  sadness  in  change  and  death.  Stevens  has  faith  in  both  joy 
and  sorrow-faith  in  the  "bough  of  summer"  and  the  immediacy  of  joy 
experienced  in  the  "comforts  of  the  sun"  and  faith,  too,  in  the  "winter  branch"  and 
the  latent  tranquility  of  sorrow  experienced  after  the  "ripe  fruit"  of  summer  has 
51  Ibid.,  p.  96. 
52  From  The  Will  to  Power  (II,  399)  as  cited  in  Leggett,  The  Nietzschean  Intertext.  p.  116. 
53  Daiches,  p.  175.  Stevens'  calm  acceptance  of  the  death  of  the  gods  in  "Sunday  Morning"  can  be 
contrasted  with  a  poem  by  Robert  Lowell,  "Waking  Early  Sunday  Morning",  written  in  response 
to  the  Stevens  poem.  Like  Stevens,  Lowell  recognises  that  the  church  has  become  something  of 
an  anachronism,  with  its  "electric  bells,  /  clearly  chiming,  "Faith  of  our  fathers.  "  But  unlike 
Stevens,  Lowell  mourns  this  loss: 
O  Bible  chopped  and  crucified 
in  hymns  we  hear  but  do  not  read, 
none  of  the  milder  subtleties 
of  grace  or  art  will  sweeten  these 
stiff  quatrains  shovelled  out  four-square- 
they  sing  of  peace,  and  preach  despair; 
yet  they  gave  darkness  some  control, 
and  left  a  loophole  for  the  soul. 
Lowell  wonders,  "When  will  we  see  Him  face  to  face?  /  Each  day,  He  shines  through  darker 
glass.  "  For  Lowell,  there  are  "No  weekends  for  the  gods  now...  " 
Pity  the  planet,  all  joy  gone 
from  this  volcanic  cone; 
peace  to  our  children  when  they  fall 
in  small  war  on  the  heels  of  small 
war--until  the  end  of  time 
to  police  the  earth,  a  ghost 
orbiting  forever  lost 
in  our  monotonous  sublime.  (from  Near  the  Ocean) 
54  "Stevens  rescued  himself  from  loss by  reaching  out  for  what  had  always  bewitched  and 
beckoned  him,  the  world  itself,  "  Lensing  rightly  comments.  From  Wallace  Stevens  and  the 
Seasons,  p.  5. 
42 fallen.  But  there  is  a  difference,  for  while  the  pleasures  of  the  'sun'  are  immediate, 
the  beauty  that  arises  from  death,  so  often  the  theme  of  the  poets,  is  transformed 
into  "sublimity  and  blessed  astonishment"  only  when  it  is  given  over  to 
expression.  It  is  precisely  because  he  is  a  poet  that  Stevens  is  able  to  declare  with 
such  force  that  "Death  is  the  mother  of  beauty.  " 
In  a  later  poem,  "Esthetique  du  Mal"  (CP  313),  Stevens  notes  the  connection 
between  pain  and  the  sublime.  The  poem  begins  with  a  man  in  Naples  "writing 
letters  home  /  And,  between  his  letters,  reading  paragraphs  /  On  the  sublime.  "  For 
a  month  while  reading  and  writing,  "Vesuvius  had  groaned,  "  and,  thought  the 
man, 
It  was  pleasant  to  be  sitting  there, 
While  the  sultriest  fulgurations,  flickering, 
Cast  corners  in  the  glass.  He  could  describe 
The  terror  of  the  sound  because  the  sound 
Was  ancient.  He  tried  to  remember  the  phrases:  pain 
Audible  at  noon,  pain  torturing  itself, 
Pain  killing  pain  on  the  very  point  of  pain. 
The  volcano  trembled  in  another  ether, 
As  the  body  trembles  at  the  end  of  life. 
In  Wallace  Stevens:  An  Approach  to  His  Poetry  and  Thought,  Robert  Pack 
believes  that  "'Esthetique  du  Mal'  can  profitably  be  read  as  a  sequel  to  'Sunday 
Morning"'  inasmuch  as  both  consider  "the  question  of  whether  earth  can  be  a 
paradise"55,  that  is,  both  poems  ask  if  the  earth,  in  all  its  mutability,  its  change  and 
death,  can  be  a  source  of  religious  fulfilment.  Both  poems  open  with  the  central 
figure  concerned  with  pleasure  and  then  turn  the  protagonist's  attention  to  images 
of  pain  and  death.  Pack  comments, 
It  is  appropriate  that  the  protagonist  of  the  poem  is  reading  about  the  sublime 
and  thinking  about  Vesuvius,  for  the  sublime  is  that  strange  mixture  of  beauty 
55  Robert  Pack,  p.  34. 
43 and  terror,  bliss  and  pain,  that  causes  ecstasy  and  wonder  and  awe,  revealing 
for  an  instant  the  mystery  of  the  universe.  57 
The  strange  and  melancholy  sensation  that  stems  from  remembered  pain  "is  a  part 
of  the  sublime  /  From  which  we  shrink.  And  yet,  except  for  us,  /  The  total  past 
felt  nothing  when  destroyed"  (CP  314).  Perhaps  humanity's  greatest  contribution 
to  the  earth  is  to  feel  the  pain  of  its  death  and  destruction,  and  equally  it  may  be 
the  earth's  passing  that  provides  the  greatest  contribution  to  humanity's  need  for 
religious  fulfilment.  Comments  Pack, 
If  to  be  in  paradise  is  to  have  a  consciousness  of  the  sublime,  there  must  be 
change  and  therefore  death,  and  therefore  pain  as  well  as  bliss. 
The  idea  of  pain  being  inextricable  from  our  sense  of  time  and  mutability, 
and  from  our  sensuous  experience  of  things,  encourages  our  acceptance  of 
earth  in  its  totality.  58 
"It  was  almost  time  for  lunch.  Pain  is  human,  "  begins  the  second  stanza  of  the 
first  canto.  Stevens'  emphasis  on  the  everydayness  of  pain  as  part  of  the  human 
experience  of  life  on  earth  is  clear  here.  By  anthropomorphisizing  Pain  (it  is  in 
need  of  lunch)  Stevens  reveals  a  flippancy  that  Pack  calls  Stevens'  "comic  vision". 
He  rightly  asserts  that, 
Change,  according  to  this  vision,  does  not  lead  toward  a  goal,  a  destination,  a 
state  of  human  perfection,  but  continues  to  renew  that  which  already  is.  There 
is  a  lightness  to  such  a  philosophy,  and  this  lightness  is  often  reflected  in 
Stevens'  style,  even  in  a  poem  about  pain.  59 
57  Ibid.,  p.  35.  See  also  Rose  Macauley's  Pleasure  of  Ruin  (London:  Thames  and  Hudson,  1953). 
Picturing  destruction  and  ruin  has  always  afforded  pleasure,  and  the  destruction  of  Pompeii  in 
particular,  notes  Macauley,  has  provided  countless  poets,  painters  and  sculptors  "an  infinity  of 
pleasure.  "  Among  the  many  ruin-enthusiasts  was  Charles  Dickens  whose  fascination  with  the 
victims  of  Vesuvius  was  rivalled  only  by  Vesuvius  itself.  He  wrote,  "Stand  at  the  bottom  of  the 
great  market  place  of  Pompeii,  and  look  up  the  silent  streets,  through  the  ruined  temples  of  Jupiter 
and  Isis,  over  the  broken  houses  with  their  inmost  sanctuaries  open  to  the  day,  away  to  Mount 
Vesuvius...  and  lose  count  of  time  and  heed  of  other  things  in  the  strange  and  melancholy  sensation 
of  seeing  the  Destroyed  and  the  Destroyer  making  this  quiet  picture  in  the  sun....  The  mountain  is 
the  genius  of  the  scene...,  "  in  Pleasure  of  Ruin,  p.  296. 
S$  Pack,  P.  36. 
59  Ibid.  p.  40.  Also,  John  Timberman  Newcomb,  commenting  on  Pack  and  other  critics,  including 
Daniel  Fuchs,  author  of  The  Comic  Spirit  of  Wallace  Stevens,  remarks  that,  "For  these  critics,  there 
was  more  in  a  poetics  of  comedy  and  celebration  than  simply  a  way  of  laughing  off  the  evils  of  the 
world.  The  celebratory  impulse  in  Stevens  could  be  seen  as  a  secular  sacrament  of  the  value  of 
life  itself,  "  in  John  Timberman  Newcomb,  Wallace  Stevens  and  Literary  Canons  (Jackson: 
University  Press  of  Mississippi,  1992),  p.  188. 
44 Stevens  accepts  that  pain  is  a  part  of  our  earthly  paradise  and  must  be  valued  as 
such.  And  when  he  laughs  at  pain,  as  he  does  in  "Esthetique  du  Mal",  Stevens  is 
not  emulating  the  laughter  of  Zarathustra,  whose  guffaws  are  but  a  strained  effort 
of  the  will  to  overthrow  the  terror  of  impermanence.  Rather,  he  is  stepping  up  to 
that  "part  of  the  sublime  /  From  which  we  [have  shrunk]". 
Having  faith  in  the  difficulty  of  life  means,  for  Stevens,  keeping  the  question 
of  belief  open-ended.  It  means  not  positing  an  easy  answer  or  clinging  to  the 
(empty)  reassurances  offered  by  the  "sort  of  God  in  whom  we  were  all  brought  up 
to  believe.  "  Stevens  differs  from  Nietzsche  in  that  he  is  not  calling  for  a  will  to 
power,  as  such,  but  rather  for  a  calm  acceptance  of  the  world  as  we  experience  it. 
Nevertheless,  he  often  draws  on  Nietzsche  to  articulate  his  thoughts,  as  is  evident 
in  the  third  stanza  of  "Esthetique"  when  he  claims  that 
The  fault  lies  with  an  over-human  god, 
Who  by  sympathy  has  made  himself  a  man 
And  is  not  to  be  distinguished,  when  we  cry 
Because  we  suffer.... 
If  only  he  would  not  pity  us  so  much, 
Weaken  our  fate,  relieve  us  of  woe  both  great 
And  small,  a  constant  fellow  of  destiny, 
A  too,  too  human  god,  self-pity's  kin 
And  uncourageous  genesis...  It  seems 
As  if  the  health  of  the  world  might  be  enough.  (CP  315) 
The  reference  to  the  "too,  too  human  god"  is  an  unmistakable  allusion  to 
Nietzsche's  Human,  All-Too  Human.  In  this  canto  Stevens  considers  the  problem 
of  an  "over-human  god"  who  by  pitying  us  weakens  our  fate.  This  pitying  god 
prevents  us  from  finding  the  satisfactions  offered  by  our  paradisal  earth.  Such  a 
god,  according  to  Zarathustra,  "died  of  his  pity  for  man.  " 
45 A  "too,  too  human  god",  a  god  that  spoke  to  us  and  heard  our  complaints  with 
a  listening  ear,  who  knew  sympathy  and  empathised  with  our  suffering,  would 
make  it  impossible  for  us  to  have  a  true  appreciation  for  the  physical  world  in 
which  we  live.  What  we  require  instead  is  a  'faithful  reality',  a  dispassionate 
giver  that  passes  no  judgements  and  offers  no  sympathy.  "If  there  must  be  a  god 
in  the  house,  "  writes  Stevens,  "let  him  be  one  /  That  will  not  hear  us  when  we 
speak:  a  coolness,  /A  vermilioned  nothingness...  "  (CP  328).  60  If  there  must  be  a 
god  in  the  house,  let  him  "dwell  quietly",  leaving  us  the  freedom  to  say  of  the 
world  how  it  looks,  how  it  feels  without  being  hindered  in  our  'saying'  by  some 
primordial  judgement  that  disallows  a  genuine  engagement  with  things  as  they  are 
encountered. 
We  must  be,  says  Stevens  elsewhere,  "An  unhappy  people  in  a  happy  world,  " 
for  to  be 
An  unhappy  people  in  an  unhappy  world-- 
Here  are  too  many  mirrors  for  misery. 
Nor  can  we  be 
A  happy  people  in  an  unhappy  world-- 
It  cannot  be.  There's  nothing  here  to  roll 
On  the  expressive  tongue,  the  finding  fang. 
A  happy  people  in  a  happy  world-- 
Buffo!  A  ball,  an  opera,  a  bar. 
Turn  back  to  where  we  were  when  we  began: 
An  unhappy  people  in  a  happy  world. 
Now,  solemnize  the  secretive  syllables. 
Read  to  the  congregation  [rabbi],  for  today 
And  for  tomorrow,  this  extremity, 
60  These  lines  are  taken  from  "Less  and  Less  Human 
,0 
Savage  Spirit"  (CP  327-8),  a  poem, 
according  to  Leonard  and  Wharton,  that  "calls  for  Nietzsche's  'gods  of  Epicurus  who  [without  the 
divisiveness  of  pity,  envy,  deliberate  indifference]  have  no  care  and  are  unknown,  '  effectively 
encouraging  appreciation  of  our  own  dexterities  and  the  natural  tones  of  life's  surprising 
rightnesses....  "  In  J.  S.  Leonard  and  C.  E.  Wharton's  The  Fluent  Mundo,  p.  121. 
46 This  contrivance  of  the  spectre  of  the  spheres, 
Contriving  balance  to  contrive  a  whole, 
The  vital,  the  never-failing  genius, 
Fulfilling  his  meditations,  great  and  small.  (CP  420) 
There  is  a  never-failing  genius  of  living  as  unhappy  people  in  a  happy  world.  In 
such  a  place  there  is  always  more  to  'read'  and  more  to  'say'.  Like  the  mystic 
cabbalist  who,  in  her  insatiable  desire  to  excavate  the  sacred  text,  discovers 
endless  "secretive  syllables",  so  too  the  poet,  by  desiring  to  "name  the  world 
flatly",  finds  endless  material  "to  roll  /  On  the  expressive  tongue.  "  To  live  as 
unhappy  people  in  a  happy  world  is  to  live  with  an  over-arching  sense  of  lack  in  a 
world  of  plenitude,  a  sense  of  lack  that  is  overcome  (if  but  for  a  time)  when  it  is 
given  utterance.  It  is  up  to  the  poet  to  make  something  of  the  sorrow  of  this 
discontentment. 
The  need  to  find  some  "imperishable  bliss",  as  with  the  lady  in  "Sunday 
Morning",  is  driven  by  the  human  desire  for  completion,  that  is,  the  desire  to  be 
released  from  the  constraints  of  time  and  to  be  finally  a  "happy  people  in  a  happy 
world".  But  as  Stevens  suggests,  this  is  not  only  untenable  but  ultimately 
undesirable-and  even  laughable.  To  the  idea  of  a  "happy  people  in  a  happy 
world"  Stevens  exclaims,  "Buffo!  A  ball,  an  opera,  a  bar.  "  Just  as  we  cannot  live 
as  unhappy  people  in  an  unhappy  world  because  "there  are  too  many  mirrors  for 
misery,  "  neither  is  it  possible  to  live  contentedly  in  perfection.  It  is  necessary  that 
there  be  a  sense  of  incompletion  and  imperfection  on  the  side  of  the  human  in 
order  for  life  to  be  worth  living.  Another  way  to  say  this  is  that  there  must  be 
some  'slippage'  between  the  'happy'  world  and  our  'unhappy'  perception  of  it  in 
order  for  us  to  situate  ourselves  as  finite  beings  in  a  universe  that  will  most 
certainly  survive  us. 
47 This  'slippage'  between  our  unhappy  selves  and  the  happy  world  is  bridged  by 
desire  which  acts  as  a  kind  of  elastic  tether,  tying  us  to  the  ever-changing, 
transient  world  in  which  we  struggle  to  make  ourselves  at  home.  For  Stevens 
desire  is both  the  bane  of  our  existence  and  our  salvation.  Desire  for  completion, 
perfection,  for  an  unattainable  absolute  makes  us  an  unhappy,  discontented 
people.  And  yet  it  is  this  insatiable  desire  that  allows  us  to  make  ourselves  at 
home-or  perhaps  make  ourselves  a  home-in  a  world  that  would  otherwise  be 
uninhabitable.  For  desire  enables  us  to  inhabit  that  space  between  lack  and 
plenitude.  Jarraway  writes,  "Desire  in  its  strictest  sense  is  an  infection  of  time,  " 
and  its  force  lies  precisely  in  its  inability  to  bring  itself  to  any  kind  of 
culminating  completion.  Put  the  other  way,  desire's  prolongation  amounts  to 
its  ability  to  inhabit  disconnection  and  fragmentation,  to  bear  within  itself  'the 
destiny  of  its  non-satisfaction.  ' 61 
The  human  "desire  to  be  at  the  end  of  distances"  (CP  527)  is  a  desire  to  be  free 
from  the  constraints  of  time;  it  is  an  "eschatological  desire,  , 62  one  that  longs  for 
the  distances  to  become  within  reach.  However,  the  nature  of  desire  means  that  it 
is  forever  pushing  out,  deferring,  and  is  constantly  being  renewed  in  its  non- 
satisfaction. 
"Desire,  "  asserts  Helen  Vendler,  "its  illusions  and  its  despairs,  is  Stevens'  great 
subject.  "  She  continues, 
Another  way  to  put  it  is  to  say  that  the  human  illusions  engendered  by  desire 
are  his  great  subject.  We  are  helpless,  he  sees,  in  this  matter.  It  is  not 
possible  for  us  to  be  without  desire;  we  cannot  help  but  engage  in  that  process 
that  Freudians  call  idealization  and  trace  to  Oedipal  causes.  Our  common 
61  Jarraway,  p.  193.  See  also  Jacques  Derrida's  Of  Grammatology,  p.  143.  Of  this  connection 
between  desire  and  change,  Jonathan  Dollimore  says,  "movement,  motion,  change,  inconstancy 
are  the  very  stuff  not  just  of  life  but  also  of  desire;  that  is  to  say,  mutability  is  also  the  inner 
dynamic  of  desire....  In  other  words,  mutability  animates  desire  even  as  it  thwarts  it.  Put  slightly 
differently,  the  very  nature  of  desire  is  what  prevents  its  fulfilment,  what  makes  it  'impossible'.  " 
In  Jonathan  Dollimore's  Death,  Desire  and  Loss  in  Western  Culture  (London:  Allen  Lane,  The 
Penguin  Press,  1998),  p.  xvii. 
62  For  more  on  this  idea  of  "escatological  desire"  see  Richard  Kearney's  article,  "Desire  of  God", 
in  God,  the  Gift  and  Postmodernism,  John  Caputo  and  Michael  J.  Scanlons,  eds.  (Bloomington: 
Indiana  University  Press,  1999),  p.  113. 
48 names  for  idealization  are  romantic  love,  religious  belief,  and  political 
engagement:  these  do  not  differ  in  essence,  for  Stevens,  from  the  poet's 
creation  of  the  aesthetic  object  of  desire.  All  human  beings  engage  in  poesis 
in  constituting  an  imagined  world  to  live  in;  and  the  engagement  in  poesis  is 
coterminous  with  life. 
Indeed,  Stevens'  great  subject  is  desire  and  his  work  does  suggest  that  he  would 
agree  that  "poesis  is  coterminous  with  life";  however,  Vendler's  reference  to 
desire's  'illusions'  is dubious.  Poesis,  constructing  an  imagined  world  in  which  to 
live,  is  not  for  Stevens  connected  with  illusion;  quite  the  opposite.  He  is  insistent 
that  the  world  in  its  seeming,  in  the  way  it  looks,  the  way  it  feels,  is  the  very  thing 
itself,  and  to  suggest  otherwise  is  to  fall  into  the  trap  of  Platonism,  something  that 
he  wishes  to  avoid. 
Again,  Stevens  is  interested  in  keeping  the  question  open  and  is  willing  to  face 
the  difficulty  of  living  without  the  comforts  of  an  Absolute,  whether  it  be  an 
absolute  offered  by  the  "God  in  whom  we  were  all  brought  up  to  believe"  or  in 
some  other  abstract  Ideal.  He  knows  that  "The  way  through  the  world  /  Is  more 
difficult  to  find  than  the  way  beyond  it"  (CP  446)  and  he  accepts  the  pain  and 
sorrow  of  Desire's  relentless  pursuit  of  that  which  will  suffice.  Looking  to  the 
world  around  him  for  the  satisfactions  of  belief  rather  than  to  "empty  heaven  and 
its  hymns"  he  is  surprised  to  discover  that  there  is  a  plenitude  of  sufficiency 
offered  for  the  taking  by  that  dispassionate  giver,  the  earth.  64  And  if  there  is 
sorrow  upon  this  realisation,  it  is  not  because  there  is  not  enough,  but  precisely 
because  there  is  so  much.  The  happy  world,  abundant  with  gifts,  triggers  the 
desire  of  an  unhappy,  gluttonous  people  who  want  more  but  who  are  unable  to 
grasp  it  all  at  once.  Stevens  knows  that  the  key  to  making  oneself  at  home  in  a 
world  of  overwhelming  abundance  is  to  desire  what  one  already  has.  As  Walt 
63  Helen  Vendler,  Wallace  Stevens:  Words  Chosen  Out  of  Desire,  pp.  31-32. 
49 Whitman,  who  as  Bloom  argues  had  a  strong  influence  on  Stevens65,  asks  in  the 
sixth  canto  of  "A  Song  for  Occupations,  " 
Will  you  seek  afar  off?  you  surely  come  back  at  last, 
In  things  best  known  to  you  finding  the  best,  or  as  good  as  the  best, 
In  folks  nearest  to  you  finding  the  sweetest,  strongest,  lovingest, 
Happiness,  knowledge,  not  in  another  'lace  but  this  place, 
not  for  another  hour  but  this  hour... 
If  desire  is  Stevens'  great  subject  then  this  is  his  great  challenge:  to  desire  those 
local  objects  of  his  immediate  habitation. 
By  rejecting  the  escapism  of  a  metaphysics,  that  is,  by  rejecting  the  God  in 
whom  he  was  brought  up  to  believe,  Stevens  struggles  to  make  himself  at  home  in 
the  everyday  world.  In  his  desire  to  spend  an  ordinary  evening  in  New  Haven 
(rather  than  an  extra-ordinary  evening  in  new  heaven),  he  discovers  the  endless 
satisfactions  of  the  quotidian.  The  local  objects  of  his  surroundings,  "the  pans 
above  the  stove,  the  pots  on  the  table,  the  tulips  among  them"  (CP  423),  these  are 
the  everyday  things  of  reality  to  which  Stevens  returns  time  and  again  for 
inspiration.  Like  Whitman  who  asks,  "Will  you  seek  afar  off?  surely  you  come 
back  at  last",  Stevens  acknowledges  that,  "We  keep  coming  back  and  coming 
back  /  To  the  real:  to  the  hotel  instead  of  the  hymns"  (CP  471).  The  allure  of 
heaven  and  its  hymns  cannot  be  sustained;  eventually  a  longing  for  the  physical 
world  will  return.  For,  according  to  Stevens, 
The  greatest  poverty  is  not  to  live 
In  a  physical  world,  to  feel  that  one's  desire 
Is  too  difficult  to  tell  from  despair.  Perhaps, 
After  death,  the  non-physical  people,  in  paradise, 
Itself  non-physical,  may,  by  chance,  observe 
The  green  corn  gleaming  and  experience 
The  minor  of  what  we  feel. 
64  Janet  McCann  comments,  "Desire  for  the  unattainable  can  only  be  mocked  by  all  the  signs  of 
earth's  plenty,  "  in  Wallace  Stevens  Revisited:  The  Celestial  Possible,  p.  15 
65  See  Bloom's  The  Poems  of  Our  Climate,  pp.  11-15. 
66  Walt  Whitman,  Leaves  of  Grass,  Sculley  Bradley  and  Harold  W.  Blodgett,  eds.  (New  York: 
W.  W.  Norton  and  Company,  1973),  p.  218. 
50 The  non-physical  people  in  paradise  are  those  who  reject  the  'truths'  of  the 
quotidian  in  favour  of  some  abstraction.  They  are  the  same  people  Stevens  refers 
to  as  'ghosts'  in  "Large  Red  Man  Reading"  (CP  423-4).  These  'ghosts'  who  had 
lived  so  long  in  search  of  paradisal  perfection  among  the  "wilderness  of  stars" 
eventually  "returned  to  earth"  in  their  desire  to  feel-to  feel  pain  as  well  as 
pleasure.  These  ghosts, 
were  those  that  would  have  wept  to  step  barefoot  into  reality, 
That  would  have  wept  and  been  happy,  have  shivered  in  the  frost 
And  cried  out  to  feel  it  again,  have  run  fingers  over  leaves 
And  against  the  most  coiled  thorn,  have  seized  on  what  was  ugly 
And  laughed... 
These  'ghostly'  people  finding  no  satisfaction  in  the  monotonous  perfection  of 
"the  non-physical  world"  turn  away  from  their  heavenly  paradise  desiring  the  very 
imperfection  that  they  originally  spurned.  They  long  to  escape  this  other- 
worldly  haven  and  return  to  the  ugliness,  the  decay,  the  inconstancies  and 
mutability  of  the  everyday  world.  Like  the  lady  in  "Sunday  Morning"  who  learns 
that  through  death  "Alone,  shall  come  fulfilment  to  our  dreams  /  And  our  desires", 
these  ghosts  come  to  recognise  the  necessity  for  death-and  the  inevitable  sorrow 
that  it  brings-in  their  desire  for  religious  fulfilment. 
The  difficulty  of  living  in  this  world  of  change  and  death  without  the  safety-net 
offered  by  the  God  in  whom  he  was  brought  up  to  believe  is  a  challenge  Stevens 
ultimately  celebrates.  Finding  himself  released  from  a  constraining  religious 
certitude,  he  discovers  a  new-found  freedom  with  which  he  must  learn  to  live. 
Unlike  other  poets  of  his  time,  Stevens  does  not  indulge  in  a  nostalgic  longing  for 
the  religious  groundedness  of  days  gone  by;  66  rather  he  welcomes  the  difficulty  of 
66  "Since  Stevens's  'main  concern  is  with  discovering,  and  through  his  poetry,  enacting  the 
possibilities  for  self-renewal  in  an  impersonal  and  recalcitrant  age,  '  he  offered  a  healthy  corrective 
51 living  without  those  false  assurances.  Living  in  a  world  uncompromised  by 
notions  of  religious  Truth,  Stevens  is  able  to  affirm  "where  we  happen  to  be".  68 
to  the  tendency  of  much  modern  literature  to  wallow  in  the  loss  of  former  anchors  of  belief  and 
certainty....  In  explicit  contrast'to  Eliot  and  later  Auden,  it  becomes  clear  that  Stevens  is  relatively 
free  from  religious  and  ideological  nostalgia';  instead  of  futile  nostalgic  yearning  'there  is  instead 
a  recognition...  of  where  we  happen  to  be,  "'  writes  John  Timberman  Newcomb  quoting  Irving 
Howe.  In  Wallace  Stevens  and  Literary  Canons,  p.  191-2.  Also,  George  S.  Lensing  rightly 
comments  that  Stevens  "reacted,  as  every  poet  must,  to  his  own  experiences  and  found  their 
origins  in  a  wrenching  sense  of  loss-but  never  fatalistically  or  with  final  despair.  Stevens 
rescued  himself  from  loss  by  reaching  out  for  what  had  always  bewitched  and  beckoned  him,  the 
world  itself,  "  in  Wallace  Stevens  and  the  Seasons,  p.  5. 
68  Newcomb,  p.  192. 
52 Chapter  Three:  The  Paradox  of  Inspiration 
[...  ]we  are  confronted  with  an  enigmatic  paradox  that  will  not  cease 
questioning  us:  if  loss,  bereavement,  and  absence  trigger  the  work  of  the 
imagination  and  nourish  it  permanently  as  much  as  they  threaten  it  and  spoil 
it,  it  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  work  of  art  as  fetish  emerges  when  the 
activating  sorrow  has  been  repudiated. 
Julia  Kristeva69 
Whatever  inspiration  is,  it's  born  from  a  continuous  "I  don't  know.  " 
Wislawa  Szymborska7° 
The  effete  vocabulary  of  summer 
No  longer  says  anything. 
from  "The  Green  Plant"  (CP  506) 
In  the  beginning  the  beginning  will  have  been  lacking  and  this  lack  will  have 
given  the  beginning.... 
Marc Froment"Meurice7' 
In  the  last  chapter  we  considered  how  Stevens'  loss  of  belief  in  the  God  of  his 
heritage  opened  up  the  possibility  for  writing  poetry.  Now  we  will  explore  more 
fully  how  this  crisis  of  faith  and  the  sorrow  that  accompanies  it  (at  least  initially) 
affects  the  creative  process  and  we  will  show  how  it  is  that  such  loss  can  actually 
provide  a  source  of  inspiration  for  the  poet. 
It  must  be  said  that  we  need  to  tread  carefully  when  using  a  loaded  word  such 
as  'inspiration',  for  as  Timothy  Clark  has  pointed  out  in  his  study  The  Theory  of 
Inspiration,  the  word  has  come  to  have  "so  little  status  that,  though  part  of  the 
ordinary  language  and  arguably  the  key  term  in  the  history  of  Western  poetics,  it 
almost  never  appears  in  guides  to  literary  terms.  02  That  the  term  inspiration  has 
become  an  embarrassment  to  such  an  extent  that  it  has  disappeared  from  the 
69  An  excerpt  from  Black  Sun  (or  Solei!  Noir)  in  The  Portable  Kristeva,  edited  by  Kelly  Oliver 
(New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1987),  p.  184. 
7°  Wislawa  Szymborska,  "The  Poet  and  the  World",  Nobel  Lecture,  1996. 
71  Marc  Froment-Meurice,  That  is  to  Say:  Heldegger's  Poetics  (Stanford,  CA:  Stanford 
University  Press,  1998),  p.  19. 
53 literary  guides  is  not  surprising  in  our  (post)modern,  post-Christian  world;  for  the 
word  inspiration  has  always  implied  a  kind  of  mysterious  transcendent  force 
calling  upon  its  prophet,  the  poet,  to  voice  its  will.  In  an  age  of  disbelief  such  as 
ours  ideas  of  transcendental  inspiration  are  met  with  sufficient  scorn.  Yet,  as 
Clark  says  in  his 
Introduction, 
accounts  of  inspiration  have  persisted,  ineradicably,  as  part  of  Western  literary 
culture  for  more  than  three  thousand  years.  They  have  provided  a  recurrent 
source  of  controversy,  obfuscation,  enthusiasm,  wonder  and  even  comedy 
throughout  the  time.  No  sooner  is  the  term  disqualified  for  various  reasons 
than  crucial  aspects  of  it  come  back,  sometimes  from  an  unexpected 
direction.  72 
Indeed,  accounts  of  inspiration  over  the  ages  have  come  from  some  unexpected 
directions  and  have  been  attributed  to  some  unusual  sources.  One  such  source  of 
poetic  inspiration  that  cannot  be  underestimated  is  melancholia,  the  feeling  of 
despair  that  a  poet  experiences  when  he  or  she  is  faced  with  an  overarching  sense 
of  lost  inspiration.  That  is  to  say,  the  source  of  inspiration  for  poets  often  comes 
from  the  loss  of  inspiration.  This  paradox  of  finding  creative  inspiration  in  the 
absence  of  inspiration  is  not  something  unique  to  the  modem  poet,  such  as 
Stevens,  but  is  alluded  to  by  poets  of  every  generation  and  has  led  to  the  writing 
of  some  of  the  greatest  poetry  from  ancient  times  to  modem. 
Before  looking  at  examples  of  poetry  inspired  by  the  loss  of  inspiration,  we 
must  first  consider  the  following  question:  When  a  poet  laments  the  loss  of  her 
creative  powers  what  exactly  is  it  that  she  is  mourning?  Is  it  something  external 
to  the  poet  that  has  been  lost,  some  kind  of  outside  influence  that  was  once 
perceived  to  have  been  present,  some  invisible  entity  such  as  a  muse  or  a  divinity? 
Or,  rather,  is  it  something  internal,  a  certain  feeling  or  emotional  climate  that  is 
71  Timothy  Clark,  The  Theory  of  Inspiration,  p.  2. 
54 generated  from  within  that  the  poet  perceives  to  be  necessary  for  poesis?  Again, 
we  ask  the  question,  from  where  does  creativity  come? 
Such  questions  may  seem  naive  to  us  (post)modems,  but  as  Clark  asserts  the 
idea  of  inspiration  persists  even  today  in  this  most  'secular'  of  societies.  No 
matter  how  many  times  the  notion  of  inspiration  has  been  refuted  over  the  years, 
it  has  been  reinstated  in  one  way  or  another  by  the  poet  who  finds  himself  unable 
to  explain  why  it  is  that  he  must  write  or  what  it  is  that  compels  him  to  write. 
What  is  more,  the  poet  upon  completing  a  work  often  finds  himself  curiously 
disconnected  from  what  he  has  created,  making  him  feel  as  though  something  or 
someone  else  had  created  the  work  rather  than  himself.  This  is  true  among  even 
the  most  agnostic  of  poets.  Take,  for  example,  Stevens'  "Tea  at  the  Palaz  of 
Hoon": 
What  was  the  ointment  sprinkled  on  my  beard? 
What  were  the  hymns  that  buzzed  beside  my  ears? 
What  was  the  sea  whose  tide  swept  through  me  there? 
Out  of  my  mind  the  golden  ointment  rained, 
And  my  ears  made  the  blowing  hymns  they  heard. 
I  was  myself  the  compass  of  that  sea: 
I  was  the  world  in  which  I  walked,  and  what  I  saw 
Or  heard  or  felt  came  not  but  from  myself; 
And  there  I  found  myself  more  truly  and  more  strange.  (CP  65) 
Stevens,  who  with  a  certain  irony  depicts  himself  here  as  anointed,  a  priestly  poet, 
maker  of  the  world  in  which  he  walks,  claims  that  his  inspiration  comes  nought 
but  from  himself.  And  yet  how  peculiar  it  is  that  he  should  find  himself  a 
stranger-or  rather,  strange-in  this  world  of  his  own  making. 
The  notion  of  inspiration  appears  to  be  directly  linked  with  such  feelings  of 
estrangement  or  uneasiness.  In  "Tea  at  the  Palaz  of  Hoon",  Stevens  offers  a 
72  Ibid,  p.  1. 
55 reflection  on  the  peculiar  sensation  of  feeling  himself  to  be  called  into  question  by 
his  own  creation,  a  sensation  that  comes  after  the  act  of  writing,  which  he  then 
makes  the  subject  of  the  poem.  For  Stevens,  poetry  is  always  the  subject  of  the 
poem  and  here  the  experience  of  poetry  is  the  subject  of  the  poem.  "Tea"  gives  an 
account  of  the  mysterious  after  effect  of  writing,  when  the  poet  feels  himself 
dislocated  or  estranged  by  his  work  of  art,  a  work  that,  once  completed,  acquires  a 
life  of  its  own.  We  might  also  say  that  "Tea"  is  born  out  of  the  poet's  experience 
of  a  mysterious  something  that  confronts  the  poet  in  his  own  work. 
"Tea  at  the  Palaz  of  Hoon"  is  unusual  in  the  sense  that  it  is  concerned  with  the 
after-effects  of  writing  and  the  emergence  of  a  mysterious  something  that  the  poet 
cannot  identify  but  which  nevertheless  seems  to  have  some  kind  of  power  over 
him.  More  often,  however,  poets  write  about  the  uneasy  moment  that  precedes 
the  writing  of  the  poem,  the  time  when  creative  inspiration  is  experienced  not  as  a 
fullness  but  as  a  lack,  or  rather  not  as  a  presence  but  as  an  absence.  That  is,  poets 
more  often  write  about  the  nothing  of  poetic  inspiration  rather  than  about  the 
something.  Consider,  for  example,  the  first  stanza  of  Herbert's  "The  Temper  (II)": 
It  cannot  be.  Where  is  that  mighty  joy 
Which  just  now  took  up  all  my  heart? 
Lord,  if  must  needs  use  thy  dart, 
Save  that,  and  me;  or sin  for  both  destroy. 
Herbert  laments  the  loss  of  his  muse,  Joy.  He  longs  for  her  return  so  that  he  may, 
in  true  seventeenth  century  style,  continue  in  what  he  considers  to  be  the  poet's 
greatest  endeavour:  to  offer  praises  to  God.  Yet,  the  poet  knows  a  secret-one 
that  is  intimated  in  the  title  of  the  poem-that  this  feeling  of  loss,  this  change  in 
temper,  also  has  the  power  to  inspire.  Herbert  knows  that  when  it  comes  to  the 
creative  process,  the  absence  of  joy  is  just  as  inspirational  as  its  presence,  a  theme 
56 he  deals  with  at  length  in  "The  Glimpse,  "  the  first  three  stanzas  of  which  appear 
below: 
Wither  away  delight? 
Thou  cam'st  but  now;  wilt  thou  so  soon  depart, 
And  give  me  up  to  night? 
For  many  weeks  of  ling'ring  pain  and  smart 
But  one  half  hour  of  comfort  for  my  heart? 
Methinks  delight  should  have 
More  skill  in  music,  and  keep  better  time. 
Wert  thou  a  wind  or  wave, 
They  quickly  go  and  come  with  lesser  crime: 
Flowers  look  about,  and  die  not  in  their  prime. 
Thy  short  abode  and  stay 
Feeds  not,  but  adds  to  the  desire  of  meat. 
Lime  begged  of  old  (they  say) 
A  neighbour  spring  to  cool  his  inward  heat; 
Which  by  the  spring's  access  grew  much  more  great. 
Having  glimpsed  Delight,  the  poet  now  mourns  her  departure  and  feels  a  more 
intense  grief  than  if  he  had  never  known  her  at  all.  "Thy  short  abode  and  stay  / 
Feeds  not,  but  adds  to  the  desire  of  meat,  "  complains  Herbert,  all  the  while  aware 
that  Delight's  sudden  and  sustained  disappearance  is  no  less  the  subject  for  poetry 
than  her  fleeting  appearance.  Present  or  absent,  Joy  is  creative.  74 
Wordsworth  too  was  inspired  by  the  muse  of  loss  and  the  loss  of  the  muse. 
Like  so  many  of  the  Romantic  poets,  he  was  interested  in  ruins  and  fragments  and 
found  in  the  debris  of  past  annhilations  the  inspiration  for  building  anew  in  words 
and  images  the  glory  of  lost  empires  and  the  joy  of  dreams  that  never  came  to 
fruition.  But  more  than  the  decay  of  ancient  buildings  and  the  grief  of  dreams 
unrealised,  it  is  the  sorrow  over  lost  sentiment  that  lies  at  the  very  centre  of  his 
poetry.  We  recall  the  familiar  lines: 
There  was  a  time  when  meadow,  grove,  and  stream, 
The  earth,  and  every  common  sight, 
74  For  an  excellent  discussion  of  'Joy'  see  George  Dekker's  Coleridge  and  the  Literature  of 
Sensibility  (London:  Vision  Press,  1978). 
57 To  me  did  seem 
Apparelled  in  celestial  light, 
The  glory  and  the  freshness  of  a  dream. 
It  is  not  now  as  it  has  been  of  yore; 
Turn  wheresoe'er  I  may, 
By  night  or  day, 
The  things  which  I  have  seen  I  now  can  see  no  more. 
Echoing  Herbert,  Wordsworth  wonders,  "Wither  is  fled  the  visionary  gleam?  / 
Where  is  it  now,  the  glory  and  the  dream?  "  The  irony  here  is  that  the  poet 
wonders  where  his  wonder  has  gone.  The  poem  turns  on  fears  of  loss  of 
inspiration  that  inspire  the  writing  of  the  poem.  And  the  fact  that  the  poet  asks  of 
the  "visionary  gleam,  "  Wither  has  it  fled?  indicates  that  it  is  still  present  in  his 
longing  for  it.  Wordsworth  seems  to  be  well  aware  of  this  irony. 
"Ode:  Intimations  of  Immortality"  is  a  joyous  lament  to  all  that  has  failed. 
The  failure  of  thought  and  feeling  is  the  very  source  of  this  poem.  The  "Ode" 
continues: 
The  Rainbow  comes  and  goes, 
And  lovely  is  the  Rose, 
The  Moon  doth  with  delight 
Look  round  her  when  the  heavens  are  bare; 
Waters  on  a  starry  night 
Are  beautiful  and  fair; 
The  sunshine  is  a  glorious  birth; 
But  yet  I  know,  where'er  I  go, 
That  there  hath  passed  away  a  glory  from  the  earth. 
The  poet  praises  the  beauty  that  he  insists  he  can  no  longer  perceive  as  he  once 
did  in  his  youth.  The  memory  of  how  nature  once  stirred  in  him  an  immediacy  of 
sentiment,  a  joy  no  longer  available  to  him  in  maturity,  leads  to  a  poignant 
expression  of  loss,  an  expression  equal,  we  might  argue,  to  the  beauty  of  the  earth 
in  its  power  to  evoke  an  emotional  response.  This  sorrow  over  the  loss  of  feeling 
calls  upon  the  poet  to  give  voice  to  it. 
Now,  while  the  Birds  thus  sing  a  joyous  song, 
And  while  the  young  Lambs  bound 
58 As  to  the  tabor's  sound, 
To  me  alone  there  came  a  thought  of  grief- 
A  timely  utterance  gave  that  thought  relief, 
And  I  again  am  strong. 
As  the  grief  over  lost  sentiment  is  given  over  to  expression,  the  poet  feels  himself 
strengthened  and  restored.  He  finds  sustenance  in  voicing  this  loss.  In  faith  he 
goes  on  to  declare  that 
Though  nothing  can  bring  back  the  hour 
Of  splendour  in  the  grass,  of  glory  in  the  flower; 
We  will  grieve  not,  rather  find 
Strength  in  what  remains  behind, 
In  the  primal  sympathy 
Which  having  been  must  ever  be, 
In  the  soothing  thoughts  that  spring 
Out  of  human  suffering, 
In  the  faith  that  looks  through  death, 
In  years  that  bring  the  philosophic  mind. 
Wordsworth  like  Herbert  and,  as  we  have  already  seen,  Stevens,  has  a 
profound  faith  in  loss.  Loss  itself  is  seen  as  a  source  of  strength  and  hope  when  it 
is  given  over  to  expression  and  memorialised  in  the  poem.  This  "faith  that  looks 
through  death"  is  the  faith  of  the  poet  who  is  not  afraid  to  look  upon  human 
suffering  and  name  it,  who  is  inspired  to  make  something  out  of  the  misery  of 
loss. 
Keats,  too,  found  his  muse  in  misery.  In  "Ode  on  Melancholy"  he  says  of  his 
mistress 
She  dwells  with  Beauty-Beauty  that  must  die; 
And  Joy,  whose  hand  is  ever  at  his  lips 
Bidding  adieu;  and  aching  Pleasure  nigh, 
Turning  to  poison  while  the  bee-mouth  sips: 
Ay,  in  the  very  temple  of  Delight 
Veiled  Melancholy  has  her  sovran  shrine, 
Though  seen  of  none  save  him  whose  strenuous  tongue 
Can  burst  Joy's  grape  against  his  palate  fine; 
His  soul  shall  taste  the  sadness  of  her  might, 
And  be  among  her  cloudy  trophies  hung. 
59 The  poet  alone  is  privy  to  Melancholy's  secret-that  she  co-habitates  with  Delight 
in  the  temple  of  Beauty.  In  equal  measure  the  two  provide  the  necessary 
materials  for  the  poet,  whose  "strenuous  tongue  /  Can  burst  Joy's  grape  against  his 
palate"  and  taste  beauty,  even  the  beauty  of  sorrow. 
Like  all  'true'  poets,  Keats  knows  that  melancholy  (and  its  close  relative 
Boredom)  is  not  a  loss  of  feeling,  but  a  feeling  of  loss.  This  is  an  important 
distinction  in  our  attempt  to  understand  the  poet's  experience  of  the  (sense  of  ) 
loss  of  inspiration.  If  it  were  truly  a  case  of  lost  feeling,  the  poet's  "strenuous 
tongue"  would  fail  him  entirely.  For  without  feeling-even  the  feeling  of  the  loss 
of  feeling,  as  in  the  case  of  Wordsworth-here  would  be  nothing  to  say.  What 
distinguishes  the  poet  from  the  'ordinary  person,  is,  as  Keats  says,  that  the  poet  is 
able  to  see  "Veiled  Melancholy"  and  unmask  her  in  the  poem;  it  is  an  unmasking 
of  his  own  feeling  of  loss,  even  his  own  feeling  of  lost  feeling.  74 
Perhaps  Stevens'  "Chaos  in  Motion  and  Not  in  Motion"  can  serve  to  clarify.  In 
this  poem,  Ludwig  Richter-Stevens  himself?  -experiences  the  terror  of  finding 
himself  with  nothing  more  to  say  and  feels  the  intense  frustration  of  having  lost 
his  ability  to  feel. 
Oh,  that  this  lashing  wind  was  something  more 
Than  the  spirit  of  Ludwig  Richter... 
The  rain  is  pouring  down.  It  is  July. 
There  is  lightning  and  the  thickest  thunder. 
It  is  a  spectacle.  Scene  10  becomes  11, 
In  Series  X,  Act  IV,  et  cetera. 
People  fall  out  of  windows,  trees  tumble  down, 
74  In  a  letter  written  on  21  December  1817,  Keats  mentions  his  idea  of  "Negative  Capability,  "  a 
quality  that  he  says  is  necessary  "to  form  a  Man  of  Achievement,  especially  in  Literature.  " 
Negative  Capability,  according  to  Keats,  is  "when  a  man  is  capable  of  being  in  uncertainties, 
mysteries,  doubts,  without  any  irritable  reaching  after  fact  and  reason....  "  By  this  Keats  seems  to 
be  saying  that  the  poet  must  endure-and  indeed  welcome-those  times  when  he  (or  she)  feels  the 
agony  of  the  loss  of  creative  inspiration. 
60 Summer  is  changed  to  winter,  the  young  grow  old, 
The  air  is  full  of  children,  statues,  roofs 
And  snow.  The  theatre  is  spinning  round, 
Colliding  with  deaf-mute  churches  and  optical  trains. 
The  most  massive  sopranos  are  singing  songs  of  scales. 
And  Ludwig  Richter,  turbulent  Schlemihl, 
Has  lost  the  whole  in  which  he  was  contained, 
Knows  desire  without  an  object  of  desire, 
All  mind  and  violence  and  nothing  felt. 
He  knows  he  has  nothing  more  to  think  about, 
Like  the  wind  that  lashes  everything  at  once.  (CP  357-8) 
Even  with  all  that  is  going  on  around  the  protagonist-people  falling  out  of 
windows,  trees  tumbling  down-that  "turbulent  Schlemihl,  "  Ludwig  Richter, 
feels  overwhelmed  by  a  lack  of  inspiration.  He  despairs  over  being  "all  mind  and 
violence  and  nothing  felt.  "  This  is  the  feeling  of  the  poet  who  "knows  he  has 
nothing  more  to  think  about  /  Like  the  wind  that  lashes  everything  at  once.  "  The 
poet  has  nothing  more  to  think  about-which  is  like  the  wind  that  lashes 
everything.  Here  Stevens  demonstrates  the  irony  of  feeling  frustrated  by  the  lack 
of  creative  inspiration  as  he  names  this  feeling  of  lost  feeling,  expressing  it  in  the 
form  of  a  simile.  Language  ultimately  relieves  him  of  his  burden  and  in  this  way 
is  the  salvation  of  the  poet.  (We  remember  Wordsworth:  "To  me  alone  there 
came  a  thought  of  grief:  /A  timely  utterance  gave  that  thought  relief.  ") 
Coleridge's  "Dejection:  An  Ode,  "  almost  certainly  influenced  Stevens'  "Chaos 
in  Motion  and  Not  in  Motion"  and  may  well  have  contributed  broadly  to  Stevens' 
ideas  on  imagination  and  inspiration.  That  familiar  complaint  uttered  by 
Coleridge  in  the  third  stanza  of  the  Dejection  Ode,  "My  genial  spirits  fail",  has 
very  often  been  the  focus  of  critics  who  seek  to  define  the  term  'genial'  as  the  poet 
uses  it  here.  Asks  David  Jasper,  "What,  precisely,  does  'genial'  mean  in  this 
61 context?  According  to  Dr  Johnson,  it  is  'festive'  or  'that  gives  cheerfulness', 
linked  therefore  with  the  concept  of  joy.  "  Jasper  continues, 
[...  ]for  Coleridge,  who  knew  the  German  language  well  by  1802,  the  failure  of 
his  genial  spirits  would  suggest,  on  the  one  hand,  a  loss  of  that  joyful 
creativity  and  productiveness  which  the  poet  shared  with  God,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  decay  of  his  'genius',  that  gift  which  makes  him  a  poet  among  men. 
He  is  robbed  of  inspiration  and  revelation.  76 
Mourning  the  waning  of  his  creative  genius  Coleridge  recollects  in  the  sixth 
stanza, 
There  was  a  time  when,  though  my  path  was  rough, 
This  joy  within  me  dallied  with  distress, 
And  all  misfortunes  were  but  as  the  stuff 
Whence  Fancy  made  me  dreams  of  happiness: 
For  hope  grew  round  me,  like  the  twining  vine, 
And  fruits,  and  foliage,  not  my  own,  seemed  mine. 
But  now  afflictions  bow  me  down  to  earth: 
Nor  care  I  that  they  rob  me  of  my  mirth; 
But  oh!  each  visitation 
Suspends  what  nature  gave  me  at  my  birth, 
My  shaping  spirit  of  Imagination. 
In  days  gone  by  when  joy  dallied  with  him  and  hope  grew  round  him,  Coleridge 
claims  that  the  products  of  this  experience  were  not  of  his  own  making  although 
they  seemed  to  come  from  himself.  His  past  poetic  creations  emerging,  as  he 
claimed,  out  of  joy  came  not  from  any  powers  belonging  to  himself  but  were  a 
divine  gift.  With  the  loss  of  this  gift,  or  at  least  with  the  perceived  loss  of  this 
gift,  the  poet  feels  that  he  may  no  longer  "hope  from  outward  forms  to  win  /  The 
passion  and  the  life,  whose  fountains  are  within.  "  The  outward  forms  no  longer 
provide  inspiration  for  the  poet  who  now  finds  himself  abandoned,  left  alone  with 
his  "viper  thoughts,  that  coil  around  [his]  mind,  /  Reality's  dark  dream!  "  But 
finding  these  thoughts  to  be  of  no  help  to  him  he  turns  to  "listen  to  the  wind,  / 
Which  long  has  raved  unnoticed.  " 
Thou  Wind,  that  rav'st  without, 
76David  Jasper,  Coleridge  as  Poet  and  Religious  Thinker/(  Allison  Park,  Pennsylvania:  Pickwick 
Publications,  1985),  pp.  67-8.  / 
62 Bare  crag,  or  mountain-tairn,  or  blasted  tree, 
Or  pine-grove  whither  woodman  never  clomb, 
Or  lonely  house,  long  held  the  witches'  home, 
Methinks  were  fitter  instruments  for  thee, 
Mad  Lutanist!  who  in  this  month  of  showers, 
Of  dark-brown  gardens,  and  of  peeping  flowers, 
Mak'st  Devils'  yule,  with  worse  than  wintry  song, 
The  blossoms,  buds,  and  timorous  leaves  among. 
This  wind  announcing  the  impending  storm  is  invisible  yet  all  powerful.  We 
might  see  a  connection  with  Stevens'  "Chaos  in  Motion  and  Not  in  Motion"  here 
as  Coleridge  claims  to  have  nothing  to  write  about,  no  inspiration,  no  enthusiasm, 
and  yet  there  is  a  frenzy  of  activity  throughout  the  stanza  right  up  until  the  last 
few  lines.  He  addresses  the  Wind, 
Thou  Actor,  perfect  in  all  tragic  sounds! 
Thou  mighty  Poet,  e'en  to  frenzy  bold! 
What  tell'st  thou  now  about? 
'Tis  of  the  rushing  of  an  host  in  rout, 
With  groans,  of  trampled  men,  with  smarting  wounds- 
At  once  they  groan  with  pain,  and  shudder  with  the  cold! 
It  is  unclear  whether  Coleridge  perceives  this  lashing  wind  to  be  external  or 
internal.  We  recall  that  with  Stevens  it  was  understood  to  be  a  manifestation  of 
his  interiority;  Coleridge,  however,  does  not  identify  it  as  belonging  to  himself  or 
to  a  power  existing  outside  of  himself.  As  with  Stevens'  destructive  wind  in 
"Chaos  in  Motion  and  Not  in  Motion"  the  stormy  weather  of  Coleridge's 
"Dejection"  appears  to  be  born  out  of  indifference,  that  is,  the  poet,  it  would  seem, 
is  writing  of  his  intense  frustration  of  feeling  under-whelmed  by  everything 
around  him.  In  an  earlier  stanza  before  the  onslaught  of  the  storm,  Coleridge 
remarks, 
All  this  long  eve,  so  balmy  and  serene, 
Have  I  been  gazing  on  the  western  sky, 
And  its  peculiar  tint  of  yellow  green: 
And  still  I  gaze-and  with  how  blank  an  eye! 
63 The  poet  claims  that  he  sees  but  not  feels  the  beauty  of  his  surroundings.  His 
'blank  eye'  can  take  in  the  sights  but  he  perceives  himself  to  be  bereft  of  the 
emotional  faculty  to  engage  with  them.  Perhaps  another  way  of  saying  this  is  that 
he  sees  the  beauty  but  cannot  give  voice  to  it.  In  this  way,  he  is  like  the  character 
in  Stevens'  "The  Man  Whose  Pharynx  was  Bad"  (CP  96). 
The  time  of  year  has  grown  indifferent. 
Mildew  of  summer  and  the  deepening  snow 
Are  both  alike  in  the  routine  I  know. 
I  am  too  dumbly  in  my  being  pent. 
The  wind  attendant  on  the  solstices 
Blows  on  the  shutters  of  the  metropoles, 
Stirring  no  poet  in  his  sleep,  and  tolls 
The  grand  ideas  of  the  villages. 
The  "grand  ideas"  no  longer  satisfy,  and  the  poet's  creative  powers  slumber  in 
indifference.  He  claims  that  he  cannot  speak,  for  he  has  nothing  to  say.  Here  we 
can  see  how  "thought,  fixed  on  a  particular  sublime,  loses  its  generative 
energy.  "77  The  once  satisfying  idea  has  become  lacklustre  and  the  poet  suffers 
from  boredom.  We  note  that  the  images  all  have  to  do  with  a  centre,  a  middle- 
point,  where  the  poet  feels  himself  to  be  suspended  emotionally,  and  once  again 
there  is  reference  to  an  impotent  wind  that,  though  it  "Blows  on  the  shutters  of  the 
metropoles,  "  is  unable  to  inspire. 
Among  the  many  images  of  loss  appropriated  by  poets  over  the  centuries, 
perhaps  none  is  so  prevalent  as  the  windy  season  of  autumn.  Themes  of  autumn 
recounting  death  and  decay  are  very  often  about  the  death  and  decay  of  the  poet's 
creative  powers.  This  is  the  time  "after  the  leaves  have  fallen"  (CP  502)  when  the 
creative  vitality  of  summer  has  come  to  an  end,  and  a  new  creative  force  is  found 
in  the  misery  of  the  howling  wind. 
77  Leonard  and  Wharton,  p.  110. 
64 A  familiar  example  of  such  autumnal  poetry  is  Shelley's  "Ode  to  the  West 
Wind"  which  reflects  the  poet's  faith  in  the  sweet  sadness  of  death,  especially  the 
sweet  sadness  of  the  death  of  inspiration.  In  the  final  stanza  the  poet  calls  upon 
the  "breath  of  Autumn's  being,  "  the  West  Wind  to 
Make  me  thy  lyre,  even  as  the  forest  is: 
What  if  my  leaves  are  falling  like  its  own! 
The  tumult  of  thy  mighty  harmonies 
Will  take  from  both  a  deep,  autumnal  tone, 
Sweet  though  in  sadness.  Be  thou,  Spirit  fierce, 
My  spirit!  Be  thou  me,  impetuous  one!  77 
Drive  my  dead  thoughts  over  the  universe 
Like  withered  leaves  to  quicken  a  new  birth! 
And,  by  the  incantation  of  this  verse, 
Scatter,  as  from  an  unextinguishable  hearth 
Ashes  and  sparks,  my  words  among  mankind! 
Be  through  my  lips  to  unawakened  Earth 
The  trumpet  of  a  prophecy!  0  Wind, 
If  Winter  comes,  can  Spring  be  far  behind? 
Shelley's  familiar  verse  summoning  the  Spirit  of  Autumn  to  drive  his  "dead 
thoughts  over  the  universe  /  Like  withered  leaves  to  quicken  a  new  birth!  "  is  a 
celebration  of  death  and  stands  as  a  testimony  to  the  poet's  faith  in  the  ability  for 
loss-especially  the  articulation  of  loss-to  bring  about  the  new.  Shelley  here  is 
the  prophet  of  Autumn,  testifying  to  the  power  of  death,  even  the  death  of  his  own 
creativity.  By  the  very  incantation  of  this  verse  is  misery  overcome  and  joy 
restored. 
In  contradistinction  to  Shelley's  Romantic  embracing  of  death  stands 
Baudelaire's  dark  despair  in  "Chant  d'  Automne.  " 
77  It  is  worth  noting  that  Stevens  echoes  Shelley's  call  to  the  pneumatic  muse,  "Be  thou  me",  in  the 
sixth  canto  of  Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction  (CP  394).  The  point  of  Stevens'  allusion- 
`Bethou  me,  said  sparrow,  to  the  crackled  blade....  Bethou,  bethou,  bethou  me  in  my  glade"-is 
unclear;  however,  it  may  be  that  he  is domesticating  this  spirit  by  laying  claim  to  it.  Barbara  M. 
65 Bientöt  nous  plongerons  dans  les  froides  tenebres; 
Adieu,  vive  clarte  de  nos  Ws  trop  courts! 
J'entends  dejä  tomber  avec  des  chocs  funebres 
Le  bois  retentissant  sur  le  pave  des  cours. 
Tout  l'hiver  va  rentrer  dans  mon  titre:  colere, 
Haine,  frissons,  horreur,  labeur  dur  et  force, 
Et,  comme  le  soleil  dans  son  enfer  polaire, 
Mon  cceur  ne  sera  plus  qu'un  bloc  rouge  et  glace. 
J'ecoute  en  fremissant  chaque  buche  qui  tombe; 
L'echafaud  qu'  on  bätit  n'a  pas  d'echo  plus  sourd. 
Mon  esprit  est  pareil  ä  la  tour  qui  succombe 
Sous  les  coups  du  belier  infatigable  et  lourd. 
Il  me  semble,  berce  par  ce  choc  monotone, 
Qu'on  cloue  en  grande  hate  un  cercueil  quelque  part. 
Pour  qui?  --C'etait  hier  1'ete;  voici  1'automne! 
Ce  bruit  mysterieux  sonne  comme  un  depart. 
(Soon  cold  shadows  will  close  over  us 
and  summer's  transitory  gold  be  gone; 
I  hear  them  chopping  firewood  in  our  court- 
the  dreary  thud  of  logs  on  cobblestone. 
Winter  will  come  to  repossess  my  soul 
With  rage  and  outrage,  horror,  drudgery, 
And  like  the  sun  in  its  polar  holocaust 
My  heart  will  be  a  block  of  blood-red  ice. 
I  listen  trembling  to  that  grim  tattoo- 
build  a  gallows,  it  would  sound  the  same. 
My  mind  becomes  a  tower  giving  way 
under  the  impact  of  a  battering-ram. 
Stunned  by  the  strokes,  I  seem  to  hear,  somewhere, 
a  coffin  hurriedly  hammered  shut-for  whom? 
Summer  was  yesterday;  autumn  is  here! 
Strange  how  that  sound  rings  out  like  a  farewell.  )78 
Baudelaire  anticipates  the  coming  season  when  the  muse  will  abandon  him.  He 
knows  the  far  away  sound  of  "that  grim  tattoo"  because  he  has  heard  it  before. 
Loss  is  something  he  has  come  to  expect;  in  fact,  it  is  so  familiar  that  he  can 
Fisher  comments  that  "This  is  no  soaring  Shelleyan  skylark,  but  a  domestic  sparrow  who  inhabits 
a  windy  suburban  garden....  "  In  Wallace  Stevens:  The  Intensest  Rendezvous,  p.  2. 
66 describe  its  devastation  even  before  it  has  occurred.  Unlike  Shelley,  Baudelaire 
does  not  openly  confess  hope  in  this  loss.  There  are  no  promises  of  spring,  no 
prophecies  of  resurrection.  Rather,  the  poem  itself  is  all  that  testifies  to  the  poet's 
faith  in  the  impending  death  of  his  creative  powers. 
It  is  interesting  to  consider  this  poem  by  Baudelaire  along  side  of  a  late  work 
of  Stevens',  "Not  Ideas  About  the  Thing  but  the  Thing  Itself'  (CP  534).  In  this 
poem  Stevens  also  hears  a  far  away  sound-but  it  is  not  the  "grim  tattoo"  of 
autumnal  death  but  the  "scrawny  cry"  of  spring  and  its  possibilities. 
At  the  earliest  ending  of  winter, 
In  March,  a  scrawny  cry  from  outside 
Seemed  like  a  sound  in  his  mind. 
He  knew  that  he  heard  it, 
A  bird's  cry,  at  daylight  or  before, 
In  the  early  March  wind. 
The  sun  was  rising  at  six, 
No  longer  a  battered  panache  above  snow... 
It  would  have  been  outside. 
It  was  not  from  the  vast  ventriloquism 
Of  sleep's  faded  papier-mache... 
The  sun  was  coming  from  outside. 
That  scrawny  cry-it  was 
A  chorister  whose  c  preceded  the  choir. 
It  was  part  of  the  colossal  sun, 
Surrounded  by  its  choral  rings, 
Still  far  away.  It  was  like 
A  new  knowledge  of  reality. 
This  sound  coming  from  "outside"  heard  vaguely  "at  the  earliest  ending  of  winter" 
is  the  sound  of  the  Muse  returning  after  her  lengthy  hibernation.  Like  Baudelaire 
who  knows  the  voice  of  Loss  even  from  afar,  Stevens  recognises  in  the  scrawny 
cry  the  call  of  his  mistress,  the  Muse.  Both  poems  have  to  do  with  that  time  of  in- 
79  Charles  Baudelaire,  Les  Fleurs  du  Mal,  translated  by  Richard  Howard.  (Boston:  David  R. 
67 betweens,  represented  by  a  change  of  season-the  former  from  summer  to 
autumn,  the  latter  from  winter  to  spring-that  time  when  the  subject  of  the  poem 
is  not  yet  clear  and  distinct,  when  the  feeling-whether  it  be  of  misery  or  joy-a  s 
not  yet  taken  on  a  'visibility'  in  words.  This  uncertainty  over  what  the  coming 
change  in  climate  will  bring  is  emphasised  by  the  use  of  the  audio  over  the  visual. 
We  consider  Baudelaire's  lines:  "I  hear  them  chopping  firewood  in  our  court...  "  / 
"I  listen  trembling  to  that  grim  tattoo...  "  /  "Stunned  by  the  strokes,  I  seem  to  hear, 
somewhere,  /a  coffin  hurriedly  hammered  shut....  "  Through  images  of  hearing 
rather  than  seeing,  the  poet  manages  to  describe  this  sense  of  indeterminancy. 
Whether  it  be  the  sorrowful  feeling  that  the  muse  will  abandon  the  poet  or  the 
joyful  feeling  that  the  muse  is  about  to  return,  it  is  sound  rather  than  sight  that 
captures  this  state  of  vagueness.  Of  course  the  irony  here  is  that  the  poet  cannot 
describe  what  the  change  will  look  like-and  yet  he  cannot  not  describe  it.  In 
both  the  Baudelaire  and  the  Stevens  poems  this  vague  sense  of  being  in-between 
'creative  climates'  and  not  having  a  clear  subject  actually  becomes  the  subject  of 
the  poem  as  the  barely  audible  beckoning  of  Loss  and  Possibility  is  given  over  to 
description  in  vivid  imagery. 
In  "Not  Ideas  About  the  Thing  But  the  Thing  Itself'  Stevens  insists  that  the 
sound  he  hears  comes  from  "outside.  "  This  is in  contrast  to  the  earlier  "Chaos  in 
Motion  and  Not  in  Motion"  in  which  he  identifies  the  lashing  wind  as  the  spirit  of 
the  poet  himself.  Stevens  frequently  toys  with  such  ideas  of  'inside'  and  'outside' 
in  relation  to  poetic  inspiration,  never  arriving  at  a  final  conclusion.  Sometimes  it 
seems,  as  with  the  "Not  Ideas"  poem,  that  the  muse  is  external  to  the  poet,  calling 
from  outside  the  mind.  At  other  times,  in  the  perceived  absence  of  inspiration,  the 
Godine,  1982),  p.  61-62  and  p.  239. 
68 poet  feels  the  despair  of  knowing  that  the  misery  that  is  itself  creative  is  nothing 
more  than  the  spirit  of  the  poet  himself.  Stevens  never  allows  himself  to  draw  any 
conclusions  about  where  the  source  of  poetic  inspiration  lies;  he  refuses  to  settle 
the  question  because  he  knows  that  the  question  of  the  source  is  itself  at  the  very 
heart  of  poetry.  Should  this  particular  question  ever  be  settled  the  poet  would  be 
silenced  for  all  time;  there  would  simply  be  nothing  more  to  say. 
The  particular  question-here 
The  particular  answer  to  the  particular  question 
Is  not  in  point-the  question  is  in  point.  (CP  429) 
The  question  of  the  source  of  inspiration  is  in  point.  Is  it  external  or  internal? 
Furthermore,  is  there  a  difference  between  external  and  internal?  79  In  "Not 
Ideas"  the  "scrawny  cry  from  outside  /  Seemed  like  a  sound  in  his  mind.  "  The 
word  "seemed"  is  significant  here.  The  far  away  sound  seemed  like  a  sound  in  the 
poet's  mind.  The  key  to  understanding  this  poem  is  to  recognise  that  for  Stevens 
the  way  that  something  seems  is  not  its  mere  appearance  but  the  very  thing  itself. 
A  thing  is  in  the  way  that  it  seems,  in  the  way  that  it  appears,  there  simply  being 
no  other  way  of  experiencing  it.  80  (Writes  Stevens  elsewhere,  "to  seem-it  is  to 
be"  (CP  339).  )  The  phenomenology  of  seeming  is  crucial  to  this  poem,  as 
suggested  by  the  title,  "Not  Ideas  About  the  Thing  But  the  Thing  Itself,  " 
reminiscent  of  Husserl's  "to  the  things  themselves.  " 
By  insisting  that  the  sound  came  from  outside  yet  seemed  like  a  sound  in  his 
mind,  the  poet  intentionally  blurs  the  distinction  between  inside  and  outside, 
thereby  leaving  the  question  regarding  the  dwelling  place  of  the  muse  up  in  the 
79  For  an  interesting  discussion  of  notions  of  'inside  and  outside,  '  see  James  S.  Cutsinger's  article, 
"Inside  without  Outside:  Coleridge,  the  Form  of  the  One,  and  God"  in  The  Interpretation  of 
Belief,  edited  by  David  Jasper  (New  York:  St  Martin's  Press,  1986). 
80  See  Marjorie  Perloffs  The  Poetics  of  Indeterminancy:  From  Rimbaud  to  Cage  (New  Jersey: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1981),  pp.  19-21.  Writes  Perloff,  "For  Stevens,  being  must  ultimately 
69 air.  The  question  of  whether  inspiration  comes  from  within  or  without  is  itself 
generative  of  poetry.  81  Returning  for  a  moment  to  Baudelaire  with  "Hymne  a  la 
Beaute"  we  see  how  such  musings  over  the  muse  creates  the  poem: 
Viens-tu  du  ciel  profond  ou  sors-tu  de  1'  abime, 
O  Beaute?  ton  regard,  infernal  et  divin, 
Verse  confusement  le  bienfait  et  le  crime, 
Et  Von  peut  pour  cela  to  comparer  au  vin. 
Tu  contiens  dans  ton  mil  le  couchant  et  1'aurore; 
Tu  repands  des  parfums  comme  un  soir  orageux; 
Tes  bailers  sont  un  philtre  et  to  bouche  une  amphore 
Qui  font  le  heros  lache  et  l'enfant  courageux. 
Sors-tu  du  gouffre  noir  ou  descends-tu  des  astres? 
Le  Destin  charme  suit  tes  jupons  comme  un  chien; 
Tu  semes  au  hasard  la  joie  et  les  desastres, 
Et  tu  gouvernes  tout  et  ne  reponds  de  rien. 
Tu  marches  sur  des  morts,  Beaute,  dont  tu  to  moques; 
De  tes  bijoux  1'Horreur  n'est  pas  le  moins  charmant, 
Er  le  Meurtre,  parmi  tes  plus  cheres  breloques, 
Sur  ton  ventre  orgueilleux  danse  amoureusement. 
L'ephemere  ebloui  vole  vers  toi,  chandelle, 
Crepite,  flambe  et  dit:  Benissons  ce  flambeau! 
L'amoureux  pantelant  incline  sur  sa  belle 
A  fair  dun  moribond  caressant  son  tombeau. 
Que  tu  viennes  du  ciel  ou  de  1'enfer,  qu'importe, 
O  Beaute!  Monstre  enorme,  effrayant,  ingenu! 
Si  ton  teil,  ton  souris,  ton  pied,  m'ouvrent  la  porte 
D'un  Infini  que  j'aime  et  n'ai  jamais  connu? 
De  Satan  ou  de  Dieu,  qu'importe?  Ange  ou  Sirene, 
Qu'importe,  si  tu  rends,  -fee  aux  yeux  de  velours, 
Rhyme,  parfum,  lueur,  ö  mon  unique  reine  !  - 
L'univers  moins  hideux  et  les  instants  moins  lourds? 
(Do  you  come  from  on  high  or  out  of  the  abyss, 
O  Beauty?  Godless  yet  divine,  your  gaze 
indifferently  showers  favor  and  shame, 
reside,  not  in'some  divine  labyrinth'  beyond  the  sense  world,  but  only  here  and  now,  within'things 
as  they  are.  "' 
81  Along  the  same  lines,  David  R.  Jarraway  argues  that  "Stevens'  strategy...  is  to  work  against 
metaphysical  closure,  to  counter  'part'  with  'counterpoint,  '  that  is,  to  resist  our  tendency  to  presence 
univocal  or  mimetic  truth  by  maintaining  the  forms  of  truth  themselves  in  a  polyvocal 
conversation  with  each  other,  "  in  Wallace  Stevens  and  the  Question  of  Belief,  p.  16. 
70 and  therefore  some  have  likened  you  to  wine. 
Your  eyes  reflect  the  sunset  and  the  dawn; 
you  scatter  perfumes  like  a  windy  night; 
your  kisses  are  a  drug,  your  mouth  the  urn 
dispensing  fear  to  heroes,  fervor  to  boys. 
Whether  spawned  by  hell  or  sprung  from  the  stars, 
Fate  like  a  spaniel  follows  at  your  heel; 
you  sow  haphazard  fortune  and  despair, 
ruling  all  things,  responsible  for  none. 
You  walk  on  corpses,  Beauty,  undismayed, 
and  Horror  coruscates  among  your  gems; 
Murder,  one  of  your  dearest  trinkets,  throbs 
on  your  shameless  belly:  make  it  dance! 
Dazzled,  the  dayfly  flutters  round  your  wick, 
crackles,  flares,  and  cries:  I  bless  this  torch! 
The  pining  lover  for  his  lady  swoons 
like  a  dying  man  adoring  his  own  tomb. 
Who  cares  if  you  come  from  paradise  or  hell, 
appalling  Beauty,  artless  and  monstrous  scourge, 
if  only  your  eyes,  your  smile  or  your  foot  reveal 
the  Infinite  I  love  and  have  never  known? 
Come  from  Satan,  come  from  God-who  cares, 
Angel  or  Siren,  rhythm,  fragrance,  light, 
provided  you  transform-O  my  one  queen! 
this  hideous  universe,  this  heavy  hour?  ) 
Baudelaire  speculates  on  the  origins  of  creative  inspiration.  Does  it  come  from 
God  or  from  Satan;  is  it  "spawned  by  hell  or  sprung  from  the  stars"?  In  the  end, 
the  poet  knows  that  it  matters  not  from  whence  it  comes.  Whether  Beauty  comes 
"from  on  high  or out  of  the  abyss"  her  power  to  transform  "this  hideous  universe" 
is  the  same.  In  this  poem  the  very  question  over  the  dwelling  place  of  the  Muse 
lightens  "this  heavy  hour"  weighed  down  with  the  misery  of  boredom. 
That  the  poet  cannot  uncover  the  mystery  of  the  source  of  inspiration  enables 
the  writing  of  the  poem.  Inside  or  outside,  from  heaven  or  from  hell,  the  Muse 
eludes  the  poet's  grasp.  There  is  no  determining  her  origins,  just  as  there  is  no 
71 uncovering  what  Stevens  calls  "the  plain  sense  of  things"  (CP  502).  Even  when  it 
seems  to  the  poet  that  he  has  exposed  the  source  and  arrived  upon  the  Muse's 
doorstep,  this  feeling  of  having  reached  the  end  of  the  imagination  disintegrates 
the  moment  it  is  articulated  in  the  poem,  as  language  in  its  exhaustibility  never 
allows  for  a  final  arrival.  It  is  not  possible  to  capture  the  Muse  in  language  and 
hold  her  in  place,  to  assign  her  a  location  'inside'  or  'outside';  for  her  existence  is 
made  possible  by  an  elusiveness  of  presence  that  is  equally  an  elusiveness  of 
absence.  She  is  never  finally  present,  nor  ever  finally  absent,  and  on  this  the 
poem  depends. 
Fat  girl,  terrestrial,  my  summer,  my  night, 
How  is  it  I  find  you  in  difference,  see  you  there 
In  a  moving  contour,  a  change  not  quite  completed? 
You  are  familiar  yet  an  aberration. 
Civil,  madam,  I  am,  but  underneath 
A  tree,  this  unprovoked  sensation  requires 
That  I  should  name  you  flatly,  waste  no  words, 
Check  your  evasions,  hold  you  to  yourself. 
Even  so  when  I  think  of  you  as  strong  or  tired, 
Bent  over  work,  anxious,  content,  alone, 
You  remain  the  more  than  natural  figure.  You 
Become  the  soft-footed  phantom,  the  irrational 
Distortion,  however  fragrant,  however  dear. 
That's  it:  the  more  than  rational  distortion, 
The  fiction  that  results  from  feeling.  Yes,  that. 
They  will  get  it  straight  one  day  at  the  Sorbonne. 
We  shall  return  at  twilight  from  the  lecture 
Pleased  that  the  irrational  is  rational, 
Unflicked  by  feeling,  in  a  gildered  street, 
I  call  you  by  name,  my  green,  my  fluent  mundo. 
You  will  have  stopped  revolving  except  in  crystal.  (CP  406-7) 
Stevens  longs  to  hold  in  check  the  elusive  Muse  so  that  he  may  call  her  by  name, 
that  he  might  'have'  her.  If  only  he  could  name  the  source  of  his  creativity  he 
72 could  stop  the  world  turning  and  arrive  at  a  transparency  of  'being'.  But  Stevens 
is  aware  that  any  sense  of  arrival  is  a  "fiction  that  results  from  feeling,  "  and  one 
arrival  leads  to  another.  For  to  arrive  at,  what  Keats  calls,  the  "temple  of  Beauty,  " 
the  residence  of  the  Muse,  is  impossible  as  long  as  there  exists  the  ever-changing 
climate  of  human  emotion  and  the  necessity  to  express  that  change  in  words. 
73 Chapter  Four:  The  Mystical  Element  in  Stevens'  Poetry 
If  the  idea  of  God  is  the  ultimate  poetic  idea,  then  the  idea  of  the  ascent  into 
heaven  is  only  a  little  below  it. 
from  "A  Collect  of  Philosophy"  (OP  274) 
Because  of  the  soul's  capacity  for  emptiness,  we  learn  that  there  is  no  final 
revelation  and  no  ultimate  name. 
from  The  Other  Side  of  Nothingness,  Beverly  Lanzetta83 
We  will  now  re-visit  something  first  mentioned  in  chapter  one  and  hinted  at  in 
chapters  two  and  three,  that  is,  Stevens'  inherent  mysticism.  Some  might  protest 
using  the  word  'mysticism'  in  connection  with  Stevens,  arguing  that  the  poet  did 
not  possess  what  is  traditionally  accepted  as  a  'religious  sensibility',  and  preferring 
instead  to  speak  of  the  poet's  engagement  with  meditation.  Meditation,  after  all, 
may  be  seen  as  a  'secular'  activity  and  the  practitioner  need  not  be  of  any 
particular  religious  persuasion,  whereas  mysticism  is  generally  understood  to  be 
religious  in  nature.  We  might  also  point  out  that  meditation  is  very  often 
connected  with  Buddhism,  and  mysticism  with  the  theistic  faiths.  84 
So  if  Stevens  is  not  a  Christian  (at  least  not  in  the  traditional  sense),  as  we  have 
already  argued,  why  classify  his  poetics  as  mystical  rather  than  meditative, 
especially  since  the  poet  himself  more  often  employs  the  term  meditation?  And 
what  is  the  difference  between  mysticism  and  meditation,  assuming  there  is  one? 
Before  we  answer  that,  we  need  to  take  a  brief  look  at  William  Bevis'  ground 
breaking  work,  Mind  of  Winter:  Wallace  Stevens,  Meditation  and  Literature,  in 
83  Lanzetta,  p.  127. 
sa  We  are  aware  that,  although  there  is  a  long  tradition  of  the  mystical  within  the  theistic  religions, 
mysticism  itself  is  not  necessarily  affirming  of  theism.  As  Lanzetta  and  other  contemporary 
scholars  have  noted,  "Reaffirming  a  tone  prevalent  from  the  beginning  in  Christian  mysticism, 
74 which  the  author  takes  great  pains  to  demonstrate  that  the  poet  underwent  intense 
meditative  experiences  similar  to  those  of  Zen  Buddhists,  though  he  denies  that 
there  is  any  religious  element  to  these  meditative  practices.  The  author  makes  a 
strong  and  convincing  argument  that  Stevens  was  a  practitioner  of  meditation,  and 
the  poetry  does  support  this  kind  of  reading;  however,  there  are  some  major  flaws 
both  in  his  approach  and  in  the  conclusions  he  reaches.  85 
Bevis  tells  us  at  the  start  of  his  work  what  it  was  that  inspired  this  volume: 
"With  many  other  readers,  I  was  intrigued  by  the  various  forms  of  nothingness, 
blankness,  poverty,  detachment,  the  truly  remarkable  vacuities  in  Stevens' 
work.  "  86  He  takes  the  following  lines  from  "The  American  Sublime"  as  an 
example, 
And  the  sublime  comes  down 
To  the  spirit  itself, 
The  spirit  and  space, 
The  empty  spirit 
In  vacant  space.  (CP 131) 
Reflecting  on  the  "empty  spirit  /  In  vacant  space",  Bevis  says, 
And  just  when  we  think  we  have  located  those  vacancies  in  fin-de-siecle 
ennui,  they  become  celebratory,  the  nihilists  become  jubilant  while  'searching 
for  the  fecund  minimum,  '  and  we  are  left  wondering  just  what  kind  of 
87  minimum  this  might  be.... 
Between  1879  and  1955  Stevens  somehow  became  "a  master  of  meditative 
detachment,  ,  88  and  Bevis  takes  as  his  central  argument  that  the  poet's  meditative 
current  thought  upholds  that  apophatic  mysticism  overturns  the  ontological  foundation  of  theism,  " 
9. 
It  should  be  noted  that  we  choose  to  wrestle  with  Bevis'  work  here  because  the  author  has  been, 
and  continues  to  be,  an  important  contributor  to  Stevensian  scholarship.  Since  the  publication  of 
Mind  of  Winter  others  have  followed  in  Bevis'  footsteps,  looking  at  Stevens'  poetics  from  the 
standpoint  of  Zen  Buddhism.  (See,  for  example,  Zhaoming  Qian's  article,  "Late  Stevens, 
Nothingness  and  the  Orient,  "  The  Wallace  Stevens  Journal  25.2  (Fall  2001):  164-172.  ) 
86  Bevis,  p.  3. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid.,  p.  9. 
75 interests  came  to  offer  "a  perfect  foil  to  his  imaginative  interests.  ,  88  He  believes 
that 
Stevens'  passive,  blank,  detached  aspect-an  aspect  essentially  comic  even 
though  words  such  as  passive  or  blank  often  have  negative  connotations  in  our 
culture-is  the  source  of  much  of  his  power  and  a  complementary  opposite 
of  imagination.  The  meditative  Stevens  is  in  constant  tension  with  the 
imaginative  Stevens.  89 
As  we  shall  later  see,  this  juxtaposing  of  the  meditative  and  the  imaginative  in 
Stevens'  work  is  problematic.  But  setting  that  aside  for  now,  we  continue  with 
Bevis'  argument. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  author  of  Mind  of  Winter  is  most  keen  to  demonstrate  the 
Zen-like  quality  of  "The  Snow  Man"  with  its  "the  nothing  that  is",  which  until 
now  he  believes  has  gone  either  unnoticed  or  has  been  deemed  unacceptable  by 
Western  readers  culturally  unequipped  to  apprehend  the  absolute  'nothingness'  of 
meditative  passivity.  The  poem,  quoted  below  in  its  entirety,  has  generated 
endless  commentary  over  the  years,  but,  says  Bevis,  has  not  been  fully 
appreciated  for  its  "neutral  description  of  a  certain  bare  state  of  mind.  "90 
One  must  have  a  mind  of  winter 
To  regard  the  frost  and  the  boughs 
Of  the  pine-trees  crusted  with  snow; 
And  have  been  cold  a  long  time 
To  behold  the  junipers  shagged  with  ice, 
The  spruces  rough  in  the  distant  glitter 
Of  the  January  sun;  and  not  to  think 
Of  any  misery  in  the  sound  of  the  wind, 
In  the  sound  of  a  few  leaves, 
Which  is  the  sound  of  the  land 
Full  of  the  same  wind 
That  is  blowing  in  the  same  bare  place 
For  the  listener,  who  listens  in  the  snow, 
88  Ibid.,  p.  4. 
89  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
90  Ibid.,  p.  28. 
76 And,  nothing  himself,  beholds 
Nothing  that  is  not  there  and  the  nothing  that  is.  (CP  9-10) 
This  is  certainly  a  puzzling  poem.  What  does  it  mean  to  "have  a  mind  of  winter", 
and  just  who  is  this  "snow  man",  this  'no  man',  who  "nothing  himself'  beholds 
both  "Nothing  that  is  not  there"  and  "the  nothing  that  is"?  And  is  this,  as  Bevis 
argues,  a  truly  "neutral  description"  of  the  experience  of  nothing?  Dissatisfied 
with  Western  readers  of  "The  Snow  Man"  who,  regardless  of  their  critical 
agendas,  have  invariably  come  to  the  conclusion  that  nothing  must  be  something, 
Bevis  calls  for  us  to  take  seriously  the  possibility  that  Stevens  is  quite  literally 
writing  of  the  experience  of  nothing.  92  That  is,  he  is  writing  about  a  meditative 
experience  characterised  by  a  total  absence  of  the  imagination.  If  critics  have 
continued  to  miss  this  crucial  point,  it  is  because  they  have  had  little  with  which 
to  compare  it.  He  writes,  "Attempting  to  follow  Stevens'  leap  from  meditative 
perception  to  poetry,  we  find  that  our  culture  offers  almost  no  description  of 
meditative  consciousness,  or  no-mind  (inaction,  Chinese,  wu-wei).  "  For  he  argues 
that, 
When  we  turn  to  our  classic  Western  mystics  such  as  Plato  or  Plotinus,  the 
gnostics,  some  Catholics,  or  even  Emerson,  we  find  idealist  conclusions  or 
theism,  something  instead  of  nothing,  even  though  many  individuals  report 
experiences  that  seem  to  have  been  meditative.  Buddhists,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  analyzed  the  most  passive  states  and  written  about  them  largely  in  a 
skeptical,  even  atheist  spirit,  offering  what  Herbert  Guenther  calls  a  'true 
92  Bevis  traces  Stevens'  experience  of  nothing  in  "The  Snow  Man"  to  William  James'  chapter  on 
"Mysticism"  in  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience.  He  believes  that  Stevens  may  have  been 
influenced  by  the  following  passage  on  the  "nothing"  of  Hindu  and  Buddhist  experience  as  related 
by  James: 
All  the  different  steps  in  yoga  are  intended  to  bring  us  scientifically  to  the  superconscious 
state  of  samädhi...  There  is  no  feeling  of  I,  and  yet  the  mind  works,  desireless,  free  from 
restlessness,  objectless,  bodiless... 
The  Buddhists  use  the  word  'samädhi'  as  well  as  the  Hindus;  but  'dhyäna'  is  their  special 
word  for  the  higher  states  of  contemplation...  In  the  third  stage  the  satisfaction  departs,  and 
indifference  begins...  Higher  stages  still  of  contemplation  are  mentioned-a  region  where 
there  exists  nothing,  and  where  the  mediator  says:  `There  exists  absolutely  nothing,  '  and 
stops. 
From  William  James'  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience  (New  York:  Mentor,  1958),  pp.  307- 
308,  as  cited  by  William  Bevis  in  "Stevens,  Buddhism,  and  the  Meditative  Mind"  in  The  Wallace 
Stevens  Journal  25.2  (Fall  2001):  152-153. 
77 phenomenology,  the  systematic  investigation  of  our  experiences  as 
experiences.  ' 
... 
[W]e  must  first  face  the  enormous  difference  between  any 
idea,  including  that  of  nothing,  and  a  state  of  consciousness  that  is 
aconceptual.  That  is  the  fence  dividing  most  Western  intellectual  traditions 
from  meditative  experience.  93 
There  are  numerous  holes  in  Bevis'  argument  here  as  he  sweeps  aside  the  mystics, 
dismissing  them  by  saying  that  many  have  reported  experiences  that  (merely) 
seem  to  have  been  meditative. 
For  Bevis  what  distinguishes  Christian  mystics  and  Buddhist  meditators  is  the 
experience  of  pure  consciousness  as  "a  physiological  mindset"  that  has  been 
developed  by  practioners  of  meditation  in  the  Far  East  but  has  remained  largely 
unknown  in  the  West.  He  argues  that  "meditative  consciousness  exists  as  a 
possible  mode  of  operation  of  the  central  nervous  system"  and  that  it  is  this 
experiential  quality  of  meditation  that  he  is  interested  in  and  not  meditative 
experience  "as  a  means  of  personal  or  philosophical  salvation.  s94  He  claims, 
This  is  not  a  religious  book;  I  am  no  more  interested  in  the  religious  aspects  of 
Buddhism  than  I  am  in  religious  aspects  of  Stevens,  who  seems  to  me 
brilliantly  secular  yet  constantly  flirting  with  ultimate  concerns  .... 
95 
The  use  of  the  word  'secular'  here  is  telling.  As  with  many  of  Stevens'  critics, 
Bevis  divides  the  world  neatly  between  the  sacred  and  the  profane,  and  places 
Stevens  safely  and  securely  within  the  'profane'  camp,  though  he  admits  that  the 
poet  flirts  "with  ultimate  concerns".  This,  however,  is  problematic  for  two 
93  Ibid.,  pp.  11-12  (emphasis  added  in  the  first  sentence).  For  a  recent  and  insightful  discussion  of 
the  similarities  and  differences  between  Eastern  and  Western  experiences  of  'nothing',  see  chapter 
seven  of  J.  P.  Williams'  Denying  Divinity:  Apophasis  in  the  Patristic  Christian  and  Soto  Zen 
Buddhist  Traditions  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000).  Also,  in  opposition  to  Bevis  who 
believes  that  there  exists  a  great  "dividing  fence"  between  Eastern  and  Western  mysticism,  John 
Caputo  demonstrates  the  close  affinity  between  Eckhart's  mysticism  and  that  of  the  Zen  masters, 
an  affinity  that  rests  on  a  similar  understanding  of  nothingness  (Abgeschiedenheit)  and  'letting  be' 
(Gelassenheit).  In  John  Caputo,  The  Mystical  Element  in  Heidegger's  Thought  (New  York: 
Fordham  University  Press,  1986),  pp.  203-217. 
94  Ibid,  pp.  6-7. 
95  Bevis,  p.  6. 
78 reasons:  first,  because  it  is  indicative  of  a  rather  outdated  and,  we  might  even  say, 
naive  understanding  of  the  religious  and  second,  because  it  does  not  attend  to 
Stevens'  project,  which  as  we  have  said  is  to  find  religious  satisfaction  in  the 
world  itself. 
But  what  of  the  mystics  and  Bevis'  claim  that  theirs  is  not  a  genuine  meditative 
experience  and  therefore  their  accounts  do  not  offer  a  true  phenomenology?  Is  it 
necessary  to  practice  meditation  with  an  "atheist  spirit"  in  order  to  have  an 
authentic  meditative  experience  of  detachment?  What  are  we  to  make  of 
statements  by  such  mystics  as  Meister  Eckhart  who  says,  "For  when  the  detached 
heart  has  the  higher  aim,  it  must  be  toward  the  Nothing"?  96  Is  Bevis  suggesting 
here  that  only  Buddhists  and  other  'true'  (read  'atheistic')  meditators  undergo 
unmediated  meditative  experiences?  It  would  seem  that  just  as  Bevis  is  too  quick 
to  dismiss  the  religious  element  in  Stevens  he  is  too  eager  to  embrace  the  notion 
of  an  unmediated  state  of  meditative  consciousness,  available  only  to  those  who 
hold  no  theistic  beliefs.  97 
There  are  four  important  points  we  glean  from  Bevis'  work  that  will  be  the 
subjects  for  our  discussion  in  the  pages  that  follow.  They  are:  1)  Can  the  case  be 
96  from  "On  Detachment"  in  Meister  Eckhart:  Selected  Treatises  and  Sermons,  translated  by 
James  M.  Clark  and  John  Skinner  (London:  Fount  Publishers,  1958),  p.  143. 
97  Bevis  appears  to  be  unaware  that  most  modern  philosophical  studies  of  Christian  mysticism 
have  also  concentrated  on  the  experiential  rather  than  on  the  theological.  In  fact,  there  have  been 
so  many  studies  centering  on  the  experience  of  human  consciousness  in  mysticism  that  recently  a 
number  of  theologians  have  attempted  to  redress  the  inbalance,  as  they  see  it.  Denys  Turner's  The 
Darkness  of  God,  Grace  Jantzen's  Power,  Gender  and  Christian  Mysticism  and  Mark  A. 
McIntosh's  Mystical  Theology  are  some  examples  of  recent  studies  in  mysticism  that  seek  to 
return  to  the  religious  and  theological  elements  of  mysticism  and  mystical  texts.  McIntosh  notes 
that  there  has  been  a  "crucial  shift  in  the  history  of  Christian  spirituality  from  an  emphasis  on  the 
ineffability  of  the  divine  mystery  to  an  emphasis  on  the  ineffability  of  the  mystic's  experience. 
The  first  emphasis  implies  the  notion,  first  clearly  articulated  by  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  of  God's 
unboundedness  and  infinity.  The  second  implies  that  what  counts  as  `mysticism'  chiefly  is  pre- 
linguistic  and  unthematized  experience,  or  a  `pure  consciousness  event'.  "  McIntosh  is  highly 
critical  of  this  second  approach.  He  believes  that  "as  long  as  the  real  significance  of  mystical 
speech  is  divorced  in  this  way  from  public  ecclesial  life  and  thought,  this  interpretation  of 
mysticism  as  primarily  inner  experience  works  covertly  to  disenfranchise  religious  communities  in 
79 made  that  Buddhists  or  other  atheistic  meditators  have  more  authentic  experience 
of  meditative  consciousness  than  (theistic)  mystics  and  are  therefore  able  to  offer 
descriptions  that  are  'truer'  phenomenological  accounts?  2)  Building  on  the  first 
question,  is  it  possible  to  speak  of  'neutral  descriptions'?  3)  Does  Stevens  himself 
posit  imaginative  and  meditative  experiences  against  one  another?  4)  Finally, 
returning  to  the  question  we  began  with  in  this  chapter,  can  we  rightly  classify 
Stevens'  poetics  as  mystical  or  must  they  be  'meditative'  (by  which  we  mean 
'nonreligious'  in  this  case)  as  Bevis  asserts? 
Our  criticism  of  Bevis'  work  begins  with  a  statement  by  Steven  Katz  from  his 
important  essay  "Language,  Epistemology,  and  Mysticism": 
There  are  NO  pure  (i.  e.,  unmediated)  experiences.  Neither  mystical 
experience  nor  more  ordinary  forms  of  experience  give  any  indication,  or  any 
grounds  for  believing,  that  they  are  unmediated.  That  is  to  say,  all  experience 
is  processed  through,  organized  by,  and  makes  itself  available  to  us  in 
extremely  complex  epistemological  ways.  The  notion  of  an  unmediated 
experience  seems,  if  not  self-contradictory,  at  best  empty.  This 
epistemological  fact  seems  to  me  to  be  true,  because  of  the  sorts  of  beings  we 
are,  even  with  regard  to  the  experiences  of  those  ultimate  objects  of  concern 
with  which  the  mystics  have  intercourse,  e.  g.,  God,  Being,  nirvana,  etc.  98 
Katz  argues  that  all  experience  is  preconditioned  by  "a  complex,  culturally 
acquired,  sociopsychological  mold  consisting  of  concepts,  beliefs,  and 
expectations  that  the  experiencing  subject  brings  to  experience.  "99  This  means 
that  one's  religious  beliefs  (or  even  one's  lack  of  religious  beliefs)  have  a  strong 
bearing  on  the  kind  of  meditative  or  mystical  experience  he  or  she  will  have  and 
how  that  experience  is  described. 
favour  of  the  academic  arbiters  of  religion.  "  In  Mystical  Theology:  The  Integrity  of  Spirituality 
and  Theology  (Oxford:  Blackwell  Publishers,  1998),  pp.  136-137. 
98  from  "Language,  Epistemology,  and  Mysticism"  in  Mysticism  and  Philosophical  Analysis, 
edited  by  Steven  Katz  (London:  Sheldon  Press,  1978),  p.  26,  as  cited  in  Nelson  Pike's  Mystic 
Union:  An  Essay  on  the  Phenomenology  of  Mysticism  (Ithaca,  New  York:  Cornell  University 
Press,  1992),  p-195- 
99  Pike  summarising  Katz's  argument,  p.  195. 
80 Mystical  experiences  have  the  content  they  have  because  mystics  come  to  the 
experience  with  certain  religious  concepts  and  beliefs,  which,  together  with 
the  symbol  systems  they  employ  and  their  expectations  concerning  what  they 
will  experience,  partially  create  the  content  of  the  mystical  experiences  they 
have.  So  now  let  us  ask:  What  content  do  mystical  experiences  have?  What 
kinds  of  experiences  are  so  created?  Katz  answers  that  Hindus  have 
experiences  that  are,  phenomenologically,  of  Brahman,  and  Christians  have 
mystical  experiences  that  are,  phenomenologically,  of  a  supreme  person  called 
'God'.  In  fact,  as  regards  their  phenomenological  content,  there  are  as  many 
different  kinds  of  mystical  experiences  as  there  are  cultures  in  which  they 
occur.  100 
If  we  accept  Katz's  argument,  then  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
Buddhists  have  more  genuine  experiences  of  meditative  detachment  than 
Christians  or  even  secular  humanists,  for  that  matter.  That  their  accounts  differ  we 
may  attribute  to  the  hermeneutical  stance  they  take  in  relation  to  their  experience. 
As  Katz  says,  "beliefs  shape  experience,  just  as  experience  shapes  belief  1.101  We 
note  that  Stevens  himself  well  understood  this  connection  between  experience  and 
culture:  "Well,  the  gods  grow  out  of  the  weather.  /  The  people  grow  out  of  the 
weather;  /  The  gods  grow  out  of  the  people"  (CP  210),  he  wrote.  By  'weather' 
Stevens  refers  to  both  the  emotional  and  cultural  climates  in  which  our 
experiences  are  anticipated  and  interpreted.  Living  in  "an  age  of  disbelief'  as  he 
ioo  Ibid.  Wayne  Proudfoot  takes  a  similar  view  in  Religious  Experience  (Berkeley,  California: 
University  of  California  Press,  1985).  He  notes,  "The  identification  of  an  experience  as  mystical, 
as  nirvana  or  devekuth  or  communion  with  God,  assumes  the  belief  that  it  is  authoritative, 
revelatory,  and  that  it  provides  support  for  the  teachings  of  the  tradition  within  which  it  is 
identified  and  interpreted.  Buddhist  meditational  practices  are  designed  to  achieve  certain  states  in 
order  to  exemplify  Buddhist  doctrines,  "  p.  153.  Also,  for  an  interesting  and  insightful  account  of 
the  changing  approaches  to  the  study  of  mysticism  and  mystical  experience,  see  Leigh  Eric 
Schmidt's  recent  article,  "The  Making  of  Modern  Mysticism"  in  the  Journal  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Religion  71  (June  2003):  273-302.  Schmidt  offers  a  geneaology  of  what  he  calls,  "the 
liberal  construction  of  mysticism". 
101  Ibid.,  p.  196.  Derrida  seems  to  be  making  much  the  same  point  in  his  chapter  "Awaiting  (at) 
the  Arrival"  in  Aporias  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  1993).  Though  he  is  not  speaking 
directly  of  mysticism,  we  can  see  the  connection  with  Katz's  argument  that  there  are  no 
unmediated  experiences.  Derrida,  in  speaking  of  the  cultural  conception  of  death,  tells  us  that 
"All  people  do  not  die  in  the  same  way.  Throughout  time,  they  have  not  died  in  the  same  way. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  enough  to  recall  that  there  are  cultures  of  death  and  that  from  one  culture  to 
another,  at  the  crossing  of  the  borders,  death  changes  face,  meaning,  language,  or  even  body,  "  p. 
43.  Drawing  upon  Heidegger's  existential  analysis  of  Dasein,  Derrida  argues  that  "In  order  to 
identify  the  different  ways  of  living  (erleben)  the  demise  (Ableben),  that  is,  the  ways  of  living  as 
such  the  moment  of  'leaving  life'...  one  must  already  know  what  death  means,  and  how  to 
81 did,  Stevens  recognised  that  his  experiences  reflected  his  culture  of  disbelief;  for 
he  could  not  divorce  himself  from,  what  he  called,  the  mythology  of  his  region. 
Because  they  are  always  informed  by  a  pre-established  set  of  beliefs, 
descriptions  of  meditative  consciousness,  then,  can  never  be  anything  other  than 
interpretive.  That  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  they  are  'merely'  interpretive.  We 
are  not  suggesting  that  these  interpretations  are  in  some  way  false,  illusory,  or 
mere  cultural  constructs.  The  fact  that  they  are  at  least  in  part  created  by  the 
practitioner's  expectations  does  not  diminish  their  value  as  phenomenological 
reports.  Quite  the  contrary.  These  interpretations  are  indeed  phenomenological 
descriptions,  or  what  Stevens  (drawing  on  the  vocabulary  of  Kant)  calls 
'seemings'.  "Such  seemings  are  the  actual  ones,  "  he  says.  Moreover,  according  to 
the  poet, 
Description  is  revelation.  It  is  not 
The  thing  described,  nor  false  facsimile. 
It  is  an  artificial  thing  that  exists, 
In  its  own  seeming,  plainly  visible...  (CP  344,  emphasis  added) 
How  is  this  so?  How  is  it  that  "description  is  revelation"?  If  we  take  Katz's 
argument  that  there  are  no  unmediated  experiences,  then  we  must  accept  that 
experience  and  interpretation  cannot  be  separated  from  one  another.  The  mystical 
experience  is  genuine;  it  actually  took  place,  and  the  description  of  this 
experience  by  the  practitioner  is  equally  genuine,  regardless  that  the  description 
bears  the  indelible  mark  of  the  practitioner's  point  of  view.  This  is  to  say  that 
there  are  no  phenomenological  descriptions  of  meditative  detachment  that  do  not 
bear  the  mark  of  the  mystic  or  meditator.  It  matters  not  what  cultural  heritage  the 
recognise  death  properly  speaking.  "  If  we  take  the  experience  of  meditative  detachment  as  a  kind 
of  death-a  'little  death'-we  can  easily  see  how  this  is  relevant  to  our  project. 
82 practitioner  comes  from  nor  that  she  be  sceptical,  pious,  atheist,  or  even  what 
Stevens  calls,  "a  disbeliever  in  reality"  (OP  117);  the  description  is  a  revelation. 
What  we  have  here  is  a  hermeneutic  circle  with  beliefs  shaping  experience  and 
experience  shaping  beliefs.  Katz  provides  us  with  an  excellent  example  of  how 
this  circle  works  in  his  analysis  of  Jewish  and  Christian  mystical  experience.  He 
begins  by  explaining  how  it  is  that  from  a  very  young  age  the  Jewish  mystic  is 
taught  a  set  of  doctrinal  truths,  truths  that  he  later  brings  to  his  mystical 
experiences.  For  example,  he  is  taught  that  the  universe  was  created  by  one  God 
who  is  ontologically  distinct  from  humankind  and  that  this  God  enters  into 
covenants  with  humans.  These  theological  truths  formed  in  conjunction  with  a 
whole  host  of  supporting  texts,  symbols,  rituals,  community  values,  and  so  on, 
come  together  to  define  in  advance  the  kind  of  "experience  he  wants  to  have,  and 
which  he  then  does  have.  "  102  "He  thus  has  an  experience  that  is, 
phenomenologically,  of  a  personal  God,  of  the  Divine  Throne,  of  the  hidden 
Torah,  or  the  like.  "  03  Equally,  however,  it  defines  the  kind  of  experience  he  will 
not  have.  Katz  argues  that  "one  thing  the  Jewish  mystic  does  not  experience  is 
identity  with  God";  that  is,  he  will  not  experience  what  is  called  'union  without 
distinction'.  '04  He  explains, 
In  the  Jewish  tradition  the  strong  monotheistic  emphasis  on  God's  uniqueness 
is  understood  to  entail  not  only  his  numerical  unity  and  perfection  but  also  his 
qualitative,  ontological,  distinction  from  his  creations....  As  a  consequence, 
Jewish  mystics  envision  the  ultimate  goal  of  mystical  relation,  devekuth,  not 
as  absorption  into  God,  or  as  unity  with  the  divine  but  rather  as  a  loving 
intimacy,  a  'clinging  to  God',  a  relation  which  at  all  times  is  aware  of  the 
102  Katz  as  cited  in  Pike,  p.  197  (emphases  are  original). 
103  Pike  summarising  Katz,  p.  197. 
104  Ibid.  Pike  is  particularly  interested  in  examining  the  types  of  mystical  experience,  particularly 
the  Christian  mystical  experience  of'union  without  distinction'.  In  his  chapter  called  "Variations 
on  Full  Union  and  Rapture"  Pike  cites  Bernard  of  Clairvaux's  Treatise  on  Loving  God  in  which  the 
mystic  describes  an  experience  of  the  "mind  ...  so'drunk  with  love'that  it  becomes'one  with 
[God]  in  spirit.  "  Bernard  reports  that  in  this  state  you  "lose  yourself  as  though  you  did  not  exist" 
and  that  you  "have  no  sense  of  yourself'  for  you  are  "emptied  out  of  yourself  and  almost 
annihilated.  "  See  Pike,  pp.  32-34. 
83 duality  of  God  and  mystic,  i.  e.  which  experiences  God  as  Other  rather  than 
Self.  l4 
To  further  his  argument,  Katz  then  contrasts  the  experience  of  the  Jewish  mystic 
with  that  of  the  Christian.  He  asserts  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  Christian 
mystical  experiences,  the  "non-absorptive"  type  which  resembles  that  of  Jewish 
devekuth  (though  with  some  differences),  and  the  "absorptive"  or  "unitive"  type 
"in  which  the  goal  sought  and  experience  reached  is  a  transcendence  of  the 
distinction  between  self  and  God.  "  105  Therefore,  unlike  Jewish  mystics,  some 
Christian  mystics  have  the  experience  of  'union  without  distinction'. 
But  why  should  some  Christian  mystics  have  'unitive'  experiences?  Katz  tells 
us, 
What  permits,  perhaps  even  encourages,  this  unitive,  absorpitive  mysticism  of 
the  divine  he  and  the  finite  I  found  in  Christian  mysticism,  though  absent  from 
its  Jewish  counterpart,  is,  I  believe,  the  formative  influence  of  the  essential 
incarnational  theology  of  Christianity  which  is  predicated  upon  an  admixing 
of  human  and  divine  elements  in  the  person  of  Jesus  which  is  outside  the 
limits  of  Jewish  consciousness.  106 
Taking  into  consideration  the  many  different  kinds  of  mystical  experience, 
including  that  of  the  Buddhist's  experience  of  nirvana,  Katz  comes  to  the 
following  conclusion: 
This  much  is  certain:  the  mystical  experience  must  be  mediated  by  the  kinds 
of  beings  we  are.  And  the  kinds  of  beings  we  are  require  the  experience  be 
not  only  instantaneous  and  discontinuous,  but  that  it  also  involve  memory, 
apprehension,  expectation,  language,  accumulation  of  prior  experience, 
concepts,  and  expectations,  with  each  experience  being  built  on  the  back  of  all 
these  elements  and  being  shaped  anew  by  each  fresh  experience.  Thus 
experience  of  x-be  x  God  or  nirvana-is  conditioned  both  linguistically  and 
cognitively  by  a  variety  of  factors  including  the  expectation  of  what  will  be 
experienced.  l7 
104  Direct  quote  from  Katz  by  Pike,  p.  197. 
los  Ibid.,  p.  198. 
106  Ibid.,  p.  200.  Katz  also  notes  the  influence  of  Plotinus  on  Christian  mysticism. 
107  Ibid.,  pp.  200-201. 
84 Before  we  turn  our  attention  back  to  Stevens  to  see  what  all  this  has  to  do  with 
his  poetics,  we  must  first  ask  this  question:  Does  this  kind  of  approach  to 
mysticism  do  it  a  disservice?  Is  Steven  Katz  (along  with  Nelson  Pike  and  others) 
usurping  the  potency  of  mystical  experience  by  placing  it  tidily  into  its  historical, 
psychological  and  social  context?  If  we  look  at  mysticism  this  way,  can  we  still 
'believe'  in  it?  That  is,  can  we  still  see  it  as  a  'special',  even  holy,  experience  or  is 
it  merely  one  experience  among  many?  109  By  drawing  on  Katz's  psycho-social 
approach  to  mysticism,  we  are  in  no  way  denying  mysticism's  value  as  an 
authentic  experience  able  to  offer  religious  fulfilment.  We  do  not  want  to  water 
down  or  to  explain  away  mystical  experience  (which  we  admit  is  a  danger  if  we 
were  to  take  Katz's  argument  any  further);  rather,  we  want  to  argue  that  it  is  an 
109  In  "The  Making  of  Modern  Mysticism,  "  Leigh  Eric  Schmidt  says  that  "There  is  hardly  a  more 
beleaguered  category  than  'mysticism'  in  the  current  academic  study  of  religion,  "  p.  273.  He  cites 
the  work  of  Katz,  Proudfoot  and  others  as  damaging  the  uniqueness  of  religious  experience. 
Through  their  work,  he  says,  religious  experience  "was  no  more  unmediated,  unique,  ineffable,  or 
perennial  than  any  other  kind  of  experience,  "  p.  274.  Grace  Jantzen  agrees.  She  argues  that 
contemporary  philosophers  have  been  "seduced  by  a  particular  picture  of  mysticism,  inherited 
largely  from  William  James,  which  involves  them  in  a  stately  dance  of  claims  and  counterclaims 
about  experience  and  interpretation,  language  and  ineffability,  credulity  and  doubt.  The 
movements  of  this  dance,  "  she  says,  "are  by  now  well  defined;  but  what  is  hardly  noticed  is  how 
little  resemblance  they  bear  to  the  things  which  preoccupied  the  medieval  men  and  women  whom 
they  themselves  would  consider  to  be  paradigm  mystics,  "  p.  3.  Jantzen  complains  that 
contemporary  philosophers  in  their  investigation  of  mysticism  are  asking  all  the  wrong  questions, 
questions  that  were  not  central  to  the  mystics  themselves,  but  which  have  been  largely  derived 
from  Kantian  epistemology.  These  philosophers  "conduct  their  discussion  of  mysticism, 
wittingly  or  not,  under  the  long  shadow  of  Kant.  Central  to  their  definition  of  mysticism, 
therefore,  is  the  work  of  Schleiermacher  and  William  James,  who  tried  to  retrieve  religious  and 
mystical  experience  from  Kantian  strictures  by  seeing  such  experiences  as  unique,  intense, 
subjective  states  of  consciousness  occurring  `on  the  verges  of  the  mind'  (James),  different  from 
normal  consciousness  and  thus  escaping  Kant's  critical  theory.  "  But  the  classical  mystics  of 
course  had  not  read  Kant,  says  Jantzen,  and  therefore  "their  preoccupations  were  quite  different 
from  what  one  might  think  if  one  read  only  modern  philosophical  discussion  of  mysticism,  "  p.  8. 
In  Grace  Jantzen's  Power,  Gender  and  Christian  Mysticism  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  1995).  We  would  like  to  point  out,  however,  that  while  the  classical  mystics  were  not 
asking  the  same  questions  as  modern  philosophers,  Wallace  Stevens  in  fact  was.  He  was  very 
much  aware  of  "the  long  shadow  of  Kant"  and  he  had  most  certainly  read  James  closely.  Stevens' 
mystical  experiences  were  informed  by  the  same  questions  that  preoccupy  modern  philosophers- 
questions  of  truth,  belief,  knowledge,  and  language.  He  did  not  share  the  thought  world  of  the 
classical  mystics  who  assumed  the  existence  of  God;  rather  he  shared  the  thought  world  of  the 
very  philosophers  that  both  Schmidt  and  Jantzen  criticise.  His  mysticism,  then,  must  be 
considered  in  light  of  this. 
85 experience  that  crosses  religious  and  cultural  boundaries  and  is  able  to  offer  a  true 
sense  of  fulfilment  even  for  a  'religious  agnostic'  like  Stevens. 
Wallace  Stevens'  mystical  experiences  must  be  understood  in  the  light  of  the 
'kind  of  being'  that  he  is-and  equally  in  relation  to  the  'kind  of  being'  he  is  not. 
That  is  to  say,  Stevens  is  not  the  "brilliantly  secular"  Zen  master  that  Bevis  makes 
him  out  to  be.  Moreover,  he  is  neither  secular  (whatever  that  means)  nor 
Buddhist.  He  is,  rather,  a  modem  American  poet  who,  having  lost  his  belief  in 
the  "God  in  whom  he  was  brought  up  to  believe",  experiences  intense  meditative 
moments  that  are  not  exactly  akin  to  Zen-like  'Nothing',  nor  are  they  exactly  akin 
to  the  Christian  'presence  in  absence'.  Stevens'  mysticism  is  peculiar  to  a  man 
who  lacked  belief  in  'the  beyond'  and  who  therefore  sought  mystical  union  with 
the  world  itself.  He  experienced  a  transcendence  of  immanence,  we  might  say. 
For  the  poet, 
What 
One  believes  is  what  matters.  Ecstatic  identities 
Between  one's  self  and  the  weather  and  the  things 
Of  the  weather  are  the  belief  in  one's  element. 
The  casual  reunions,  the  long-pondered 
Surrenders,  the  repeated  sayings  that 
There  is  nothing  more  and  that  it  is  enough 
To  believe  in  the  weather  and  in  the  things  and  men 
Of  the  weather  and  in  one's  self,  as  part  of  that 
And  nothing  more.  (CP  258) 
Placing  his  faith  in  his  element,  that  is,  placing  his  faith  in  where  he  lives,  Stevens 
finds  that  the  everyday  world  is  enough.  The  "casual  reunions,  the  long-pondered 
/  Surrenders",  when  mind  and  world  seem  to  come  together  and  obliterate 
distinction  between  self  and  environment,  offer  a  momentary  fulfilment.  And 
although  he  acknowledges  that  the  "way  through  the  world  /  Is  more  difficult  to 
find  than  the  way  beyond  it"  (CP  446),  Stevens  celebrates  this  difficulty  in  living 
86 in  the  everyday  world,  a  "world  that  is  still  profound"  where  "Man  sits  and  studies 
silence  and  himself'  (CP  447). 
Stevens'  experience  of  the  mystical  is  that  of  mind  uniting  with  world,  and  it  is 
his  goal,  in  the  words  of  Henry  James, 
To  live  in  the  world  of  creation--to  get  into  it  and  stay  in  it-to  frequent  it  and 
haunt  it-to  think  intensely  and  fruitfully-to  woo  combinations  and 
inspirations  into  being  by  a  depth  and  continuity  of  attention  and  meditation- 
this  is  the  only  thing.  09 
The  "only  thing"  for  Stevens  like  James  is  to  live  in  a  physical  world;  thus,  the 
poet's  mystical  experiences  are  not  born  out  of  an  attempt  to  escape  from  his  local 
environment  but  rather  out  of  a  desire  to  inhabit  it  more  fully,  more  deeply.  For 
as  Stevens  tells  us  in  the  last  canto  of  "Esthetique  du  Mal",  "The  greatest  poverty 
is  not  to  live  /  In  a  physical  world...  ".  Furthermore,  he  believes  that  "The 
adventurer  /  In  humanity  has  not  conceived  of  a  race  /  Completely  physical  in  a 
physical  world"  (CP  325),  lines  that  are  probably  best  understood  when  contrasted 
with  a  passage  from  Evelyn  Underhill's  Mysticism.  Writes  Underhill, 
Mysticism,  then,  offers  us  the  history,  as  old  as  civilization,  of  a  race  of 
adventurers  who  have  carried  to  its  term  the  process  of  a  deliberate  and  active 
return  to  the  divine  fount  of  things.  They  have  surrendered  themselves  to  the 
life-movement  of  the  universe,  hence  have  lived  with  an  intenser  life  than 
other  men  can  ever  know;  have  transcended  the  "sense-world"  in  order  to  live 
on  high  levels  the  spiritual  life.  110 
For  Underhill  the  mystics  are  a  race  of  adventurers  privileged  above  other  men 
and  women  in  their  ability  to  transcend  the  "sense-world"  and  arrive  at  the  "divine 
fount  of  things".  But  Stevens  turns  this  notion  on  its  head.  He  does  not  wish  to 
escape  from  the  sense-world  but  to  inhabit  it,  to  relish  it,  and  to  embrace  the  joy 
and  sorrow  that  it  brings.  According  to  Underhill,  the  mystics  have  "lived  an 
109  Henry  James  as  quoted  by  Stevens  (L  506). 
87 intenser  life"  than  'ordinary'  people  because  they  have  managed  to  escape  the 
world  of  the  senses,  but  Stevens  questions  this.  He  muses,  "Perhaps,  /  After 
death,  the  non-physical  people,  in  paradise,  /  Itself  non-physical,  may,  by  chance, 
observe  /  The  green  corn  gleaming  and  experience  /  The  minor  of  what  we  feel.  " 
What  we  feel  living  in  the  sense-world-desire,  despair,  rapture,  misery-is  a  part 
of  our  earthly  existence;  it  is  this  that  allows  us  to  live  an  'intense  life'  and  for  that 
reason  emotions  ought  to  be  celebrated,  not  denied.  This  embracing  of  the 
physical  world  (of  which  the  ever  changing  emotional  climates  are  a  part)  makes 
Stevens'  mystical  experiences  unique.  He  is,  we  might  say,  the  first  of  a  new  race 
of  adventurers  desiring  to  be  "completely  physical  in  a  physical  world.  " 
With  this  in  mind,  let  us  now  return  to  "The  Snow  Man",  a  poem  that,  as  we 
recall,  Bevis  reads  as  a  "neutral  description"  of  Nothing.  But  is  this  really  a 
description  of  the  Zen-like  experience  of  Chinese  wu-wei  or  no-mind?  And  is 
Bevis  right  in  arguing  that  it  is  a  poem  reflecting  a  meditative  state  "characterized 
by  an  absence  of  mental  and  emotional  activity"?  '  12 
"The  Snow  Man"  is  eerily  still,  reflecting  the  icy  landscape  of  Stevens'  own 
interior.  113  The  poem  progresses  with  an  almost  inhuman  precision,  an  exactness 
that  leaves  no  room  for  feeling  yet  emerging  out  of  feeling.  This  listener  "who 
listens  in  the  snow"  in  the  final  stanza  is  the  poet  himself  who  pauses  to  hear  the 
peculiar  hush  of  his  own  wintry  landscape.  This  poem  is  certainly  not  a  neutral 
description,  but  rather  a  description  that  emerges  out  of  a  feeling  of  blankness  or 
coldness.  It  is  a  description  of  an  extended  meditation  on  the  self,  a  self  that 
"'  Evelyn  Underhill,  Mysticism:  A  Study  in  the  Nature  and  Development  of  Man's  Spiritual 
Consciousness  (New  York:  Dutton,  1911),  p.  41. 
"Z  William  W.  Bevis,  "Stevens,  Buddhism,  and  the  Meditative  Mind",  The  Wallace  Stevens 
Journal  25.2  (Fall  2001):  148-163. 
88 Stevens  finds  cold  and  empty.  Stevens  frequently  made  his  interior  landscape  the 
subject  of  his  contemplation  and  more  often  than  not  he  discovered  on  these 
inward  voyages  an  emotional  blankness.  But  rather  than  mourn  this  blank,  he 
celebrated  it,  even  took  pleasure  in  it.  In  a  letter  to  Sister  M.  Bernetta  Quinn,  a 
long  time  correspondent,  Stevens  wrote: 
This  morning  I  walked  around  in  the  park  here  for  almost  an  hour  before 
coming  to  the  office  and  felt  as  blank  as  one  of  the  ponds  which  in  the  weather 
at  this  time  of  year  are  motionless.  But  perhaps  it  was  the  blankness  that 
made  me  enjoy  it  so  much.  (L  762).  113 
At  first  it  seems  odd  that  Stevens  should  admit  to  enjoying  this  feeling  of 
blankness,  but  we  can  understand  it  better  when  we  read  his  comment  on  "The 
Snow  Man".  He  says,  "`The  Snow  Man'  is  about  the  necessity  of  identifying 
oneself  with  reality  in  order  to  understand  it  and  enjoy  it"  (L  464).  For  Stevens, 
these  contemplative  moments  when  mind  unites  or  identifies  with  world  (and 
`world'  in  this  instance  is  the  poet's  internal  landscape)  provide  a  feeling  of 
"2  Remarking  on  another  of  Stevens'  poems,  Marjorie  Perloff  says  that  "The  landscape  of  'The 
Auroras  of  Autumn'  is  thus  the  externalization  of  the  poet's  psyche;  its  configurations  and 
equivocations  point  always  to  his  interiority.  "  See  The  Poetics  of  Indeterminancy,  p.  22. 
1  Stevens  often  describes  his  interior  as  cold  and  blank,  and  for  some  time  he  saw  this  coldness  of 
feeling  as  a  personal  failing  and  berated  himself  for  it  in  a  journal  entry  dated  July  31,1899.  But 
over  the  course  of  time,  according  to  Richard  Eilmann,  "gradually  Stevens  began  to  think  of  a  kind 
of  song  that  would  affirm  rather  than  deny  coldness  or  frost.  In  fact,  there  is  a  persistent  lowering 
of  the  temperature  of  his  mind's  native  land.  "  Richard  Ellmann,  "How  Stevens  Saw  Himself,  "  in 
Wallace  Stevens:  A  Celebration,  edited  by  Frank  Doggett  and  Robert  Buttel  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1980),  p.  163.  Also,  regarding  "The  Snow  Man",  J.  Hillis  Miller 
writes,  "In  the  impoverishing  of  the  world  when  the  gods  disappear  man  discovers  himself, 
orphaned  and  dispossessed,  a  solitary  consciousness.  Then  are  men  truly  'natives  of  poverty, 
children  of  malheur'  (CP,  322).  The  moment  of  self-awareness  coincides  with  the  moment  of  the 
death  of  the  gods.  God  is  dead,  therefore  I  am.  But  I  am  nothing.  I  am  nothing  because  I  have 
nothing,  nothing  but  awareness  of  the  barrenness  within  and  without.  "  From  J.  Hillis  Miller,  Poets 
of  Reality  (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1966),  p.  219.  Nathan  Scott  says  similarly,  "Since 
the  Holy  Spirit  has  disappeared  and  the  region  of  our  habitancy  is  no  longer  a  place  of  grace  and 
glory,  the  things  and  creatures  of  earth  must  be  offered  the  one  asylum  that  now  remains--namely, 
that  inland  sanctuary  remote  from  the  exposed  frontiers  of  the  world  which  is  provided  within,  by 
the  creative  largesse  of  the  human  spirit  itself,  "  in  Nathan  Scott's  Visions  of  Presence  in  Modern 
American  Poetry  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1993),  p.  41.  We  would,  however, 
argue  against  Scott  here  when  he  claims  that  the  "region  of  our  habitancy  is  no  longer  a  place  of 
grace  and  glory.  "  It  is  precisely  at  the  moment  of  the  disappearance  of  the  gods  when  our  'region' 
becomes  the  place  of  grace  and  glory,  a  point  that  Stevens  makes  over  and  over  again  in  his 
poetry. 
89 certain  `rightnesses',  a  sense  of  having  arrived  at  the  longed-for  `centre'  where 
the  world  seems  to  have  stopped  revolving  and  all,  including  the  mind,  is  at  rest. 
By  placing  his  faith  in  his  `element',  Stevens  can  enjoy  even  the  cold,  blank, 
emptiness  of  his  own  internal  climate.  In  fact,  all  indications  are  that  he  preferred 
the  icy  vacancies  of  `winter'  over  and  above  the  florid  plenitude  of  `summer',  as 
can  be  gleaned  from  a  close  examination  of  his  poems  of  winter  and  summer. 
Moreover,  Stevens  himself  declared  that  "cold's  glacial  beauty  is  his  fate"  (CP 
426)  and  he  enjoyed  these  cold  vacancies,  both  within  and  without.  Thus,  "The 
Snow  Man"  is  a  hymn  to  the  feeling  of  emptiness  and  to  the  capability  of  the 
imagination  that  is  capable  of  imagining  a  barrenness  both  inside  and  out.  It  is 
not  a  poem  of  an  unmediated  arrival  at  Nothing  devoid  of  imagination,  as  Bevis 
would  have  us  believe.  Nor,  as  Bevis  asserts,  does  Stevens  posit  the  imaginative 
and  the  meditative  against  one  another.  On  the  contrary,  such  meditative 
moments  of  negation  are  indeed  dependent  upon  the  imagination.  Meditation  for 
Stevens  is  an  exercise  of  the  imagination  or  what  he  calls  "an  exercise  in  viewing 
the  world".  "5 
In  direct  opposition  to  Bevis'  reading  of  Stevens'  negations  in  Mind  of  Winter, 
Barbara  Fisher  in  her  chapter  "Something  for  Nothing"  considers  the  frequency 
with  which  Stevens  employs  terms  of  negation  and  comes  to  the  conclusion  that 
115  Charles  M.  Murphy,  former  rector  of  the  North  American  College,  Vatican  City,  writes,  "...  I 
recall  a  seminarian  at  the  time  that  I  was  rector  always  sitting,  summer  or  winter,  on  the  same 
bench  every  day  to  meditate.  I  once  asked  him  why  he  did  this.  He  replied  that  by  having  this 
fixed  place  in  the  universe  he  could  detect  the  subtle  changes  that  occur  as  one  season  passes  into 
the  next.  In  a  similar  way  Wallace  Stevens  spent  hours  in  Elizabeth  Park  near  his  home  sitting  and 
observing  the  divinity  that  disguises  itself  in  subtleties  of  the  weather,  "  in  Wallace  Stevens:  A 
Spiritual  Poet  in  a  Secular  Age,  p.  72.  Murphy's  statement  would  be  strenthened  if  he  were  to 
remove  the  word  "disguises"  and  say  that  Stevens  sat  and  observed  the  "divinity  in  subtleties  of 
the  weather". 
90 through  his  poetry  he  achieves  the  "`feel'  of  a  perceptual  vacuum"  that  has  its 
"parallels  in  mystical  theology.  "  116  She  says  that 
Along  with  the  salient  nothings-the  `nothing  that  is  not  there  and  the  nothing 
that  is'-Stevens's  categories  of  bleakness  include  images  of  emptiness, 
whiteness,  invisibility;  northern  cold,  ice  and  snow;  pure  transparent  crystal 
and  dark  water  without  reflections,  `like  dirty  glass'  (CP  503).  117 
Fisher  sees  the  negativa  in  Stevens'  poetry  as  "having  nothing  to  do  with 
negativity  as  a  retreat  from  reality",  but  rather  as  an  ongoing  engagement  with 
reality,  and  she  argues  that  his  negations  must  be  recongised  as  having  a  positive 
value.  Something  does  come  from  nothing,  according  to  the  author,  who  believes 
that  "there  are  echoes  of  Henri  Bergson's  vitalist  proposition...  that  all  human 
action  begins  in  the  desire  to  fill  an  emptiness,  to  "`embroider  `something'  on  the 
canvas  of  `nothing"'.  "  This  certainly  helps  make  sense  of  some  of  the  later 
poetry,  paticularly  in  the  final  collection,  The  Rock,  where  Stevens  tells  us  that 
"the  poem  makes  meanings  of  the  rock,  /  Of  such  mixed  motion  and  such  imagery 
/  That  its  barrenness  becomes  a  thousand  things  /  And  so  exists  no  more"  (CP 
527).  Here  the  barrenness  of  the  rock  inspires  the  poet  to  "cover  the  rock  with 
leaves",  or  as  Bergson  says  to  "embroider  `something'  on  the  canvas  of 
`nothing.  "'  But  does  it  not  work  the  other  way  around  also,  that  is,  that  when  in 
possession  of  something  one  longs  for  nothing?  Stevens  says,  "not  to  have  is  the 
beginning  of  desire.  /  To  have  what  is  not  is  its  ancient  cycle"  (CP  382).  The 
desire  to  have  nothing  comes  from  being  in  possession  of  something  and  no 
longer  wanting  what  one  has.  This  is  the  source  of  Stevens'  ascetic  tendencies, 
about  which  Fisher  comments  that  there  appears 
in  a  number  of  poems  a  compelling  urge  to  burn  away,  empty  out,  strip  off.  It 
is  a  passion  to  penetrate  to  the  very  soul  of  things.  In  the  grip  of  this  mood 
116  Fisher,  p.  36. 
117  Ibid.,  p.  35. 
91 Stevens  abandons  verbal  gesture,  ornament,  the  flirts  of  fancy,  and  seriously 
courts  the  void.  The  temptations  of  the  florid  and  the  baroque  vanish  when 
this  side  of  his  temperament  takes  hold;  the  language  becomes  noticeably 
stripped  down  and  spare.  Sensuous  objects  are  relinquished  for  a  glimpse  of 
the  res  itself.  Stevens  wants  at  these  moments  to  work  his  way  back, 
somehow,  to  first  perception.  118 
At  these  times,  Stevens  wants  to  "see  the  very  thing  and  nothing  else.  "  He  wants 
to  "see  it  with  the  hottest  fire  of  sight"  and  to  "burn  everything  not  part  of  it  to 
ash"  (CP  373).  Indeed,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  chapter  one,  Stevens  expresses 
thoughout  his  poetry  a  desire  to  arrive  at  a  metaphysical  `centre'  by  attempting  to 
deconstruct  his  own  preconceptions  and  to  rid  himself  of  what  he  `has'. 
Stevens'  poetry  vacillates  between  two  points,  between  the  desire  to  make 
something  of  nothing  ("to  cover  the  rock  with  leaves")  and  the  desire  to  undo  the 
something  and  return  to  nothing  ("to  be  stripped  of  every  fiction").  119  Regarding 
this  desire  to  `undo',  Jonathan  Dollimore  believes  that  the  "restless,  dissatisfied 
energy  which  is  the  stuff  of  life  is  always  shadowed  by  that  desire  to  become 
unbound.  "  This  is,  he  says,  "the  desire  for  oblivion,  for  a  dissolution  of 
consciousness,  the  irresistible  desire  to  regress  back  to  a  state  of  zero  tension 
before  consciousness,  before  life,  before  effort,  before  lack.  "  120  In  the  words  of 
John  Donne, 
We  seem  ambitious,  God's  whole  work  to  undo; 
Of  nothing  he  made  us,  and  we  strive... 
To  bring  ourselves  to  nothing  back.  121 
118  Ibid.,  pp.  37-38. 
119  Fisher  believes  that  at  some  point  there  was  an  "important  transition  in  Stevens's  attitude 
toward  negation,  and  his  essentially  positive  pursuit  of  the  negativa  is,  philosophically  speaking,  a 
transition  from  Nietzsche  to  Bergson,  from  decreation  to  the  procreative  empty  space  of  vitalism,  " 
p.  xxv.  We  would  argue,  however,  that  the  poetry  does  not  suggest  such  a  definitive  shift  from  the 
decreative  to  the  procreative,  but  rather  a  constant  inter-play  between  the  two.  Neither 
`Nietzschean  decreation'  nor  `Bergsonian  vitalism'  is  posited  above  the  other  in  Stevens'  poetry. 
120  Jonathan  Dollimore,  "Death  and  the  Self,  "  in  Rewriting  the  Self:  Histories  from  the 
Renaissance  to  the  Present,  edited  by  Roy  Porter  (London:  Routledge,  1997),  p.  256. 
121  From  Donne's  Anniversaries  in  The  Complete  English  Poems,  ed.  A.  J.  Smith, 
Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1971.  Cited  by  Dollimore  in  "Death  and  the  Self'. 
92 Stevens'  desire  to  "become  unbound"  and  bring  himself  back  to  nothing  is  the 
theme  of  "The  Dwarf': 
Now  it  is  September  and  the  web  is  woven. 
The  web  is  woven  and  you  have  to  wear  it. 
The  winter  is  made  and  you  have  to  bear  it, 
The  winter  web,  the  winter  woven,  wind  and  wind, 
For  all  the  thoughts  of  summer  that  go  with  it 
In  the  mind,  pupa  of  straw,  moppet  of  rags. 
It  is  the  mind  that  is  woven,  the  mind  that  was  jerked 
And  tufted  in  straggling  thunder  and  shattered  sun. 
It  is  all  that  you  are,  the  final  dwarf  of  you...  (CP  208) 
With  the  onslaught  of  September  the  possibility  of  summer  has  come  to  an  end. 
The  idea  that  once  gave  pleasure  while  it  was  still  `alive'  in  the  vaguaries  of  the 
mind  has  now  become  too  clearly  defined,  too  determinate.  The  poet  here  longs 
to  throw  off  this  weighty  idea  that  no  longer  satisfies  so  that  he  might  be  free  once 
again  to  experience  the  enlargements  of  possibility. 
As  Fisher  notes,  "negation  can  be  a  discipline,  "  and  in  Stevens  the  practice  of 
stripping  away  does  indeed  have  its  parallels  in  mystical  theology.  One  thinks,  for 
example,  of  Meister  Eckhart,  who  desired  to  be  stripped  of  all  desire,  including 
his  desire  for  God.  "I  find  no  other  virtue  better  than  a  pure  detachment  from  all 
things,  "  said  Eckhart.  "Therefore  I  pray  to  God  that  he  may  make  me  free  of 
God,  for  my  real  being  is  above  God  if  we  take  `God'  to  be  the  beginning  of  all 
created  things.  ""22  Stevens  also  wishes  to  be  free  of  `God',  if  we  define  God 
122  Meister  Eckhart  quoted  in  Denys  Turner's  The  Darkness  of  God:  Negativity  in  Christian 
Mysticism  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1995),  p.  173.  Regarding  Eckhart's  idea  of 
detachment,  see  also  the  introduction  to  John  Caputo's  The  Mystical  Element  in  Heidegger's 
Thought  (New  York:  Fordham  University  Press,  1986).  Says  Caputo,  "In  Eckhart,  one  finds  a 
powerful  deconstructive  effort  aimed  at  undoing  the  onto-theo-logical  God,  an  unrelenting  drive  to 
free  us,  to  free  God,  from  the  constructs  and  idols  of  metaphysics.  Eckhart  is  always  looking  for 
ways  to  get  beyond  `God',  that  is  to  say,  what  men  call  God,  whether  on  the  basis  of  metaphysical 
theology  or  even  revealed  faith....  Whatever  we  know  about  God  is  not  God,  for  that  is  God 
93 variously  as  the  "First  Idea",  the  "motionless  centre",  or  even  the  "blessed  rage 
for  order".  Both  Eckhart  and  Stevens  long  to  be  free-not  from  desire  exactly- 
but  from  the  desire  to  possess,  whether  it  be  the  desire  to  possess  a  tangible  object 
or  an  intangible  idea,  such  as  the  idea  of  God.  Denys  Turner  asks,  "What,  then,  is 
the  practice  of  detachment?  " 
I  think  that  as  we  can  say  that  detachment  is  the  solution,  so  the  problem  is  not 
human  desire  itself,  but  its  possessiveness.  The  strategy  of  detachment  is  the 
strategy  of  dispossessing  desire  of  its  desire  to  possess  its  objects,  and  so  to 
destroy  them.  For  Eckhart  it  is  not  just  that,  in  addition  to  our  other  desires, 
we  also  desire  to  possess;  as  for  John  of  the  Cross,  possessiveness  for  Eckhart 
is  pandemic;  all  our  desires  are  infected  by  it,  all  that  we  desire  we  desire  qua 
object  of  possession;  no  matter  how  unpossessible  an  object  may  be  in  itself, 
possessiveness  will  convert  it  into  a  possible  object  of  possession,  will  make  a 
property  of  it,  will  `privatise'  it,  as  it  were.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the 
undetached  person  denatures  her  world  and  cannot  properly  enjoy  it.  She 
cannot  meet  with  reality  on  its  own  terms,  but  only  on  her  own.  22 
To  "meet  with  reality  on  its  own  terms"...  this  is  the  strategy  of  detachment.  By 
detaching  oneself  from  objects  of  desire,  by  letting  go  and  letting  be  (what 
Eckhart  calls  Gelassenheit,  a  word  that  is  later  appropriated  by  Heidegger),  we  are 
able  to  accept  reality  on  its  own  terms,  to  cherish  the  things  of  the  earth  without 
grasping  them.  123  Turner  continues, 
Detachment,  for  Eckhart,  is  not  the  severing  of  desire's  relation  to  its  object, 
but  the  restoration  of  desire  to  a  proper  relation  of  objectivity;  as  we  might 
say,  of  reverence  for  its  object.  Detachment  is  therefore  the  basis  of  the  true 
insofar  as  he  has  been  brought  under  the  sway  of  human  knowledge.  Whatever  we  want  of  God  is 
not  God  for  that  is  God  insofar  as  he  has  been  brought  under  the  sway  of  human  willing.  The  only 
way  to  God-that  is,  to  the  truly  divine  God,  what  Eckhart  sometimes  called  the  Godhead  beyond 
all  God-is  to  shut  down  the  whole  operation  of  knowing  and  willing,  that  is  to  say,  to  suspend 
the  operations  of  subjectivity,  to  disconnect  the  ego  cogito,  and  let  God  be,  let  God  be  God,  "  p. 
xviii. 
'22  Ibid,  p.  183. 
123  Regarding  Eckhart's  idea  of  Gelassenheit,  Beverly  Lanzetta  remarks,  "Detachment  becomes 
the  linguistic  analog  of  the  soul's  reenactment  of  the  mystery  in  which  God  relinquishes  all 
naming  and  identifying.  Detachment  is  a  higher  intimacy  that  is  'so  close  to  nothingness  that  there 
is  nothing  so  subtle  that  it  can  be  apprehended  by  detachment,  except  God  alone.  ' 
"The  Meister  portrays  a  deconstructing  God,  a  God  who  liberates  the  soul  from  the 
absolutizing  of  a  final  truth  or  an  ultimate  name.  His  experience  of  nothingness  opened  a  new  eye 
on  Christian  theology,  one  that  compelled  him  to  exclaim  of  God:  'He  is  pure  nothing:  he  is 
neither  this  nor  that,  "'  in  The  Other  Side  of  Nothingness,  p.  74. 
94 possibility  of  love,  which  is  why,  for  Eckhart,  it  is  more  fundamental  than 
love,  being  the  condition  of  its  possibility.  125 
The  same  could  be  said  of  Stevens'  understanding  of  detachment,  that  is,  that  the 
"true  possibility  of  love"  comes  from  letting  be,  and  letting  be  for  a  poet  involves 
liberating  the  object  of  desire  from  the  confines  of  language  that  has  become 
lacklustre.  Meeting  with  reality  on  its  own  terms  requires  that  Stevens  throw 
away  the  "rotted  names"  (CP  183),  that  he  strip  away  worn-out  words  and 
suspend  naming  altogether  for  as  long  as  possible. 
"And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love?  "  Stevens  asks  at  the  start  of 
"Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction".  The  object  of  love  in  the  canto  is  undefined, 
unnamed: 
And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love? 
Do  I  press  the  extremest  book  of  the  wisest  man 
Close  to  me,  hidden  in  me  day  and  night? 
In  the  uncertain  light  of  single,  certain  truth, 
Equal  in  living  changingness  to  the  light 
In  which  I  meet  you,  in  which  we  sit  at  rest, 
For  a  moment  in  the  central  of  our  being, 
The  vivid  transparence  that  you  bring  is  peace.  (CP  380) 
Basking  in  "uncertain  light"  Stevens  and  his  nameless  companion  meet  and  sit  in 
the  "central  of  [their]  being"  at  rest.  The  will  to  possess  is  not  in  evidence.  This  is 
a  meeting  of  equals-this  is  the  poet  meeting  "with  reality  on  its  own  terms.  "  We 
125  Turner,  p.  183.  See  also  John  Caputo's  Radical  Hermeneutics.  Caputo  explains  that  for 
Eckhart,  "Gelassenheit  means  living  `without  why,  '  by  which  he  means  something  quite 
interesting.  The  soul's  relationship  to  God  should  be  `without  why'....  That  means  that  the  soul 
should  not  act  on  the  basis  of  demonstrated  or  even  revealed  truths  about  God,  or  for  the  sake  of 
what  it  wants  to  gain  from  God,  for  these  are  both  `why's'-bases  and  grounds  and 
expectations-and  as  such  treat  God  as  some  exterior  principle.  Living  without  why,  with 
Gelassenheit,  means  seeking  nothing  exterior  or  outside-or,  better,  not  seeking  at  all-but  simply 
letting  God's  life  well  up  in  us  and  flow  through  us  as  an  inner  principle  of  life.  We  should  love 
God  as  we  love  life,  Eckhart  said,  for  Himself,  not  as  we  love  our  cow,  that  is,  for  its  milk. 
Gelassenhiet  means  then  a  certain  splendid  releasing  of  life  which  Eckhart  identifies  with  love- 
for  Eckhart  the  highest  and  clearest  case  of  Gelassenheit  is  love-which  lets  life  rise  up  and  flow 
over,  which  puts  away  the  machinery  of  metaphysics  and  the  mean  desires  of  egoism  in  order  to 
let  the  truly  divine  God  flow  in  Himself,  in  the  world,  and  in  others.  "  In  Radical  Hermeneutics: 
Repetition,  Deconstruction,  and  the  Hermeneutic  Project  (Bloomington,  Indiana:  Indiana 
University  Press,  1987),  p.  265. 
95 note  that  the  use  of  pronouns  is  significant  in  this  passage.  The  other  remains 
unnamed,  only  referred  to  by  the  second  person  pronoun,  `you',  until  lines  six  and 
seven  when  `I'  and  `you'  give  way  to  `we'  and  `our'.  "[W]e  sit  at  rest,  /  For  a 
moment  in  the  central  of  our  being"  seems  to  suggest  the  mystical  experience  of 
union  without  distinction,  or  an  undifferentiated  unity.  In  Stevensian  terms  this  is 
the  uniting  of  the  imagination  with  reality.  Detachment  for  the  poet  involves 
resisting  the  temptation  to  grasp  `reality'  by  allowing  the  object  to  remain 
nameless  for  a  time:  "The  sun  /  Must  bear  no  name,  gold  flourisher,  but  be  /  In 
the  difficulty  of  what  it  is  to  be"  (CP  381).  Such  moments  when  the  imagination 
lets  go  and  lets  be,  when  it  resists  the  desire  to  possess  `reality',  are  "times  of 
inherent  excellence,  " 
As  when  the  cock  crows  on  the  left  and  all 
Is  well,  incalculable  balances, 
At  which  a  kind  of  Swiss  perfection  comes 
And  a  familiar  music  of  the  machine 
Sets  up  its  Schwärmerei,  not  balances 
That  we  achieve  but  balances  that  happen, 
As  a  man  and  woman  meet  and  love  forthwith. 
Perhaps  there  are  moments  of  awakening, 
Extreme,  fortuitious,  personal,  in  which 
We  more  than  awaken,  sit  on  the  edge  of  sleep, 
As  on  an  elevation,  and  behold 
The  academies  like  structures  in  the  mist.  (CP  386) 
These  "balances"  happen  when  the  imagination  resists  the  urge  to  organise  and 
arrange,  when  it  allows  the  other  to  be-to  be  without  a  name. 
Detachment  brings  freedom  not  only  to  the  would-be  object  of  desire  but  also 
to  the  one  who  suppresses  the  will  to  possess.  Both  the  desired  and  the  desirer  are 
liberated  in  detachment.  Both  become  "large  in  possibility".  "The  Latest  Freed 
Man"  (CP  204),  a  work  that  could  be  profitably  read  as  a  companion  piece  to 
96 "The  Dwarf',  expresses  this  sense  of  mutual  detachment  better  than  any  of 
Stevens'  poems.  In  the  poem,  the  `freed'  man,  who  has  grown  weary  "of  the  old 
descriptions  of  the  world",  suddenly  discovers  the  freedom  of  being  like  a  "man 
without  a  doctrine"  living  in  a  landscape  without  a  doctrine.  Sitting  on  the  edge 
of  his  bed  at  six  in  the  morning,  the  man  speaks  aloud:  "I  suppose  there  is  /A 
doctrine  to  this  landscape.  Yet,  having  just  /  Escaped  from  the  truth,  the  morning 
is  color  and  mist,  /  Which  is  enough....  "  In  this  moment  of  liberation  the  man 
feels  the  freedom  of  "being  without  description".  Being  without  description  in  a 
landscape  without  a  doctrine,  the  man  is  suddenly  struck  by  the  freshness  of 
things  around  him,  the  "freshness  of  the  oak-leaves"  and  "everything  bulging  and 
blazing  and  big  in  itself...  ".  Says  Stevens  elsewhere,  "The  freshness  of 
transformation  is  /  The  freshness  of  a  world.  It  is  our  own,  /  It  is  ourselves,  the 
freshness  of  ourselves...  "  (CP  397-398). 
In  "A  Word  with  Jose  Rodriguez-Feo"  Stevens  writes,  "We  must  enter  boldly 
that  interior  world  /  To  pick  up  relaxations  of  the  known"  (CP  334).  The  motive 
for  meditation  is  to  enjoy  such  moments  of  the  imagination  when  reason  relaxes 
its  grip  on  the  `known',  allowing  for  the  emergence  of  something  new  and 
previously  unknown.  At  such  times  Stevens  becomes  "an  ignorant  man  again" 
(CP  380).  This  exercise  in  viewing  the  world  anew  involves  an  overthrowing  of 
an  order  by  way  of  a  momentary  escape  from  reason's  desire  to  arrange  and  hold 
captive.  Writes  Stevens  in  his  essay  "Imagination  as  Value", 
The  truth  seems  to  be  that  we  live  in  concepts  of  the  imagination  before  the 
reason  has  established  them.  If  this  is  true,  then  reason  is  simply  the 
methodizer  of  the  imagination.  It  may  be  that  the  imagination  is  a  miracle  of 
logic  and  that  its  exquisite  divinations  are  calculations  beyond  analysis,  as  the 
conclusions  of  the  reason  are  calculations  wholly  within  analysis  (NA  154). 
97 Stevens'  experience  of  mystical  contemplation  is  one  where  the  powers  of  the 
imagination,  capable  of  "exquisite  divinations",  are  enhanced  while  the  desire  to 
possess-to  capture  by  ordering  and  arranging-is  diminished.  These  are 
moments  of  the  irrational,  moments  of  distortion  when  the  world  is  seen  again 
with  an  "ignorant  eye".  '25 
"You  must  become  an  ignorant  man  again,  "  says  Stevens,  "And  see  the  sun 
again  with  an  ignorant  eye....  "  This  means  throwing  off  the  rotted  names,  the 
lacklustre  language  that  holds  the  thing  captive  and  allowing  it  to  be  in  "the 
difficulty  of  what  it  is  to  be",  that  is,  allowing  it  to  be  without  a  name. 
How  clean  the  sun  when  seen  in  its  idea, 
Washed  in  the  remotest  cleanliness  of  a  heaven 
That  has  expelled  us  and  our  images... 
There  is  a  project  for  the  sun.  The  sun 
Must  bear  no  name,  gold  flourisher,  but  be 
In  the  difficulty  of  what  it  is  to  be.  (CP  381) 
Stevens'  mysticism  has  to  do  with  un-naming,  un-doing  and  `un-knowing',  or  in 
his  words,  "becoming  an  ignorant  man  again.  "  It  is  a  process  of  dis-possessing 
`reality'  and  loving  it  enough  to  allow  it  to  be.  Only  when  reality  has  been  dis- 
possessed  can  there  be  a  meeting  of  equals,  a  rendezvous  between  reality  and  the 
125  Timothy  Clark  notes  that  "...  a  crucial  part  of  the  process  of  composition  is  understood  as  a 
desired  or  even  calculated  suspension  of  reasoning  or  deliberation,  a  temporary  mania  or  insanity. 
This  suspension  is  valorised  as  a  mode  of  access  to  'deeper'  or  spontaneously  productive  areas  of 
the  psyche.  The  irrationality  that  is  inspiration,  though  analogous  to  a  kind  of  insanity,  is 
understood  to  be  sui  generis,  a  peculiar,  unique  and  probably  rare  state  of  being.  The  creative  is 
less  irrational  than,  so  to  speak,  'supra-rational.  '  It  achieves  feats  unattainable  by  any  merely 
rational  or  procedural  method.  "  From  The  Theory  of  Inspiration,  pp.  2-3.  Curiously,  nowhere  in 
Clark's  study  does  he  mention  mysticism  or  the  mystics  in  relation  to  creative  inspiration, 
although  he  does  note  the  connection  between  inspiration  and  religious  experience,  albeit  he  is 
skeptical  of  any  suggestion  of  the  religious.  He  says  that  many  accounts  of  inspiration, 
particularly  those  of  the  nineteenth-century,  "confirm  a  basically  liberal  conception  of 
personhood-inspiration  is  invariably  the  'liberation'  of  a  supposedly  truer  or  deeper  self  from  out 
of  the  pressures  of  convention,  cliche,  tradition,  false  thinking  or  inauthenticity.  The  fascination 
of  these  episodes  also  lies  in  their  seductive  status  as  modem  versions  of  miracle.  Glimpses  of  the 
creative  process  remain  like  brief  visions  of  a  promised  land.  They  are,  in  effect,  secularized 
versions  of  religious  conversion  narratives  such  as  those  of  St  Paul  and  St  Augustine,  with  their 
dramatic  peripeteia  and  scenes  of  recognition,  "  p.  S. 
98 imagination.  According  to  Stevens,  the  very  nature  of  poetry  "is  an 
interdependence  of  the  imagination  and  reality  as  equals"  (NA  27),  and  it  is 
through  this  meeting  of  equals  that  something  new  emerges: 
Two  things  of  opposite  natures  seem  to  depend 
On  one  another,  as  a  man  depends 
On  a  woman,  day  on  night,  the  imagined 
On  the  real.  This  is  the  origin  of  change. 
Winter  and  spring,  cold  copulars,  embrace 
And  forth  the  particulars  of  rapture  come. 
Music  falls  on  the  silence  like  a  sense, 
A  passion  that  we  feel,  not  understand. 
Morning  and  afternoon  are  clasped  together 
And  North  and  South  are  an  intrinsic  couple 
And  sun  and  rain  a  plural,  like  two  lovers 
That  walk  away  as  one  in  the  greenest  body.  (CP  392) 
When  `reality'  is  loved  enough  that  the  will  to  possess  is  abandoned,  the 
detached  person  experiences  "an  elevation",  "the  highest  of  all  flights".  126  Such 
"peak  experiences,  "  which  belong  as  much  to  the  agnostic  poet  as  to  the  medieval 
Christian  mystic,  offer  a  temporary  release  from  gnawing  desire  and  bring  a  sense 
of  fulfillment  characterised  by  feelings  of  "wholeness,  rightness,  and  well- 
being.  "127  Says  Eckhart, 
126  Meister  Eckhart,  Meister  Eckhart:  Selected  Treatises  and  Sermons,  translated  by  James  M. 
Clark  and  John  Skinner  (London:  HarperCollins,  1958),  p.  143-144. 
1271tIt  is  curious,  "  writes  Robert  Bellah,  "how  the  notion  that  such  experiences  are  the  exclusive 
property  of  religious  virtuosi  ever  got  started,  since  they  are  probably  as  old  and  as  widespread  as 
the  human  race  itself.  "  Robert  N.  Bellah,  Beyond  Belief  Essays  on  Religion  in  a  Post-Traditional 
World  (London:  Harper  and  Row,  1970),  p.  199.  Although  the  work  is  somewhat  dated  now,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  Bellah  cites  Stevens  as  "the  greatest  American  'theological  poet'  of  the 
twentieth  century,  "  and  argues  that  "he  may  be  particularly  useful  in  helping  us  discern  the 
structure  of  contemporary  religious  consciousness,  "  p.  197.  See  also  chapter  six,  entitled  "Beyond 
Belief',  of  Denis  Donoghue's  Adam's  Curse:  Reflections  on  Religion  and  Literature  (Notre  Dame, 
Indiana:  University  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  2001).  Donoghue  launches  a  scathing  attack  on  Bellah, 
declaring  that  "you  would  never  discover  from  his  books  what  religion  is,  apart  from  the  empty 
formulae  of  his  gestures  toward  it.  Nor  would  you  discover  how  religion  has  come  to  be  dark  with 
mystery....  Religion,  according  to  his  lowest  common  denomination  of  it,  has  no  necessary 
involvement  with  belief,  "  p.  101.  And  addressing  Bellah's  proclamation  of  Stevens  as  the 
"greatest  American  theological  poet",  Donoghue  writes,  "I  admire  Stevens's  poetry,  but  I  don't 
understand  the  sense  in  which  he  is  said  to  be  a  theological  poet,  unless  Bellah  has  in  view-as  I'm 
afraid  he  has-some  form  of  secular  theology  which  is  designed  to  get  rid  of  theology,  "  p.  94.  He 
99 ... 
if  the  heart  is  to  find  preparedness  for  the  highest  of  all  flights,  it  must  aim 
at  a  pure  nothing  and  in  this  there  is  the  greatest  possibility  that  can  exist.  For 
when  the  detached  heart  has  the  higher  aim,  it  must  be  towards  the  Nothing.  129 
And  why,  according  to  the  Meister,  must  the  "detached  heart"  aim  "towards  the 
Nothing"?  "Because,  "  he  says,  "in  this  is  the  highest  receptivity.  " 
Take  a  parable  from  nature:  if  I  want  to  write  on  a  wax  tablet,  then  no  matter 
how  noble  the  thing  is  that  is  written  on  the  tablet,  I  am  none  the  less  vexed 
because  I  cannot  write  on  it.  If  I  really  want  to  write  I  must  delete  everything 
that  is  written  on  the  tablet,  and  the  tablet  is  never  so  suitable  for  writing  as 
when  absolutely  nothing  is  written  on  it.  130 
Eckhart's  example  is  particularly  poignant  for  the  poet  who  requires  a  tabula  rasa 
on  which  to  write  anew.  If  Stevens  is  enamoured  with  negation,  if  he  is  in  love 
with  the  `icy  vacancies  of  winter',  it  is  precisely  because  it  is  through  the  negativa 
that  he  is  fully  receptive  to  the  possible  discoveries  of  the  imagination.  Through 
the  disciplined  process  of  stripping  away  and  journeying  into  that  interior  to  "pick 
up  relaxations  of  the  known",  he  discovers  something  previously  unknown, 
unnamed,  and  undiscovered,  something  that  has  the  power  to  take  him  by 
surprise. 
Throw  away  the  lights,  the  definitions, 
And  say  of  what  you  see  in  the  dark 
That  it  is  this  or  that  it  is  that, 
But  do  not  use  the  rotted  names. 
How  should  you  walk  in  that  space  and  know 
Nothing  of  the  madness  of  space, 
Nothing  of  its  jocular  procreations? 
Throw  the  lights  away.  Nothing  must  stand 
Between  you  and  the  shapes  you  take 
goes  on,  "It  is  not  surprising  that  Bellah  quotes  Stevens  in  a  book  on  'religion  in  a  post-traditional 
world.  '  He  evidently  thinks  that  Stevens,  more  than  any  other  writer,  articulates  a  religious 
sensibility  that  sustains  itself  without  belief  and  aspires  somehow  to  go  beyond  belief  in  a 
direction  that  can't  be  indicated,  "  pp.  100-101.  But  Donoghue's  own  understanding  of  Stevens' 
religious  sensibility  is  clearly  limited,  as  demonstrated  by  his  whole  discussion  of  the  poet's  notion 
of'belief,  outlined  on  pp.  94-96. 
'29  Ibid. 
130  Ibid. 
100 When  the  crust  of  shape  has  been  destroyed. 
You  as  you  are?  You  are  yourself. 
The  blue  guitar  surprises  you.  ("The  Man  With  the  Blue  Guitar",  CP  183) 
We  note  the  repetition  of  the  word  `Nothing'  here  and  the  paradox  of  Nothing's 
"jocular  procreations".  By  shedding  the  lights,  the  definitions,  the  rotted  names, 
the  shapes,  it  is  as  if  the  poet  has  regressed  back  (progressed  forward?  )  to  the 
Nothing,  to  that  wax  tablet  wiped  clean  of  all  writing.  But  the  Nothing  cannot 
stay;  it  cannot  linger.  As  soon  as  the  "crust  of  shape  has  been  destroyed"  a  new 
shape  begins  to  emerge  demanding  a  new  name.  Out  of  the  experience  of 
Nothing  comes  Something.  Creatio  ex  nihilo. 
**** 
Before  continuing  with  these  thoughts  in  the  next  chapter,  we  must  first  answer 
that  question  with  which  we  began:  Does  Stevens  qualify  as  a  mystic?  The 
difficulty  in  answering  this  question  stems  from  the  more  general  problem  of 
finding  a  working  definition  for  the  word  `mystic'.  What  exactly  is  a  mystic  and 
what  is  mysticism?  Is  a  mystic,  as  Richard  H.  Jones  believes,  one  who  undergoes 
`mystical  experiences'  that  occur  as  the  result  of  "the  process  of  turning  one's 
attention  inward  and  stilling  all  normal  cognitive  and  emotional  activities,  "  a 
process  of  "forgetting",  a  definition  that,  by  the  way,  sounds  much  like  Bevis' 
understanding  of  Buddhist  meditation?  131  Is  a  mystic,  then,  to  be  defined  as  one 
who  undergoes  certain  special  types  of  experiences  not  immediately  available  to 
the  general  public?  And  if  mysticism  is  primarily  experiential  then  are  certain 
drug-induced  experiences  to  be  counted  as  mystical?  In  his  introduction  to  The 
Darkness  of  God,  Denys  Turner  deals  with  the  whole  question  of  mysticism  and, 
what  he  calls,  "the  problem  about  the  role  of  `experience'  within  `the 
101 mystical"'.  132  For  Turner  the  recent  focus  on  the  experiential  in  mysticism  is 
problematic  because  it  does  not  take  seriously  the  accounts  of  the  medieval 
mystics  who  were  by  and  large  not  interested  in  experience  as  such,  in  spite  of 
their  frequent  use  of  such  `experiential'  words  as  `inwardness'  and  `ascent'.  He 
explains, 
...  whereas  our  employment  of  the  metaphors  of  `inwardness'  and  `ascent' 
appears  to  be  tied  in  with  the  achievement  and  the  cultivation  of  a  certain  kind 
of  experience-such  as  those  recommended  within  the  practice  of  what  is 
called,  nowadays,  `centring'  or  `contemplative'  prayer-the  mediaeval 
employment  of  them  was  tied  in  with  a  `critique'  of  such  religious  experiences 
and  practices.  Whereas  we  appear  to  have  `psychologized'  the  metaphors,  the 
Neoplatonic  mediaeval  writer  used  the  metaphors  in  an  `apophatic'  spirit  to 
play  down  the  value  of  the  `experiential';  and  that,  therefore,  whereas  it  would 
come  naturally  to  the  contemporary,  `psychologising'  mind  to  think  of  `the 
mystical'  in  terms  of  its  characterizing  experiences,  the  mediaeval  mind 
thought  of  the  `mystical',  that  is  to  say,  the  `hidden'  or  `secret',  wisdom  as 
being  what  the  Author  of  The  Cloud  of  Unknowing  called  a  `divinity'  which  is 
`hidden'  precisely  from  experience.  133 
It  is  not  surprising  that  contemporary  studies  of  mysticism  have  neglected  the 
religious  in  favour  of  the  experiential  when  we  consider  just  how  misunderstood 
`the  religious'  is  today.  William  Bevis  and  his  repudiation  of  the  religious 
element  in  Stevens  is  one  example  of  how  contemporary  scholars  are  embarrassed 
by  any  suggestion  of  the  religious  as  they  anxiously  insist  that  theirs  is  a  `secular' 
(read  `scientific')  study.  Bevis'  repeated  claim  to  be  interested  in  Stevens' 
meditative  practices  is  a  way  of  distancing  himself  from  the  more  uncomfortable 
and  uncertain  (that  is,  unmeasurable)  elements  of  Stevens'  poetics.  By  stressing 
the  experiential,  which,  as  Bevis  is  keen  to  demonstrate,  is  measurable  in  some 
way134,  over  the  religious,  modem  scholars  are  claiming  mysticism  as  a  field  for 
"'  Richard  H.  Jones,  Mysticism  Examined:  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  Mysticism  (Albany,  New 
York:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1993),  p.  1. 
132  Turner,  p.  4. 
133  Ibid. 
"a  Bevis,  as  we  have  already  mentioned,  is  primarily  interested  in  meditation  (as  opposed  to 
mysticism,  as  he  understands  it)  as  a  particular  state  of  consciousness  characterised  by  transience, 
102 scientific  and  rational  inquiry.  Through  removing  the  uncertain,  irrational, 
inexplicable,  and  even  mysterious  element  in  mysticism,  it  becomes  an 
examinable,  and,  therefore,  `respectable'  field  for  `serious'  scholars.  Even  the 
term  `ineffable',  so  closely  associated  with  mysticism,  has  been  subjected  to  this 
kind  of  scientific  scrutiny,  with  scholars  concentrating  on  the  ineffability  of 
experience.  "In  other  words,  "  writes  McIntosh,  "language  for  talking  about  the 
indescribable  wonder  of  God  (who  cannot  be  experienced  in  se)  becomes  the 
language  of  having  a  wonderfully  indescribable  experience  of  God.  "135  Certainly 
both  Nelson  Pike  and  Steven  Katz,  as  we  have  already  seen,  fall  into  this  category 
of  scholars  of  mysticism  who  are  more  interested  in  the  experiential  than  they  are 
in  the  theological  or  religious  elements  of  mysticism,  though  they  do  not 
completely  divorce  one  from  the  other. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  debate  between  the  experiential  and  the  religious  are 
those  theologians  who  take  little  interest  in  the  experiential  arguing  that  what  is 
central  to  mysticism  is  not  the  inner  states  of  consciousness  but  the  "breaking 
through  of  wisdom.  "  136  That  is  to  say,  the  important  thing  about  contemplation  is 
what  it  brings  in  terms  of  a  "new  understanding,  a  new  encounter  with  wisdom,  " 
says  McIntosh.  137  What  is  important  is  not  experience  but  revelation. 
But  it  seems  that  both  of  these  viewpoints  are  too  one-sided.  What  is  needed  is 
a  proper  balance  when  considering  experience  and,  what  we  might  call,  revelation 
in  mysticism,  a  balance  predicated  upon  the  belief  that  the  experience  is  an 
ineffability,  "sensations  of  time  and  space  changed  or  transcended"  and  "sensations  of  selfloss- 
that  is,  absence  of  thought  or  feeling  according  to  later  reports,  and  minimal  cortical  activity  as 
measured  by  machines  during  meditation.  "  He  continues,  "Such  a  state  of  consciousness  differs  in 
report  and  measurable  characteristics  from  other  states  such  as  waking,  dreaming,  day-dreaming, 
and  hypnotic  trance,  and  such  calm  self-loss  differs  also  from  the  other  mystical  categories  of  the 
occult,  vision,  and  ecstasy  (excited  self-loss).  "  From  Mind  of  Winter,  p.  12.  Emphases  added. 
'35  Mark  A.  McIntosh,  p.  68. 
136  Ibid,  p.  12. 
137  Ibid. 
103 integral  part  of  the  revelation.  Turning  to  the  writings  of  the  mystic  Teresa  of 
Avila,  we  consider  her  description  of  the  state  she  calls  the  `Prayer  of  Quiet'  in 
The  Way  of  Perfection  and  how  it  demonstrates  the  relationship  between  mystical 
experience  and  revelation: 
This  is  a  supernatural  state,  and,  however  hard  we  try,  we  cannot  reach  it  for 
ourselves;  for  it  is  a  state  in  which  the  soul  enters  into  peace,  or,  rather,  in 
which  the  Lord  gives  it  peace  through  His  presence,  as  He  did  that  just  man 
Simeon.  In  this  state,  all  the  faculties  are  stilled.  The  soul,  in  a  way  which 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  outward  senses,  realizes  that  it  is  now  very  close  to 
its  God,  and  that,  if  it  were  but  a  little  closer,  it  would  become  one  with  Him 
through  union....  [The  soul]  cannot  understand  how  it  knows  Him,  yet  it  sees 
that  it  is  in  the  Kingdom..  .  and  it  feels  such  reverence  that  it  dares  ask  for 
nothing.  It  is,  as  it  were,  in  a  swoon,  both  inwardly  and  outwardly,  so  that  the 
outward  man  (let  me  call  it  the  `body',  and  then  you  will  understand  me 
better)  does  not  wish  to  move,  but  rests,  like  one  who  has  almost  reached  the 
end  of  his  journey,  so  that  it  may  the  better  start  again  upon  its  way,  with 
redoubled  strength  for  its  task.  138 
Teresa  differentiates  between  those  who  enter  into  a  meditative  state  "whenever 
they  like",  as  a  "hedgehog  or  a  tortoise  withdrawing  into  itself",  and  those,  like 
herself,  who  enter  into  a  `supernatural'  state  "only  when  God  is  pleased  to  grant 
[...  ]  this  favour.  "139  The  mystic  can  prepare  herself  for  this  state  but  she  cannot 
enter  into  it  without  God  granting  it  as  a  gift.  She  writes,  "One  preparation  for 
listening  to  Him,  as  certain  books  tell  us,  is  that  we  should  contrive,  not  to  use  our 
reasoning  powers,  but  to  be  intent  upon  discovering  what  the  Lord  is  working  in 
»140  the  soul.... 
...  the  soul  whom  the  Lord  has  been  pleased  to  lead  into  this  Mansion  will  do 
best  to  act  as  I  have  said.  Let  it  try,  without  forcing  itself  or  causing  any 
turmoil,  to  put  a  stop  to  all  discursive  reasoning,  yet  not  to  suspend  the 
understanding,  nor  to  cease  from  all  thought,  though  it  is  well  for  it  to 
remember  that  it  is  in  God's  presence  and  Who  this  God  is.  If  feeling  this 
should  lead  it  into  a  state  of  absorption,  well  and  good;  but  it  should  not  try  to 
138  Teresa  of  Avila,  The  Way  of  Perfection,  translated  and  edited  by  E.  Allison  Peers  from  the 
critical  edition  of  P.  Silverio  de  Santa  Teresa,  C.  D.  (Garden  City,  New  York:  Doubleday,  Image 
Books,  1964),  chapter  31. 
139  Teresa  of  Avila,  Interior  Castle,  translated  by  E.  Allison  Peers  (London:  Sheed  and  Ward, 
1974),  p.  41. 
140  Ibid. 
104 understand  what  this  state  is,  because  that  is  a  gift  bestowed  upon  the  will. 
The  will,  then,  should  be  left  to  enjoy  it,  and  should  not  labour  except  for 
uttering  a  few  loving  words,  for  although  in  such  a  case  one  may  not  be 
striving  to  cease  from  thought,  such  cessation  often  comes,  though  for  a  very 
short  time.  141 
According  to  Teresa,  an  authentic  mystical  experience  is  different  from  other 
experience;  for  her  it  is  a  "supernatural  state",  that  is,  one  that  cannot  be  reached 
merely  through  one's  own  efforts.  She  feels  herself  called  to  enter  into  this 
supernatural  state  to  experience  the  peace  that  "the  Lord  gives.  "  Two  things  stand 
out  in  these  passages:  first  that  the  mystic  is  invited  to  enter  into  this  state,  and 
second  that  she  is  given,  what  she  calls,  the  peace  of  God.  Here  we  have  the  key 
to  the  religious  element  of  mystical  experience:  the  mystic's  sense  of  being  called 
into  mystic  union  and  being  offered  a  gift.  Both  the  calling  and  the  gift-giving 
happen  freely  for  the  one  who  is  `listening'  for  the  invitation  to  receive. 
Herein  lies  Bevis'  problem  with  Western  mystics,  that  they  always  find 
`something'  instead  of  `nothing'.  We  recall  that  he  argues  that  Stevens' 
meditative  practices  were  not  in  any  sense  religious,  nor  did  they  yield 
`something'.  However,  in  spite  of  Bevis'  protestations,  if  we  look  closely  at 
Stevens'  poetry,  we  do  in  fact  find  clues  to  suggest  that  there  are  indeed  parallels 
with  the  Christian  mystics  who  believed  that  their  experiences  were  brought  about 
through  an  invitation  to  mystic  union  and  that,  through  this  union,  they  received  a 
gift. 
For  Stevens,  the  experience  of  the  merging  of  reality  and  the  imagination 
brings  something  new  into  being.  And  experience  must  not  be  devalued  in  this 
process;  it  is  necessary  for  the  making  of  the  thing.  We  recall  Stevens'  emphasis 
in  "Sunday  Morning"  on  passions,  moods,  grievings  and  elations-all  sensory 
141  Ibid,  p.  43. 
105 experiences  to  be  valued  equally.  He  does  not  elevate  one  experience  above 
another;  all  are  part  of  the  changing  climates  of  the  mind,  those  internal  changes 
that  respond  to  the  changing  climates  of  reality.  Nothing  attests  more  to  Stevens' 
faith  in  change  to  bring  about  something  new  than  his  never-ending  meditations 
on  the  seasons. 
If  Turner,  McIntosh  and  others  have  been  unhappy  with  contemporary  studies 
of  mysticism  that  have  focused  on  experience  to  the  exclusion  of  `revelation',  it 
may  be  because  there  appears  to  be  an  underlying  assumption  among  these 
scholars  of  `experientialism'  that  there  is  but  one  kind  of  experience  that  can  be 
classified  as  `mystical',  an  assumption  that  Stevens  would  most  certainly  reject. 
The  great  paradox  of  Stevens'  mysticism  is  that  for  him  to  be  detached,  to  let  go 
and  let  be,  to  suppress  the  desire  to  possess  and  to  grasp,  means  being  attached  to 
the  flux  and  flow  of  reality  and  welcoming  all  the  many  experiences  it  brings. 
106 Chapter  Five:  A  Poetics  of  Gelassenheit 
That  which  is  the  most  difficult  to  find  is,  as  the  proper  and  the  near,  what  we 
must  look  for  the  longest.  And  as  long  as  it  is  being  looked  for,  it  is  never 
lost.  Any  hasty  and  hurried  search  is  not  a  search  but  a  wild  wandering  about 
from  one  thing  to  another.  The  constant  suspension  of  meditation  belongs  to 
the  search.  Meditation  is  like  the  withheld  breath  of  modesty  facing  the 
awaited  marvel.  The  search  properly  speaking  is  a  constant  hesitation,  not  the 
hesitation  of  someone  who  is  simply  perplexed  and  indecisive,  but  the 
hesitating  of  someone  who  dwells  a  long  time,  takes  his  time,  looks  in  front 
and  behind  himself,  because  he  is  seeking  and  dwelling  in  experience.  The 
discovery  and  the  appropriation  of  the  proper  are  one  with  the  dwelling  of  the 
step. 
Martin  Heidegger'42 
...  mystics  (mystein:  quiet;  keep  it  a  secret)  and  negative  theologians  (I  cannot 
say  a  thing)  are  among  our  greatest  poets.... 
John  Caputoýa3 
The  name  keeps  the  secret. 
Marc  Froment-Meurice'44 
Not  ideas  about  the  thing  but  the  thing  itself 
Wallace  Stevens  (CP  534) 
In  the  last  chapter  we  considered  how  a  third  thing,  poetry,  is  born  out  of  the 
union  between  reality  and  the  imagination,  and  we  said  of  this  third  thing  that  it  is 
an  entity  that  once  `born'  lives  independently  of  its  `birth  parents'.  Importantly, 
for  Stevens,  it  is  not  to  be  considered  merely  as  a  witness  to  or  a  description  of  an 
experience,  and  by  experience  here  we  mean  the  mystical  experience  of  the 
rendezvous  of  reality  and  the  imagination.  This  third  thing  does  not  merely  point 
to  something  else,  something  outside  itself;  it  is  rather  a  thing  in  itself.  This  is  to 
say  that  the  poem  is,  in  the  words  of  Martin  Heidegger,  a  "self-sufficient 
142  From  Heidegger's  Holderlins  Hymne  "Andenken  "as  cited  by  Froment-Meurice,  p.  222. 
'a'  John  D.  Cauto,  Against  Ethics:  Contributions  to  a  Poetics  of  Obligation  with  Constant 
Reference  to  Deconstruction  (Bloomington,  Indiana:  Indiana  University  Press,  1993),  p.  75. 
107 presence".  '44  In  the  following  pages  we  will  take  leave  of  Stevens  for  a  while  and 
turn  first  to  the  problem  of  what  we  might  call  `mystical  ineffability'  and  then  to 
some  of  the  later  works  of  Heidegger  contained  in  Poetry,  Language,  Thought  to 
see  how  it  is  that  the  poem  comes  to  be  understood  as  `not  an  idea  about  the  thing 
but  the  thing  itself'.  For  Heidegger,  more  than  any  other  thinker,  provides  the 
theoretical  underpinning  for  understanding  poetry  as  a  "self-sufficient  presence" 
which  emerges  out  of  what  we  will  call  `a  poetics  of  Gelassenheit'. 
The  notion  of  the  poem  as  an  independent  entity  is  important  as  it  relates  to  the 
mystical  experience  of  ineffability  and  the  understanding  of  the  relationship 
between  language  and  `reality.  '  A  basic  characteristic  of  mysticism  is  this 
problem  of  capturing  in  words  that  which  is  invisible,  incomprehensible, 
unknowable,  and  uncreated.  It  is,  essentially,  a  problem  of  naming  the 
unnameable.  Plotinus  explains, 
The  [One]  is  only  thus,  as  it  is,  and  not  otherwise.  But  even  the  expression  `it 
is  thus'  is  inaccurate,  for  thereby  it  would  be  limited  and  thereby  made  into  a 
definite  something  (and  an  individual  having  number).  For  then  it  would 
again  take  its  place  amongst  things  of  which  it  can  be  said  that  they  are  thus  or 
not.  But  the  [One]  is  exalted  above  all  these  things.  '45 
Nevertheless,  regardless  of  the  impossibility  of  naming  the  unnameable  and 
saying  the  unsayable,  mystics  do  name  and  say.  "In  one  of  his  typical  remarks 
about  the  Godhead,  "  says  Richard  Jones,  "Meister  Eckhart  declares  `Everything 
in  the  Godhead  is  one,  and  of  that  there  is  nothing  to  be  said.  '  Well,  did  he  not 
143  Marc  Froment-Meurice,  p.  232 
144  Martin  Heidegger,  Poetry,  Language,  Thought,  translated  by  Albert  Hofstadter  (New  York: 
Harper  and  Row,  1971),  p.  29.  Hereafter  referred  to  as  PLT. 
145  Plotinus  as  cited  by  Rudolph  Otto  in  Religious  Essays  (London:  Oxford  University  Press, 
1931),  p.  84. 
108 just  say  something  about  it?  "147  Indeed,  mystics  do  very  often  give  a  name  to  this 
Nothing  that  will  bear  no  name,  not  even  the  name  `Nothing'. 
There  are  different  ideas  concerning  `mystical  ineffability'  that  stem  from  the 
two  basic  understandings  of  mysticism  that  we  briefly  addressed  in  the  last 
chapter.  We  recall  that  for  some,  mysticism  is  considered  to  be  purely 
experiential,  while  for  others  (like  Plotinus  and  Eckhart  above),  it  involves  an 
encounter  with  the  divine  and  "the  breaking  through  of  wisdom.  "  For  the  former 
`ineffability'  is  about  the  ineffability  of  experience,  that  is,  the  inability  to 
describe  adequately  the  mystical  experience  of  union  without  distinction  in  words. 
The  assumption  made  by  these  `experientialists'  is  that  language  is  predicated 
upon  a  subject-object  split,  that  it  always  points  to  something  outside  itself; 
therefore,  when  the  mystic  experiences  the  feeling  of  union  without  distinction, 
words  are  understood  to  be  wholly  inadequate  to  convey  this  unitive  or  non- 
dualistic  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  for  the  latter  group,  language  is 
considered  to  be  inadequate  either  because  it  is  unable  to  capture  in  words  that 
which  is  thought  to  be  beyond  all  words  and  all  names  or  because  (and  there  is  a 
marked  difference  here)  language  is  thought  to  be  incapable  of  describing  it 
completely.  148  Either  way  the  distrust  of  language  for  this  second  group  arises 
from  the  deep  humility  of  the  mystic  who  has  reverence  for  that  which  is  finally 
unknown  and  unsayable.  It  is,  we  might  say,  a  reverence  for  keeping  that  which  is 
hidden,  hidden. 
147  Jones,  Mysticism  Examined,  p.  101. 
148  J.  P.  Williams  emphasises  the  difference  between  these  two  concepts  of  ineffability  in  his 
chapter  "Dogen's  Apophasis".  Williams  says  that  according  to  Zen  Master  Dogen  "the 
ineffability  of  reality  is  not  a  question  of  there  being  no  words  which  would  describe  it,  but  rather 
that  there  are  no  words  which  would  describe  it  completely,  "  p.  129.  This  is  a  particularly 
important  point  if  sacred  texts  are  to  continue  to  have  any  relevancy. 
109 Mystics  often  claim  that  silence  is  the  only  appropriate  response  to  the 
ineffability  of  149  But  how  is  silence  to  be  conveyed?  Does  it  not  require 
contextualisation  in  order  for  it  to  be  a  `significant  silence'?  Is  silence  conveyed 
merely  through  not  speaking?  Or  can  there  be  another  kind  of  silence,  one  that 
speaks?  Also,  is  it  not  possible  for  silence  to  be  tyrannous,  that  is,  is  it  not 
possible  to  have  a  "tyranny  of  silence"  just  as  it  is  possible  to  have  a  tyranny  of 
speech?  150 
What  is  needed  is  a  silence  that  is  faithful  to  the  ineffability  or  `unsayableness' 
of  ;  what  is  needed  is  a  silence  that  speaks,  and  in  speaking  keeps  what  is 
hidden,  hidden  and  what  is  secret,  secret.  But  how  is  it  possible  to  retain  silence 
while  `speaking  silence'?  Moreover,  how  is  it  possible  to  keep  the  secret  of 
secret,  while  showing  its  secret? 
These  are  the  very  questions  that  preoccupy  Martin  Heidegger  in  his  essays 
"The  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art"  and  "What  Are  Poets  For?  ",  questions  largely 
inspired  by  his  reading  of  the  poet  Hölderlin.  In  1914  Heidegger  says  that  he  was 
struck  by  an  "earthquake"  and  this  earthquake  was  not  the  start  of  the  First  World 
War,  as  one  might  expect,  but  rather  his  reading  of  the  poet  Friedrich  Hölderlin 
(1770-1843).  Heidegger  became  so  enthusiastic  about  the  poet  that  he  declared 
149  The  reader  will  appreciate  the  apparent  difficulty  in  this  chapter  of  finding  an  appropriate 
signifier.  We  have  chosen  to  use  ''  to  indicate  the  `unsayable'  in  order  to  avoid  the 
confusion  and  inconsistency  of  employing  a  number  of  different  terms  used  by  different  thinkers, 
such  as  'reality'  (Stevens),  'Being'  (Heidegger),  'the  gods'  (HÖlderlin),  'the  Name'  (Marion),  'the 
Godhead'  (Eckhart)  and  so  on. 
150  Williams  notes  that  Dogen  believed  that  "silence  is  easier  than  words  to  misread:  silence  needs 
a  context  to  give  it  meaning,  and  when  taken  out  of  context  can  fail  to  teach  anything  or,  worse, 
may  teach  the  wrong  thing....  Dogen's  concerns  about  the  abuse  of  silence  are  not  merely 
philosophical  but  spring  from  a  deep  concern  that  the  soteriology  on  offer  to  the  wider  community 
should  be  viable.  Dogen  therefore,  tirelessly  and  repeatedly,  makes  it  his  business  to  drive  a 
wedge  between  the  unspeakable  and  what  []  has  [been]  called  the  `tyranny  of  silence':  silence  is 
not  the  sole  possible  response  to  reality,  nor  is  it  ever  a  possible  sole-response,  "  pp.  130-131. 
110 that  "My  thinking  stands  in  an  unavoidable  relationship  to  the  poetry  of 
Hölderlin.  "151 
Commenting  further  on  Hölderlin  in  "What  Are  Poets  For?  ",  Heidegger  says 
that  through  his  poetry  we  can  "come  to  learn  what  is  unspoken,  "152  for  as  a  poet, 
Hölderlin  understood  the  paradox  of  speaking  the  unspoken  and  naming  that 
which  resists  all  names. 
Nenn'  ich  den  Hohen  dabei?  Unschikliches  liebet  ein  Gott  nicht, 
Ihn  zu  fassen,  ist  fast  unsere  Freude  zu  klein. 
Schweigen  müssen  wir  oft;  es  fehlen  heilige  Nahmen, 
Herzen  schlagen  und  doch  bleibet  die  Rede  zurük? 
Will  I  name  the  High?  A  god  does  not  like  the  unseemly. 
To  grasp  him  our  joy  is  almost  too  small. 
Often  we  must  remain  silent.  They  are  lacking,  the  sacred  names. 
Hearts  beat,  and  yet  discourse  remains  behind?  '53 
It  is  `unseemly'  to  name  the  god;  therefore,  silence  is  to  be  preferred.  But  again, 
how  to  speak  this  silence,  and  what  role  does  the  poet  have?  Says  Hölderlin: 
Aber  weil  so  nähe  sie  sind  die  gegenwartige  Götter 
Muss  ich  seyn,  als  wäre  sie  fern,  und  dunkel  in  Wolken 
Muss  ihr  Name  mir  seyn,  nur  ehe  der  Morgen 
Aufglanzt,  ehe  das  Leben  in  Mittag  glühet 
Nenn'  ich  stille  sie  mir,  damit  der  Dichter  das  seine 
Habe,  wenn  aber  hinab  das  himmlische  Licht  geht 
Denk'  ich  das  vergangenen  gern,  und  sage-blühet  indess. 
But  since  they  are  so  close,  the  present  gods, 
I  must  be  as  though  they  were  far  away  and  obscure  in  the  clouds 
Must  to  myself  be  their  name;  only,  before  the  morning 
Dawns,  before  life  blazes  up  in  noon 
I  will  name  them  silently  to  myself,  so  that  the  poet  has  his  part, 
But  when  /  if  the  celestial  light  goes  down 
I  willingly  have  that  light  of  the  past  in  mind,  and  say-flower  nonetheless.  '54 
's'  As  quoted  in  Timothy  Clark's  Martin  Heidegger  (London:  Routledge,  2002),  pp.  98. 
152  Heidegger,  PLT,  p.  96.  Elsewhere  Heidegger  says  that  "we  never  know  a  mystery  by  unveiling 
or  analysing  it  to  death,  but  only  in  such  a  way  that  we  preserve  the  mystery  as  mystery.  "  As  cited 
by  Timothy  Clark  in  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  119. 
133  As  cited  by  Froment-Meurice,  p.  89.  Translated  into  English  by  Jan  Plug. 
154  Ibid,  pp.  95-96. 
111 "I  will  name  them  silently  to  myself,  so  that  the  poet  has  his  part".  This  is  what 
Heidegger  say  poets  are  for:  they  take  part  in  naming  the  gods  `silently',  while  at 
the  same  time  letting  the  gods  `be'  in  silence.  They  take  part  in  naming  the  gods 
not  with  the  view  to  `capture'  them  in  words  but  with  the  intent  to  let  them  `be', 
to  let  them  `presence'  through  language. 
"In  the  name  of  the  sacred,  in  the  name  of  sacred  necessity,  "  writes  Marc 
Froment-Meurice, 
naming  is  an  utter  necessity,  but  naming  in  silence.  Naming  is  necessary,  and 
yet  "they  are  lacking,  the  sacred  names.  "  Or  should  we  say  that  the  name  is 
necessary  because  it  causes  a  lack  or  failure.  A  name,  even  a  sacred  one,  will 
always  only  be  a  name,  not  the  sacred  itself.  Unless  [Saul]-it  is  saved  [saun, 
passed  over  in  silence,  a  silence  that,  even  more  than  any  name,  would  witness 
the  `lot'  of  the  poet.  '55 
"Naming  in  silence"  requires  that  the  poet  makes  certain  not  to  transgress  the 
unsayableness  of  . 
What  is  unsayable  must  remain  unspoken  in  the  poem. 
But  how  is  it  possible  for  the  poet  to  name  that  which  resists  all  naming  without 
transgressing? 
The  vocation  of  the  poet  is  to  `listen'  into  `being'.  There  is  involved  a 
calling  and  a  listening  that  opens  up  a  space  for  to  presence.  calls 
to  the  poet  for  its  secret  to  be  shown;  it  does  not  call  for  its  secret  to  be  `told',  as 
in  a  revealing  of  what  the  secret  is.  For  there  can  be  no  `telling'  of  what  is 
unknown  and  unknowable,  but  there  can  be  a  `showing'  of  the  secret.  156  Insofar 
as  poetry  shows  the  secret  while  keeping  the  secret,  poetry  allows  for  the  silence 
appropriate  to  the  ineffable  to  be  retained.  Thus,  it  is  poetry  that  speaks  the 
155  Ibid,  p.  96.  See  also  John  Caputo's  "Apostles  of  the  Impossible:  On  God  and  the  Gift  in 
Derrida  and  Marion"  in  God,  the  Gift  and  Postmodernism,  pp.  185-ff. 
156  Says  Heidegger  in  "The  Way  to  Language":  "The  saying  is  a  showing....  It  lets  what  is 
coming  to  presence  shine  forth,  lets  what  is  withdrawing  into  absence  vanish....  It  liberates  what 
comes  to  presence  to  its  particular  presencing,  spirits  away  what  is  withdrawing  into  absence  to  its 
particular  kind  of  absence.  "  Martin  Heidegger,  Basic  Writings:  Martin  Heidegger,  edited  by 
David  Farrell  Krell  (London:  Routledge,  1993),  pp.  413-414. 
112 silence;  it  is  poetry  that  `shows'  the  secret  while  keeping  the  secret.  157  That  is, 
poetry  allows  ('lets  be',  Gelassenheit)  that  which  cannot  be  spoken  to  remain 
unspoken.  Poetic  naming,  what  Froment-Meurice  calls  "naming  in  silence",  then, 
liberates  by  harkening  to  its  call  and  letting  it  presence. 
The  poet  avoids  transgressing  by  `letting  be',  Gelassenheit-by  letting 
be  . 
We  recall  that  Eckhart  uses  this  term  Gelassenheit  in  "On  Detachment" 
when  he  speaks  of  the  "true  man"  who  "lets  God  be  God".  For  Eckhart 
Gelassenheit  is  "concerned  with  getting  rid  of  self-seeking"  and,  "giving  oneself 
over  to  the  `divine  will'.  "158  The  root  of  the  word,  lassen,  means  to  "let  go, 
relinquish,  to  abandon,  "  and  for  Eckhart  this  means  that  the  "soul  in  Gelassenheit 
must  relinquish  everything  which  would  impede  God's  advent  into  the  soul.  "159 
But  this  is  not  the  only  meaning  of  lassen.  The  root  `lassen'  can  also  mean  to 
"`let'  or  `permit,  '  and  so  it  suggests  openness  and  receptivity.,,  160  (We  recall 
Eckhart's  analogy  of  the  wax  tablet.  )  This  means  for  Eckhart  that  "the  soul  which 
has  left  behind  all  the  obstacles  to  the  birth  of  God  can  at  the  same  time  permit  or 
let  the  Father  bear  his  Son  there.  s161  Thus,  the  "first  moment  is  negative-to 
relinquish  creatures-and  the  second  is  positive-to  permit  the  Son's  birth.  "  By 
157  Says  Froment-Meurice,  "The  poem  springs  forth  from  the  call  to  speak  what  demands  and 
refuses  language",  p.  18.  And  in  the  last  chapter,  "Farewell",  he  concludes:  "Thus  saying  is  a 
reserve  in  a  double  sense:  a  prohibition  (to  unveil  the  `secret'  of  disclosing)  and  at  the  same  time 
the  resource  that  keeps  the  same  secret  in  its  a-phasic  purity,  a  secret  for  which  there  is  no  place  to 
be  said  and  whose  saying  will  not  take  place.  The  secret  must  [faut]  not  be  said  because  this 
saying  fails  [faut],  if  I  may  say  so.  But  we  will  only  be  able  to  fail  the  word  and  thus  betray  the 
word's  lack,  like  its  already  exposed  secret,  as  the  most  manifest,  manifestness  itself,  Being. 
Being  is  the  name  of  the  secret,  as  the  name  is  the  Being  of  the  secret.  And  the  secret  is  nothing 
other  than  the  name  of  Being,  a  name  all  the  more  secret  for  saying  nothing,  nothing  other  than 
what  must  be  (secret)  and  fails  Being  (the  Secret),  "  p.  233.  Also,  see  Timothy  Clark  who  says, 
"The  poetic...  is  language  which  manifests  itself  partly  as  a  secret,  namely,  as  that  which  legibly 
makes  known  that  something  is  hidden,  withdrawn,  unsaid,  without  directly  revealing  anything  but 
the  reserve  of  secrecy.  "  In  Clark's  Martin  Heidegger,  pp.  117-118. 
158  Caputo,  The  Mystical  Element,  pp.  180-181. 
159  Ibid,  p.  119. 
160  Ibid. 
161  Ibid. 
113 this  we  can  see  how  it  is  that  "the  birth  of  the  Son  is  in  some  way  the  work,  or 
better  the  `co-work,  '  of  the  soul  itself.  "  162 
Heidegger,  seeing  the  possibilities  inherent  in  this  idea  for  his  own  work, 
appropriates  Eckhart's  term  and  uses  it  in  relation  to  the  poet  who  by  `letting  be' 
`allows'  the  presencing  of  that  which  is  an  absence.  This  dual  definition  of 
Gelassenheit  appeals  to  Heidegger  because  it  allows  for  `mortals'  like  Hölderlin 
to  play  a  role  in  the  `presencing'  of  . 
Poets  are  not  merely  passive  receptors, 
conduits  through  which  speaks;  that  is,  they  are  not  merely  scribes  taking 
dictation.  Rather,  they  listen  to  the  bidding  of  and,  harkening  to  its  call, 
they  open  up  the  space  for  it  to  come  to  presence.  Poets,  then,  `allow'  for  the 
presencing  of  ,  that  is,  they  both  `let  be'  and  `permit'  its  showing. 
But  how  does  the  poet  permit  such  presencing? 
The  poet  permits  presencing  by  naming  that  which  calls  and  thereby  providing 
it  with  limits  or  boundaries  that  allow  it  to  make  an  appearance.  For  naming 
"liberates  the  thing  inasmuch  as  it  at  the  same  time  redresses  it  in  a  skin  with 
which  the  thing  can  make  a  body  in  order  to  have  figure,  countenance,  allure, 
dress.  "163  Poetic  naming  provides  the  limits  that  enable  appearance.  This  can 
happen  because  limits  not  only  restrict  but  they  also  make  space  for  something  to 
be.  The  limit  is  "not  that  at  which  something  stops  but  [...  ]  that  from  which 
something  begins  its  presencing.  s164  Of  this,  Edward  Casey  comments  in  The 
Fate  of  Place, 
162  Ibid,  p.  173.  Thus,  says  Caputo,  "Eckhart  unwittingly  fathered  the  long  tradition  of  God's 
`need'  of  man",  p.  181. 
163  Froment-Meurice,  p.  21. 
"  Heidegger,  "Building  Dwelling  Thinking",  PLT,  p.  154. 
114 Within  a  limit,  room  is  made-and  thus  place.  To  lack  limit  is  to  lack  place, 
and  conversely:  not  to  be  in  place  is  to  be  unlimited.  A  limit  is  a  positive 
power  within  which  place  is  made.  164 
It  is  language  that  sets  out  limits  thereby  creating  a  dwelling  place.  It  is  language 
that  `builds'  the  dwelling  in  which  can  dwell  and  come  to  appearance. 
Heidegger  insists  that  "language  alone  brings  what  is,  as  something  that  is,  into 
the  Open  for  the  first  time.  " 
Where  there  is  no  language,  as  in  the  being  of  stone,  plant,  and  animal,  there 
is  also  no  openness  of  what  is,  and  consequently  no  openness  either  of  that 
which  is  not  and  of  the  empty. 
Language,  by  naming  beings  for  the  first  time,  first  brings  beings  to  word 
and  to  appearance.  Only  this  naming  nominates  beings  to  their  being  from  out 
of  their  being.  Such  saying  is  a  projecting  of  the  clearing,  in  which 
announcement  is  made  of  what  it  is  that  beings  come  into  the  Open  as.  165 
Thus,  by  naming,  language  brings  something  to  appearance  for  the  first  time. 
This  is  to  say  that  language  brings  something  new  into  existence.  It  does  not 
merely  re-name  (as  in  the  so-called  process  of  `de-familiarisation');  rather,  it 
brings  into  being  a  new  thing,  a  new  thing  that  has  no  previous  existence. 
We  are  getting  very  close  now  to  making  our  main  point  in  this  chapter,  the 
point  with  which  we  began:  the  poem  as  a  thing  in  itself.  And,  as  we  get  close  to 
making  our  point,  it  may  seem  that  we  are  a  long  way  from  Stevens;  in  fact,  it 
may  seem  that  we  are  a  long  way  ahead  of  Stevens.  But  in  some  ways,  we  are 
only  just  catching  up  with  him.  Before  we  go  on  to  show  how  it  is  that  the  poem 
becomes  a  "self-sufficient  presence",  or  in  Stevens'  words,  "not  ideas  about  the 
thing  but  the  thing  itself,  "  there  are  some  other  ideas  central  to  both  Heidegger's 
project  and  Stevens'  poetics  that  we  must  consider. 
164  Edward  Casey,  The  Fate  of  Place:  A  Philosophical  History  (Berkeley:  University  of  California 
Press,  1997),  p.  262. 
165  PLT,  p.  73. 
115 We  have  said  that  poetic  naming,  that  is,  "naming  in  silence",  requires  that  the 
poet  not  transgress  or  violate  but  `allow'  it  `to  be',  in  both  senses  of  the 
word  Gelassenheit.  And  we  have  said  that  the  way  the  poet  avoids  transgressing 
is by  harkening  to  its  call.  But  the  question  we  have  yet  to  deal  with  is how  is  it 
that  calls?  What  does  call?  And  how  do  poets  recognise  this  call? 
The  answer  is,  the  calling  is  silence.  Silence  is  what  the  poet  hears  and  makes 
present  by  providing  it  a  dwelling  place  in  language.  Thus,  "naming  in  silence"  is 
naming  this  silence.  For  Heidegger,  what  defines  a  poet  is  his  or  her  ability  to 
hear  this  silence  and  to  speak  it.  For  most  people  the  voice  of  silence  cannot  be 
heard,  not  because  they  do  not  have  the  potential  for  hearing  it,  but  because  the 
way  that  they  live  drowns  out  this  silence.  Caught  up  in  the  hustle  and  bustle  of 
everyday  life,  they  do  not  pause  to  listen.  They  live  a  noisy  existence  in  (what 
Heidegger  calls)  `inauthenticity',  concerning  themselves  with  idle  talk  and 
unimportant  pursuits,  and  worrying  about  how  they  `fit  in'  with  others.  Living 
inauthentically,  they  have  forgotten  the  most  important  thing  that  allows  them  to 
hear  the  silence.  That  is,  they  have  forgotten  the  question  of  their  own  existence 
and  their  own  potentiality  for  non-being.  Put  simply,  they  have  forgotten  death. 
Poets,  however,  are  those  who  live  `authentically'  by  living  toward  death.  Of 
course,  they  cannot  live  every  moment  of  every  day  remembering  death;  they 
cannot  sustain  this  question  of  their  own  potentiality  for  non-existence  over  long 
periods;  however,  poets  do  from  time  to  time  dare  to  ask  this  existential  question, 
thereby  opening  themselves  up  to  the  possibility  of  their  own  non-existence,  a 
possibility  that  creates  anxiety.  Poets  are  those  mortals  who  "dwell  in  the 
116 nearness  of  death,  "  167  who  remember  their  own  mortality,  and  who  tremble  in 
anxiety  in  the  face  of  the  possibility  of  their  own  non-being. 
Thus,  there  is  an  uncertainty  and  instability  in  living  `authentically',  that  is,  in 
living  toward  death.  Says  Heidegger,  it  is  an  "altogether  unsettling  experience" 
this  "hovering"  in  potentiality  "where  there  is  nothing  to  hold  onto.  "  168  Any  sense 
of  groundedness  gives  way  exposing  one  to  the  nothing,  and  consequently, 
leaving  one  feeling  anxious  and  ill  at  ease.  This  anxiety  that  is  experienced  in  the 
face  of  the  nothing  might  be  described  as  "a  kind  of  ontological  queasiness  that 
creeps  up"  on  a  person  whenever  he  or  she  comes  "close  to  understanding  the 
inherent  instability"  of  existence.  169 
Although  living  authentically  is  unsettling,  uncertain,  and  anxiety-ridden, 
Heidegger  claims  that  there  is  freedom  in  `authenticity'.  Released  from 
stagnating  certainties  and  false  assurances,  the  one  who  lives  in  authenticity  is 
free  `to  be'  (Gelassenheit),  or  in  Stevens'  words  free  "to  be  in  the  difficulty  of 
what  it  is  to  be".  In  living  authentically  everything  is  possible,  uncertain, 
indefinite,  incomplete.  For  the  individual  who  lives  toward  death,  "her  future  is 
not  already  mapped  out,  tending  towards  an  end:  `The  incessant  becoming 
generates  the  uncertainty  of  earthly  life,  where  everything  is  uncertain.  t"l  70  And 
to  live  in  the  uncertainty  of  being-toward-death  is  to  experience  life  as  a  constant 
state  of  `becoming',  where  nothing  is  fixed  or  finished.  Writes  Caputo,  living 
authentically 
consists  in  keeping  alive  that  indefiniteness,  that  possible-who-knows-when, 
maybe-soon,  maybe-now,  that  sense  of  walking  on  thin  ice,  without  assurance, 
keeping  the  play  in  play,  keeping  the  exposure  to  the  abyss  in  play,  without 
167  Heidegger  as  quoted  by  Caputo  in  Radical  Hermeneutics,  p.  201. 
168  Heidegger,  Basic  Works,  p.  101. 
169  Jonathan  Ree,  Heidegger  (New  York:  Routledge,  1999),  p.  27. 
170  Michael  Weston  citing  Kierkegaard  in  Kiekegaard  and  Modern  Continental  Philosophy:  An 
Introduction  (London:  Routledge,  1994),  p.  31. 
117 arresting  and  tranquilizing  it.  Being-toward-death  means  staying  open  to  the 
possible  just  insofar  as  it  is  a  possible;  it  means  staying  in  motion.  171 
Living  toward  death  keeps  everything  in  motion:  "The  way  to  keep  the  play  in 
play  is  to  keep  death  in  play,  to  keep  mortality,  to  keep  the  movement  toward 
death  in  motion  ('to  cultivate  death  as  possibility'  ).  9472  In  living  toward  death, 
the  ground  gives  way  exposing  the  individual  to  the  flux  and  flow  where  there  is 
nothing  to  hold  onto.  All  is  in  motion;  all  is  possibility.  One's  feet  do  not  touch 
the  ground  because  there  is  no  `ground'.  It  is  like  Stevens'  `freed  man',  "being 
without  description"  in  a  landscape  "without  a  doctrine"-both  liberating  and 
terrifying  at  the  same  time. 
Gelassenheit,  for  Heidegger,  "goes  hand  in  hand  with  anxiety.  "  173  In 
Gelassenheit  one  is  freed  from  any  sense  of  being  grounded,  a  freedom  that  is 
awe-inspiring-as  awe  consists  of  a  combination  of  elation  and  terror. 
Furthermore,  Gelassenheit  as  we  recall  has  a  dual  effect.  It  brings  freedom  both 
to  and  to  the  one  who  suppresses  the  desire  to  possess  . 
Thus,  there 
is  a  two-way  releasing  in  Gelassenheit;  as  the  poet  `lets  be'  and  `permits'  the 
presencing  of  ,  so  too  is  he  `let  be'  or  `released'.  In  Gelassenheit,  then, 
there  is  a  relationship  between  mortals  and  . 
But  the  question  is,  what  is  the 
nature  of  this  relationship? 
Heidegger  claims  that  there  is  an  originary  relationship  between  beings  and 
and  that  this  relationship  is  exposed  whenever  beings  forego  the  desire  to 
hold  onto  and  live  authentically  in  existential  uncertainty.  When  human 
beings  release  their  grip  on  and  "hover  in  anxiety"  the  question  of  their 
own  existence  is  loosened.  This  is  to  say  that  in  freeing 
,  they  themselves 
171  Caputo,  Radical  Hermeneutics,  p.  199. 
172  Ibid,  p.  201. 
118 are  freed.  But  how  is  this  so?  How  is  it  that  beings  are  released  when  they 
release  ?  And  why  should  human  beings  concern  themselves  with  the 
letting  be  of  in  the  first  place?  For  example,  why  should  Meister  Eckhart 
be  concerned  with  letting  be  ?  How  is  it  that  he  even  intuits  the  need 
to  let  be  ? 
Heidegger  tells  us  that  human  beings  are  concerned  with  the  `letting  be'  or 
`releasement'  of  precisely  because  they  are  concerned  (albeit  unwittingly) 
with  the  `letting  be'  or  `releasement'  of  themselves.  Human  beings,  then,  care 
about  because  they  care  about  their  own  being.  Thus  beings  concern 
themselves  with  the  `releasement'  of  because  it  means  the  releasement  of 
beings  themselves  to  themselves.  That  is  to  say,  beings  themselves  turn  out  to  be 
what  is  `released'  in  the  `releasement'  of  Furthermore,  human  beings 
become  most  concerned  with  their  being  when  they  are  faced  with  the  potentiality 
of  their  own  non-existence-when  they  are  faced  with  the  possibility  of  their  own 
death.  Therefore  care  or concern  (Sorge)  for  is  heightened  when  mortals,  in 
living  authentically,  come  face  to  face  with  their  own  mortality.  Human  beings, 
says  Heidegger,  belong  to  ,  and  because  they  belong  to  they  have 
concern  for  it.  does  not  stand  wholly  outside  of  or  apart  from  beings, 
because  if  it  did  then  human  beings  would  not  have  any  relationship  to  it.  It  is 
only  because  humans  are  related  to  , 
because  they  belong  to  it  in  some  way, 
that  they  know  to  listen  for  's  bidding. 
Yet,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  human  beings  stand  in  relation  to 
remains  a  mystery;  it  remains  hidden.  So  what  is  this  relationship  then?  How  is  it 
173  Caputo,  The  Mystical  Element,  p.  247. 
119 possible  for  beings  to  have  a  relationship  with  that  which  is  hidden,  that  which 
calls  in  silence? 
According  to  Heidegger,  beings  exist  as  a  hermeneutic  relationship  to 
174  Like  Hermes,  the  messenger  of  the  gods,  they  act  as  the  receivers  of 
's  message.  But  they  do  not  only  receive;  they  also  `set  forth'  the  message 
in  language.  As  we  have  already  said,  everyone  has  the  potential  for  receiving  this 
message,  for  hearing  this  call,  which  is  the  call  of  silence,  but  only  those  who  are 
listening,  only  those  `poets'  who  live  in  authenticity  are  open  to  receiving  it  and 
letting  it  `be'  in  language. 
Now,  all  this  is  very  interesting,  we  might  think,  but  what  does  it  have  to  do 
with  poetics  and  with  the  poem  as  a  self-sufficient  presence? 
Briefly  stated,  the  poet  lets  poetry  happen.  Insofar  as  the  poet  `lets  be'  and 
`permits'  to  be  present  in  poetry,  she  does  not  have  ownership  of  the  work. 
Rather,  in  harkening  to  the  call  of  ,  she  allows  the  self-disclosure  of 
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  poet  is  passive,  operating  merely  as  some  kind  of  scribe 
who  has  no  role  in  the  happening  of  the  poem.  Nor  is  it  to  say  that  poetry 
happens  without  struggle,  without  effort.  The  `setting  forth'  of  the  message 
requires  enormous  effort  on  the  part  of  the  poet.  Nevertheless,  she  does  not  own 
this  work  that  she  `sets  forth';  nor  should  she  desire  to  be  in  possession  of  it.  After 
all,  her  task  is  to  free  not  to  capture  or  possess  . 
For  the  poet  frees 
, 
by  opening  up  that  space  which  `allows'  it  `to  be';  and  in  allowing  it  to  be 
she  respects  its  independence. 
As  we  have  just  said,  the  `letting  happen'  of  poetry  is  not  accomplished 
without  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  poet.  But  we  must  be  clear  what  we  mean  here 
174  Says  Caputo,  "Man  is  to  be  understood  as  a  hermeneutic  relationship  to  the  message  that  is  sent 
his  way,  "  in  Radical  Hermeneutics,  p.  104. 
120 by  struggle.  First,  we  recall  that  according  to  Heidegger  the  poet  must  be  living 
authentically,  that  is,  living  with  the  anxiety  of  the  potential  for  non-being  in 
order  to  be  able  to  hear  the  silence  that  calls.  This  in  itself  constitutes  a  struggle, 
the  struggle  to  submit  oneself  willingly  to  the  abyss,  to  allow  oneself  to  be  held 
out  into  the  open  of  existential  uncertainty.  This  is  the  first  thing  that  the  poet 
must  struggle  with.  The  second,  related,  struggle  involves  the  poet's  efforts  to  let 
go  and  let  be  the  emerging  poem.  Thus,  the  struggle  for  the  poet  is  the  struggle  to 
overcome  her  desire  to  grasp,  take  hold  of,  or  to  force  the  emergence  of  the  poem. 
The  effort  required  on  the  part  of  the  poet,  then,  is  not  the  effort  to  beat  the  poem 
into  submission  or  to  form  poetry  through  violent  means.  It  is  the  poet's 
wrestling  with  herself  to  force  herself  to  let  go  of  her  desire  to  master  the 
emerging  poem.  Therefore  the  enormous  effort  required  on  the  side  of  the  poet  is 
the  effort  to  submit  to,  rather  than  lord  over,  the  happening  of  poetry. 
Poetry,  says  Heidegger,  happens,  and  in  the  happening  of  poetry  a  new  thing  is 
born,  a  new  thing  that  is  not  dependent  upon  anything  else.  And  this  new  thing, 
the  poem,  is  not  about  something;  it  is  not  even  about  the  relationship  between 
beings  and  .  It  emerges  out  of  this  relationship,  but  it  is  not  about  it.  The 
poem  is  about  nothing;  it  means  nothing.  Commenting  on  "The  Origin  of  the 
Work  of  Art",  Marc  Froment-Meurice  says, 
the  first  thing  Heidegger  establishes  concerning  the  work  is  that  it  means 
nothing.  It  means  nothing  else,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  not  an  allegory,  a 
symbol,  or  a  sign  that  would  refer  to  an  external  signified.  '75 
The  poem  is  not  an  idea  about  a  thing,  but  a  thing  in  itself;  for  the  poem  "brings 
into  existence  something  new  that  needs  to  be  understood  only  on  its  own  terms:  " 
17$  Froment-Meurice,  p.  152. 
121 The  truth  that  discloses  itself  in  the  work  can  never  be  proved  or  derived  from 
what  went  before.  What  went  before  is  refuted  in  its  exclusive  reality  by  the 
work.  176 
Thus,  Heidegger  rejects  the  traditional  notions  of  poetry  (and  art  generally)  as  a 
reflection  of  something  outside  or  external  to  the  work.  Explains  Clark,  "The  true 
work  of  art  does  not  simply  take  things  or  objects  already  in  existence  and  then 
re-present  them,  as  in  the  tired  old  view  of  art  as  a  sort  of  `reflection'  of  reality  or 
society.  "  177  Rather,  poetry  for  Heidegger  is  a  self-sufficient  presence  that  occurs 
when  beings  let  it  happen. 
Now,  what  happens  in  the  happening  of  poetry,  and  what  can  we  say,  if 
anything,  about  this  new  thing  that  had  no  previous  existence?  Heidegger  says 
that  in  the  happening  of  poetry,  truth  happens.  The  happening  of  poetry  is,  in  fact, 
the  happening  of  truth.  Moreover,  the  very  nature  of  poetry  for  Heidegger  is  truth 
"setting  itself  to  work.  "  178 
Truth,  as  the  clearing  and  concealing  of  what  is,  happens  in  being  composed, 
as  a  poet  composes  a  poem.  All  art,  as  the  letting  happen  of  the  advent  of  the 
truth  of  what  is,  is,  as  such,  essentially  poetry.  The  nature  of  art,  on  which 
both  the  art  work  and  the  artist  depend,  is  the  setting-itself-into-work  of 
truth.  179 
This  truth  that  happens  in  the  very  act  of  composition  both  reveals  and  conceals  at 
the  same  time.  It  shows  the  secret  while  allowing  the  secret  to  remain  secret. 
Again,  we  consider  the  role  of  the  poet  in  this  happening  of  poetry,  which  is 
equally  the  happening  of  truth,  and  how  the  poet  must  struggle  to  submit  himself 
both  to  the  anxiety  of  the  potential  for  non-being  and  to  the  emergence  of  the 
poem.  Says  Heidegger, 
176  Timothy  Clark  citing  Heidegger,  in  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  101. 
177  Ibid,  p.  103. 
17B  Heidegger,  PLT,  p.  36. 
179  Ibid,  p.  72. 
122 Truth  establishes  itself  as  a  strife  within  a  being  that  is  to  be  brought  forth 
only  in  such  a  way  that  the  conflict  opens  up  in  this  being,  that  is,  this  being  is 
itself  brought  into  the  rift-design....  Truth  establishes  itself  in  a  being  in  such 
a  way,  indeed,  that  this  being  itself  occupies  the  Open  of  truth.  This 
occupying,  however,  can  happen  only  if  what  is  to  be  brought  forth,  the  rift, 
entrusts  itself  to  the  self-secluding  factor  that  juts  up  in  the  Open.  The  rift 
must  set  itself  back  into  the  heavy  weight  of  stone,  the  dumb  hardness  of 
wood,  the  dark  glow  of  colors.  As  the  earth  takes  the  rift  back  into  itself,  the 
rift  is  first  set  forth  into  the  Open  and  thus  placed,  that  is,  set,  within  that 
which  towers  up  into  the  Open  as  self-closing  and  sheltering.  '80 
Thus,  the  happening  of  truth  is  directly  related  to  the  strife  experienced  by  the 
poet  who  struggles  to  let  be,  and  in  struggling  to  let  be,  allows  for  (Gelassenheit) 
the  emergence  of  truth.  This  is  to  say  that  the  happening  of  truth  is  dependent  on 
the  struggle  and  strife  of  beings  to  face  up  to  the  possibility  of  their  own  non- 
existence. 
Since  we  have  progressed  throughout  this  chapter  by  way  of  positing 
questions  and  then  answering  them,  it  seems  natural  at  this  point  to  ask  the 
question,  What  is  truth?,  or  at  least,  What  does  Heidegger  mean  here  by  truth? 
But  for  the  present  moment  we  will  suspend  any  investigation  of  the  word  `truth' 
and  instead,  in  the  next  chapter,  return  to  Stevens  who  has  until  this  point  been 
kept  very  much  in  the  background  of  our  discussion  of  the  poetics  of  Gelassenheit 
and  the  idea  of  the  poem  as  a  thing  in  itself.  So  putting  aside  for  now  thoughts  on 
the  `happening  of  truth',  we  turn  to  look  at  Stevens  alongside  of  Heidegger  and 
consider  how  the  ideas  in  this  chapter  might  be  related  to  his  poetics. 
180  Ibid,  pp.  63-64. 
123 Chapter  Six:  Poets  in  a  "Destitute  Time" 
and  what  are  poets  for  in  a  destitute  time?  " 
Hölderlin,  as  cited  by  Heidegger 
"What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  poetry  in  a  time  of  disbelief?  " 
Stevens,  "Two  or  Three  Ideas"  (OP  263) 
"Being  is  a  poem  and  even  THE  initial  poem.  " 
Marc  Froment-Meuricelsl 
From  a  historical  standpoint  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  there  is  no  indication 
that  Stevens  had  first  hand  knowledge  of  Heidegger's  work,  though  he  was 
certainly  aware  of  his  growing  reputation  on  the  Continent,  mentioning  Heidegger 
in  a  letter  to  a  friend  and  erroneously  referring  to  him  as  a  "Swiss  philosopher"  (L 
758).  182  Although  we  can  find  no  direct  connection  between  Stevens  and 
Heidegger  it  is  possible  to  discern  indirect  connections,  first  through  their 
common  literary  forefathers,  especially  Nietzsche  and  Hölderlin,  and  second 
through  their  shared  experience  of  living  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century, 
an  age  characterised  by  increasing  `secularisation'  and  the  anxiety  that 
accompanied  the  move  away  from  organised  religion  and  grounding  theologies. 
For  our  purposes  here  we  will  consider  Stevens  and  Heidegger  together  by 
looking  at  two  essays,  Heidegger's  "What  Are  Poets  For?  "  and  Stevens'  "Two  or 
Three  Ideas",  essays  that  reflect  the  influence  of  Hölderlin  (and  perhaps 
Nietzsche,  to  a  lesser  extent)  and  the  anxiety  of  the  "age  of  disbelief. 
181  Froment-Meurice,  p.  177. 
182  In  a  letter  to  Paule  Vidal,  Stevens  writes:  "Heidegger,  the  Swiss  philosopher,  has  written  a  little 
work  dealing  with  the  poetry  of  the  German  poet,  Hölderlin.  "  Stevens  asked  Vidal,  who  was 
planning  a  trip  to  the  Continent,  to  bring  him  back  a  copy  of  the  book.  It  is  unclear  whether  or  not 
he  ever  received  it. 
124 Heidegger  begins  his  essay  with  a  question  from  Hölderlin:  "...  and  what  are 
poets  for  in  a  destitute  time?  "'  83  He  takes  as  his  starting  point  this  destitution  of 
the  times,  which,  he  says,  began  with  the  "appearance  and  sacrificial  death  of 
Christ",  marking  "the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  day  of  the  gods.  "  184  The  age  is 
destitute  because  it  has  witnessed  the  withdrawal  of  God  and  the  gods.  It  is,  says 
Heidegger  echoing  Hölderlin,  an  age  when  the  One  God  and  the  many  gods  have 
fled  causing  "the  divine  radiance"  to  "become  extinguished".  "Ever  since  the 
`united  three'-Herakles,  Dinoysos,  and  Christ-have  left  the  world,  the  evening 
of  the  world's  night  is  spreading  like  darkness.  "  185  In  this  age  of  the  "world's 
night",  the  God  and  the  gods  have  defaulted;  they  have  failed  to  appear,  and 
because  "of  this  default,  there  fails  to  appear  for  the  world  the  ground  that 
grounds  it.  "  186  Thus,  the  God  and  the  gods  have  fled  and  in  their  absence  the 
ground  that  they  offered  has  disappeared  exposing  humankind  to  the  abyss. 
Stevens  echoes  this  proclamation  of  the  disappearance  of  the  gods  in  "Two  or 
Three  Ideas".  Like  Heidegger  and  Hölderlin,  he  speaks  of  the  gods  in  the  plural, 
"both  ancient  and  modern,  both  foreign  and  domestic"  (OP  259),  believing  that 
"The  death  of  one  god  is  the  death  of  all"  (CP  381).  Those  noble  gods  that  once 
were  emblazoned  with  "divine  radiance"  have  been  all  but  forgotten,  claims 
Stevens,  and  their  gradual  disappearance  from  the  collective  memory  of  humanity 
is  something  to  be  taken  seriously:  "To  speak  of  the  origin  and  end  of  gods  is  not 
a  light  matter.  It  is  to  speak  of  the  origin  and  end  of  eras  of  human  belief'  (OP 
259).  Although  the  disappearance  of  the  gods  may  not  be  a  light  matter,  Stevens 
183  Ibid,  p.  91. 
184  Ibid. 
185  Ibid. 
186  Ibid,  p.  92. 
125 does  not  seem  to  lament  their  dissolution;  in  fact,  he  is  noticeably  dispassionate  in 
reporting  their  passing: 
To  see  the  gods  dispelled  in  mid-air  and  dissolve  like  clouds  is  one  of  the 
great  human  experiences.  It  is  not  as  if  they  had  gone  over  the  horizon  to 
disappear  for  a  time;  nor  as  if  they  had  been  overcome  by  other  gods  of 
greater  power  and  profounder  knowledge.  It  is  simply  that  they  came  to 
nothing.  (OP  260) 
He  continues: 
Since  we  have  always  shared  all  things  with  them  and  have  always  had  a  part 
of  their  strength  and,  certainly,  all  of  their  knowledge,  we  shared  likewise  this 
experience  of  annihilation.  It  was  their  annihilation,  not  ours,  and  yet  it  left  us 
feeling  that  in  a  measure  we,  too,  had  been  annihilated.  It  left  us  feeling 
dispossessed  and  alone  in  a  solitude,  like  children  without  parents,  in  a  home 
that  seemed  deserted,  in  which  the  amical  rooms  and  halls  had  taken  on  a  look 
of  hardness  and  emptiness. 
The  experience  of  humanity's  feeling  of  mutual  annihilation  is  placed  firmly  in 
the  past  here.  The  time  for  grieving,  for  feeling  lost  and  dispossessed  is  over. 
What  was  most  extraordinary  is  that  [the  gods]  left  no  mementoes  behind,  no 
thrones,  no  mystic  rings,  no  texts  either  of  the  soil  or  of  the  soul.  It  was  as  if 
they  had  never  inhabited  the  earth.  There  was  no  crying  out  for  their  return. 
Neither  Stevens  nor  Heidegger  laments  the  passing  of  the  ancient  gods  or  the 
death  of  that  One  God  in  whom  they  were  brought  up  to  believe.  Nor  does  either 
of  them  perceive  the  gap  left  in  their  absence  as  something  to  be  abhorred.  It  is  an 
uncertain  time,  even  an  anxious  time,  but  both  men  recognise  that  it  is  precisely 
the  uncertainty  and  anxiety  that  allows  for  possibility.  For,  although  it  may  be  an 
age  of  darkness  and  of  destitution  without  these  gods  that  once  brought  comfort 
and  security,  it  is  also  a  time  of  waiting,  of  expectation,  and  of  advent.  It  is  also  a 
time  of  hope  but  a  hope  that  is  indeterminate.  For  it  cannot  be  said  what  is  hoped 
for.  It  must  not  be  said  what  is  hoped  for.  There  is  hope  but  not  a  named  hope, 
not  a  hope  for  something.  There  is  only  hope  and  expectation  but  not  a  hope  of 
this  or  that  or  an  expectation  of  anything  in  particular.  Hoping  for  something  cuts 
126 off  possibility;  it  makes  it  impossible  to  hear  the  voice  of  silence  that  calls  to  the 
would-be  poet. 
In  "What  Are  Poets  For?  "  Heidegger  says  that  it  is  for  such  a  time  as  this  that 
poets  are  needed.  For  it  is  up  to  the  poet  to  face  the  abyss  left  in  the  wake  of  the 
disappearance  of  the  gods,  to  look  into  it,  to  turn  toward  it,  to  reach  into  it  and  not 
shy  away  from  it. 
In  the  age  of  the  world's  night,  the  abyss  of  the  world  must  be  experienced 
and  endured.  But  for  this  it  is  necessary  that  there  be  those  who  reach  into  the 
abyss.  187 
It  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  poet's  nature  that,  before  he  can  be  truly  a  poet  in 
such  an  age,  the  time's  destitution  must  have  made  the  whole  being  and 
vocation  of  the  poet  a  poetic  question  for  him.  Hence  'poets  in  a  destitute 
time'  must  especially  gather  in  poetry  the  nature  of  poetry.  88 
In  this  age  of  the  world's  night,  the  gods  have  failed  and  fled,  and  it  is  up  to  the 
poet  to  turn  toward  the  abyss,  to  accept  the  anxiety  and  uncertainty  of  living 
without  a  ground.  It  is  the  poet's  vocation  to  reach  into  the  nothing  of  the  abyss 
and  not  succumb  to  the  temptation  to  turn  back  in  nostalgia  to  the  gods  whose 
time  has  come  and  gone.  Timothy  Clark  comments,  "Any  sense  of  the  sacred 
can  no  longer  look  to  old  gods  to  be  sustained.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  poet  not  to 
evade  this  disenchantment.  "  189  The  world's  night  is  to  be  endured,  and  the  gap 
that  has  been  exposed  in  the  absence  of  the  gods  must  be  allowed  to  remain  open. 
The  poet  must  not  attempt  to  cover  up  this  space  with  false  idols.  "To  genuinely 
hold  open  the  space  of  the  sacred  we  must  think  through  and  endure  its  current 
emptiness  and  destitution,  and  not  be  hasty  to  fill  it  unthinkingly  with  gods  which 
could  only  be  idols,  bogus  alternatives.  "190 
187  Ibid,  p.  92. 
188  Ibid,  p.  94. 
189  Clark,  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  110-111. 
190  Ibid,  p.  111. 
127 In  his  poem  "Germania",  Hölderlin  asserts  the  need  to  hold  open  this  space,  to 
endure  the  abyss,  without  looking  backwards  to  the  safety  and  security  of  the  gods 
of  a  bygone  era.  He  rejects  any  invocation  "to  the  muses  or  to  the  classical  gods, 
in  homage  or  for  inspiration"'  91  and  opens  the  poem  with  what  might  be  described 
as  a  negative  invocation: 
Not  them,  the  blessed,  who  once  appeared, 
Those  images  of  gods  in  the  ancient  land, 
92  Them,  it  is  true,  I  may  not  now  invoke... 
Clark  comments  on  these  brief  lines: 
Yet,  this  renunciation  of  invoking  is  not  a  simple  rejection  or  dismissal  of  the 
gods.  It  arises  from  a  sense  of  painful  necessity:  who  can  invoke  the  dead?  It 
does  not  mean  there  is  no  desire  for  such  an  invocation.  The  poem  opens 
itself  in  the  space  of  an  invocation  that  is  longed  for  but  must  now  be 
renounced  ('I'm  afraid,  for  deadly  /  And  scarcely  permitted  it  is  to  awaken  the 
dead').  So  in  effect,  the  non-invocation  is  formally  still  a  kind  of  invocation: 
that  is,  it  remains  something  whereby  the  poem  opens  itself  to  the  space  of 
`the  gods',  but  it  does  so  in  a  way  that  bears  out  how  that  phrase  now  stands 
for  a  lack  only,  a  cipher  marking  an  empty  space  that  might  one  day  be  filled 
but  which  for  the  present  can  only  be  kept  open,  safeguarded  from 
obliteration....  We  are  torn,  writes  Heidegger,  between  `the  open  welcome  of 
readiness'  and  `the  absence  of  filfillment.  '  What  is  invoked  in  not  being 
invoked  can  have  no  name  in  this  `godless'  time.  It  is  simply  `the  invoked'  or 
`the  awaited'  (das  Erharrte).  193 
Hölderlin  invokes  with  a  non-invocation.  He  does  not  name  what  is  invoked. 
What  is  invoked  is  nothing,  nothing  that  can  be  named.  His  invocation  is  not  an 
invoking  of  something;  it  is,  rather,  a  kind  of  revocation,  that  is,  a  revoking  or 
invalidating  of  those  gods  that  he  knows  belong  to  a  bygone  era-those  tired, 
worn-out,  hackneyed  gods  that  at  times  he  still  catches  himself  yearning  after.  Of 
the  (non)invocation  of  Hölderlin's  "Germania",  Timothy  Clark  says, 
If  this  were  in  the  conventional  language  of  statements,  then  Hölderlin  would 
merely  be  declaring  the  classical  gods  to  be  non-existent.  In  fact,  it  is  an 
action  whose  effect  is  to  open  and  hold  open  a  space-that  of  the  absence  of 
191  lb  id,  p.  110. 
192  from  Holderlin's  "Germania"  as  cited  by  Timothy  Clark  in  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  110. 
193  Clark,  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  110. 
128 the  gods-in  which  the  poem  will  unfold.  As  Heidegger  writes  in  `The  Letter 
on  Humanism'  that  `If  the  human  being  is  to  find  his  way  once  again  into  the 
nearness  of  being,  he  must  learn  to  exist  in  the  nameless.  ' 
This  reference  to  humanism  brings  us  back  to  Stevens'  "Two  or  Three  Ideas", 
which  appears  to  take  a  `humanistic'  turn  after  his  dispassionate  account  of  the 
dissolution  of  the  gods.  Stevens'  language  here  is  quite  different  from  that  of 
both  Heidegger  and  Hölderlin;  nevertheless,  he  is  not  so  far  apart  from  either  of 
them.  We  pick  up  Stevens  in  mid-stream: 
when  the  gods  have  come  to  an  end,  when  we  think  of  them  as  the  aesthetic 
projections  of  a  time that  has  passed,  men  turn  to  a  fundamental  glory  of  their 
own  and  from  that  create  a  style  of  bearing  themselves  in  reality.  (OP  262) 
In  this  passage,  and  indeed  throughout  most  of  this  essay,  Stevens  comes  across 
as  having  great  confidence  in  the  ability  of  men  [sic]  to  recreate  for  themselves 
new  gods  in  the  wake  of  the  annihilation  of  the  ancient  gods,  those  "aesthetic 
projections  of  a  time  that  has  passed".  Again,  we  hear  the  confidence  in  the 
human: 
In  an  age  of  disbelief,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  in  a  time  that  is  largely 
humanistic,  in  one  sense  of  another,  it  is  for  the  poet  to  supply  the 
satisfactions  of  belief,  in  his  measure  and  in  his  style.  (OP  260) 
Stevens'  ideas  regarding  the  role  of  the  poet  appear  to  be  very  different  from 
those  set  forth  in  "What  Are  Poets  For?  "  Just  what  does  Stevens  mean  by 
asserting  that  "in  an  age  of  disbelief'  it  is  up  to  the  poet  "to  supply  the 
satisfactions  of  belief'?  Is  this  not  in  direct  contrast  to  what  Heidegger  is  saying? 
Would  not  such  created  `satisfactions'  be  mere  idols,  gods  created  in  the  image  of 
man  to  soothe  the  anxiety  of  the  modern  age?  How  different  Stevens'  words 
sound  from  those  of  Heidegger  /  Höderlin: 
`...  and  what  are  poets  for  in  a  destitute  time?  ' 
129 Hölderlin  shyly  puts  the  answer  into  the  mouth  of  his  poet-friend  Heinse, 
whom  he  address  in  the  elegy: 
`But  they  are,  you  say,  like  the  wine-god's  holy  priests, 
Who  fared  from  land  to  land  in  holy  night.  ' 
Poets  are  mortals  who,  singing  earnestly  of  the  wine-god,  sense  the  trace  of 
the  fugitive  gods,  stay  on  the  gods'  tracks,  and  so  trace  for  their  kindred 
mortals  the  way  toward  the  turning.  The  ether,  however,  in  which  alone  the 
gods  are  gods,  is  their  godhead.  The  element  of  this  ether,  that  within  which 
even  the  godhead  itself  is  still  present,  is  the  holy.  The  element  of  the  ether 
for  the  coming  of  the  fugitive  gods,  the  holy,  is  the  track  of  the  fugitive  gods. 
But  who  has  the  power  to  sense,  to  trace  such  a  track?  Traces  are  often 
inconspicuous,  and  are  always  the  legacy  of  a  directive  that  is  barely  divined. 
To  be  a  poet  in  a  destitute  time  means:  to  attend,  singing,  to  the  trace  of  the 
fugitive  gods.  This  is  why  the  poet  in  the  time  of  the  world's  night  utters  the 
holy.  This  is  why,  in  Hölderlin's  language,  the  world's  night  is  the  holy  night. 
It  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  poet's  nature  that,  before  he  can  be  truly  a  poet 
in  such  an  age,  the  time's  destitution  must  have  made  the  whole  being  and 
vocation  of  the  poet  a  poetic  question  for  him.  Hence  poets  in  a  destitute 
time'  must  especially  gather  in  poetry  the  nature  of  poetry.  Where  that 
happens  we  may  assume  poets  to  exist  who  are  on  the  way  to  the  destiny  of 
the  world's  age.  We  others  must  learn  to  listen  to  what  these  poets  say- 
assuming  that,  in  regard  to  the  time  that  conceals  Being  because  it  shelters  it, 
we  do  not  deceive  ourselves  through  reckoning  time  merely  in  terms  of  that 
which  is  by  dissecting  that  which  is.  194 
What  are  we  to  make  of  this?  Heidegger's  own  poetic  musings  on  poetry  and  the 
nature  of  the  poet  make  it  difficult  to  say  anything  about  this  passage  without 
feeling  as  though  we  are  being  intrusive.  Nevertheless,  we  will  risk  engaging 
with  this  most  ethereal  of  Heidegger's  passages  and  endeavour  to  tread  lightly. 
Heidegger's  use  of  the  word  `godhead'  is  reminiscent  of  Meister  Eckhart's 
`Godhead'  which  may  be  understood  as  `the  nothing'.  In  the  passage  above,  the 
"godhead"  is  the  "ether"  "in  which  alone  the  gods  are  gods"  and  it  is  to  this  ether, 
this  abysmal  nothing  that  the  poet  turns  in  a  destitute  time.  In  fact,  the  poet  is  not 
truly  able  to  turn  himself  toward  this  nothing  until  "the  time's  destitution"  has 
"made  the  whole  being  and  vocation  of  the  poet  a  poetic  question  for  him.  "  That 
is  to  say,  the  poet  must  be  confronted  by,  or  rather  willingly  expose  himself  to,  the 
130 groundlessness,  the  nothingness,  for  the  question  (of  Being)  to  be  just  that,  a 
question.  Furthermore,  the  poet  is  true  to  his  calling  when  he  dwells  within  this 
question,  this  question  that  is  exposed  by  the  destitution  of  the  times.  The  poet, 
by  dwelling  in  the  question  in  the  face  of  the  abyss,  "utters  the  holy". 
But  how  does  this  relate  to  Stevens  who  says  that  in  "an  age  of  disbelief'  "it  is 
for  the  poet  to  supply  the  satisfactions  of  belief'? 
To  begin  with,  both  Stevens  and  Heidegger  agree  that  this  "age  of  the  world's 
night"  /  "age  of  disbelief'  is  a  time  for  poets.  When  the  gods  have  failed  and 
fled  it  is  up  to  poets  `to  make',  poesis,  in  the  wake  of  their  departure.  But,  we 
might  ask,  does  Stevens  meet  Heidegger's  criteria  for  a  true  poet,  that  is,  one  who 
submits  himself  to  the  destitution  of  the  time  so  that  his  "whole  being  and 
vocation"  becomes  "a  poetic  question  for  him"?  And  what  are  we  to  make  of 
Heidegger's  statement  that  "poets  in  a  destitute  time"  must  "gather  in  poetry  the 
nature  of  poetry"?  What  does  it  mean  to  "gather  in  poetry  the  nature  of  poetry"? 
We  will  address  this  last  question  first. 
According  to  Heidegger,  Hölderlin's  is  a  "poetry  of  poetry"  and  his 
distinctiveness  is  "his  whole  poetic  mission",  this  mission  being  "to  make  poems 
solely  out  of  the  essence  of  poetry".  194  Of  this  Timothy  Clark  explains, 
He  means  by  this  not  some  vague  notion  of  poetry  which  is  about  itself, 
becoming  a  sort  of  criticism,  but  poetry  engaged  explicitly  with  the  very  kind 
of  disclosive  power  described  in  `The  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art',  in  other 
words  with  its  power  of  revealing  deep  history  (Geschichte),  those  most  basic 
and  unthought  modes  of  being  which  are  normally  too  close,  or  too  obvious, 
for  us  to  see.  For  instance,  one  of  the  most  immediately  powerful  and 
unusually  celebratory  of  Hölderlin's  poems  is  `Homecoming'  (1802).  Here 
the  poem  concerns  the  occasion  of  the  poet's  return  home,  to  his  native  land, 
travelling  across  a  lake  to  a  small  southern  German  town  shadowed  by  the 
Alps.  `All  seems  familiar,  even  the  hurried  greetings  /  Seem  those  of  friends, 
193  Heidegger,  PLT,  p.  93-94.  Emphases  added. 
194  Clark  citing  Heidegger  in  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  107.  For  an  indepth  discussion  of  Holderlin 
and  "the  essence  of  poetry",  see  chapter  four  of  David  Hallibruton's  Poetic  Thinking:  An 
Approach  to  Heidegger  (Chicago:  Chicago  University  Press,  1981). 
131 every  face  seems  a  kindred  one'.  Everything,  in  the  homecoming,  is  familiar 
but  estranged  by  being  seen  anew,  newly  realized  in  its  specific  nature  in  a 
way  imperceptible  to  a  daily  inhabitant  who  has  never  left  and  to  whom  all  is 
unproblematically  ordinary.  To  bring  the  familiar  nearer  by  perceiving  at  a 
new  distance,  to  cherish  what  we  recognize  by  acknowledging  the  resistance 
of  its  otherness,  this  is  the  force  of  the  poetic  which  Heidegger  celebrates  in 
this,  one  of  Hölderlin's  happiest  texts.  196 
Clark  goes  on  to  say,  "Hölderlin  turns  poetic  language  back  upon  its  own 
founding  power-his  mission  is  to  disclose  and  affirm  this  power  of  sacred 
disclosure,  to  poetize  poetizing,  or  to  bring  the  power  of  language  itself  to  word.  " 
Still  we  are  unclear.  What  does  it  mean  to  turn  "poetic  language  back  upon  its 
own  founding  power"?  What  is  this  so-called  founding  power  of  language?  And 
what  does  Clark  mean  by  saying  in  the  above  passage  that  Hölderlin 
acknowledges  "the  resistance  of  its  otherness"?  We  venture  an  answer:  it  would 
seem  that  the  founding  power  of  language  that  Hölderlin  poetizes  is 
,  that 
which,  as  we  said,  resists  all  names  and  can  only  be  `shown'  in  the  silence  of 
poetry.  If  Hölderlin  can  be  said  to  "gather  in  poetry  the  nature  of  poetry"  it  is 
because  his  poems  show  the  secret  of  while  keeping  the  secret,  that  is,  they 
allow  the  alterity  of  to  presence  while  at  the  same  time  allowing  it  to 
remain  other.  The  paradox  here  is  that  that  which  founds  language  resists 
language.  Indeed,  founds  language  by  its  very resistance  of  language. 
So  what  of  Stevens?  Can  it  be  said  of  him  that  he  "gathers  in  poetry  the  nature 
of  poetry"?  Does  he  allow  the  otherness  of  to  remain  other?  And  does  he 
resist  the  temptation  to  create  idols  in  the  absence  of  the  gods  like  Hölderlin, 
continuing  to  wait  with  expectation  for  he  knows  not  what?  Certainly  he  is  a  very 
different  poet  from  Hölderlin.  Nevertheless,  it  is  possible,  even  responsible, 
perhaps,  to  read  Stevens  as  a  true  poet,  according  to  Heidegger's  definition,  who 
196  Ibid,  pp.  105-106. 
132 does  indeed  turn  toward  the  abyss  and  not  away  from  it,  who  allows  "the  time's 
destitution"  to  make  his  "whole  being  and  vocation"  "a  poetic  question  for  him.  " 
First,  it  must  be  said,  however,  that  it  was  some  time  before  Stevens  allowed 
the  question  to  remain  open-ended,  before  he  resisted  the  desire  for  closure,  as  he 
does  in  his  later,  longer  poems.  Some  of  his  earlier  poems,  such  as  "Cuisine 
Bourgeoise"  and  "Of  Modern  Poetry"  pay  homage  to  the  climate  of  the  times,  that 
is,  the  destitution  of  the  age,  but  they  seem  to  suggest  a  humanistic  (and,  perhaps, 
typically  `modern')  response  to  what  is  perceived  as  a  problem  to  be  fixed.  We 
take,  for  example,  "Cuisine  Bourgeoise": 
These  days  of  disinheritance,  we  feast 
On  human  heads.  True,  birds  rebuild 
Old  nests  and  there  is  blue  in  the  woods. 
The  church  bells  clap  one  night  in  the  week. 
But  that's  all  done.  It  is  what  used  to  be, 
As  they  used  to  lie  in  the  grass,  in  the  heat, 
Men  on  green  beds  and  women  half  of  sun. 
The  words  are  written,  though  not  yet  said. 
It  is  like  the  season  when,  after  summer, 
It  is  summer  and  it  is  not,  it  is  autumn 
And  it  is  not,  it  is  day  and  it  is  not, 
As  if  last  night's  lamps  continued  to  bum, 
As  if  yesterday's  people  continued  to  watch 
The  sky,  half  porcelain,  preferring  that 
To  shaking  out  heavy  bodies  in  the  glares 
Of  this  present,  this  science,  this  unrecognized, 
This  outpost,  this  douce,  this  dumb,  this  dead,  in  which 
We  feast  on  human  heads,  brought  in  on  leaves, 
Crowned  with  the  first,  cold  buds.  On  these  we  live, 
No  longer  on  the  ancient  cake  of  seed, 
The  almond  and  deep  fruit.  This  bitter  meat 
Sustains  us...  Who,  then,  are  they,  seated  here? 
Is  the  table  a  mirror  in  which  they  sit  and  look? 
Are  they  men  eating  reflections  of  themselves?  (OP  227-228) 
The  tone  of  this  poem  regarding  the  disappearance  of  the  gods  is  markedly 
different  from  the  essay  "Two  or  Three  Ideas".  Where  the  essay  suggests  a  calm 
acceptance  of  the  modem  condition,  this  poem  has  a  pervasive  feeling  of 
133 impatience  and  discontentment.  The  sustaining  "bitter  meat"  is  derived  from  a 
cannibalistic  eating  of  the  poet's  own  poetic  constructions  that  stem  from  a 
reasoning  mind,  meat  that  is  believed  to  be  devoid  of  the  richness  and  goodness  of 
"the  ancient  cake  of  seed.  "  The  people,  "yesterday's  people",  continue  to  keep 
vigil  for  the  gods  that  once  brought  more  satisfying  sustenance,  and  there  is  a 
mild  contempt  directed  at  those  who  prefer  to  continue  to  watch  the  sky  for  the 
gods'  return  rather  than  "shaking  out  heavy  bodies  in  the  glares". 
Few  of  Stevens'  critics  have  troubled  to  comment  on  "Cuisine  Bourgeoise" 
published  in  the  collection  Ideas  of  Order,  concentrating  instead  on  another  poem 
from  the  same  collection,  "Of  Modern  Poetry".  The  poem  begins: 
The  poem  of  the  mind  in  the  act  of  finding 
What  will  suffice.  It  has  not  always  had 
To  find:  the  scene  was  set;  it  repeated  what 
Was  in  the  script. 
Then  the  theatre  was  changed 
To  something  else.  Its  past  was  a  souvenir. 
In  this  poem  as  in  "Cuisine  Bourgeoise",  Stevens  takes  as  his  subject  the  changing 
climate  of  the  times.  It  was  1935  when  Ideas  of  Order  was  published  and  the 
poems  in  this  collection  stand  out  against  those  of  the  preceding  volume, 
Harmonium,  published  more  than  a  decade  before.  In  his  chapter  "Ideas  of  Order: 
Compos(t)ing  the  romantic",  Angus  Cleghorn  remarks  on  the  volume  of  1935, 
Responding  to  the  social,  intellectual,  and  political  upheaval  of  the  thirties, 
Stevens  reevaluated  the  role  of  the  poet  in  society.  This  meant  questioning  the 
assumptions  behind  the  spontaneous  poetry  in  Harmonium.  The  secular 
philosophy  in  `Sunday  Morning'  and  `The  Snow  Man'  creates  earthy  hedons 
that  continue  to  be  possible  throughout  Stevens'  poetry....  However,  the 
poetry  of  the  thirties  is  specifically  directed  toward  social  responsibilities  as 
they  are  ordered  by  ideas  in  language....  Because  `life  is  the  essential  part  of 
literature,  '  Stevens  looked  at  the  way  his  life  as  a  poet  had  been  formed  by  the 
traditions  of  poetry  and  the  customs  of  living....  The  romantic  traditions  and 
customs  that  Stevens  inherits  are  the  fulcrum  upon  which  this  volume  tilts. 
134 Stevens'  efforts  at  change  depend  upon  discarding  the  past  for  a  `freshening  of 
life'.  197 
There  is in  Ideas  of  Order  much  evidence  of  this  effort  to  throw  off  the  inherited 
romanticism  that  Stevens  sees  as  hampering  his  ability  to  be  a  prophet  of  the 
times.  In  the  poem  preceding  "Of  Modem  Poetry",  "Man  and  Bottle",  Stevens 
proclaims,  "The  mind  is  the  great  poem  of  winter,  the  man,  /  Who,  to  find  what 
will  suffice,  /  Destroys  romantic  tenements  /  Of  rose  and  ice...  "  (CP  238). 
Throughout  these  poems,  he  directly  acknowledges  that  things  are  no  longer  as 
they  were,  that  "the  theatre"  has  "changed"  and  that  poetry  must  change  with  it.  198 
We  could  argue  that  the  poems  are  not  altogether  unlike  Hölderlin's  negative 
invocation  in  so  far  as  they  acknowledge  that  to  be  able  to  say  something  new  the 
poet  can  no  longer  draw  upon  the  old.  We  recall  Hölderlin's  words:  "Not  them, 
the  blessed,  who  once  appeared,  /  Those  images  of  gods  in  the  ancient  land,  / 
Them,  it  is  true,  I  may  not  now  invoke....  " 
In  "Of  Modern  Poetry",  after  Stevens  has  insisted  on  the  need  to  welcome 
change,  he  meditates  on  the  necessity  for  poetry  to  be  a  living  thing,  constantly 
changing  in  a  world  of  perpetual  change: 
It  has  to  be  living,  to  learn  the  speech  of  the  place. 
It  has  to  face  the  men  of  the  time  and  to  meet 
The  women  of  the  time.  It  has  to  think  about  war 
And  it  has  to  find  what  will  suffice.  It  has 
To  construct  a  new  stage.  It  has  to  be  on  that  stage 
And,  like  an  insatiable  actor,  slowly  and 
With  meditation,  speak  words  that  in  the  ear, 
197  Angus  J.  Cleghorn,  Wallace  Stevens'  Poetics:  The  Neglected  Rhetoric  (New  York:  Palgrave, 
2000),  pp.  27-28. 
198  Joseph  N.  Riddel  remarks,  "'Of  Modern  Poetry'...  would  appear  not  to  be  what  many  critics 
presume,  an  explicit  commentary  on  modern  poetry,  but  a  celebration  of  poetry  which  realizes  and 
satisfies  the  rage  for  order.  The  idea  of  a  `modern'  poetry  is  an  idea  of  poetry  in  our  time  only  in 
the  sense  that  our  time  is  self-consciously  discontinuous  with  a  traditional  past.  Rejecting  the  old 
script,  seeking  for  what  will  suffice,  Stevens'  meditation  is  dedicated  to  the  beleagured  modern 
who  must  turn  away  from  the  providential  to  the  hazards  and  beauties  of  the  commonplace,  as 
entertained  by  a  common  self....  "  In  Joseph  N.  Riddel,  The  Clairvoyant  Eye:  The  Poetry  and 
Poetics  of  Wallace  Stevens  (Baton  Rouge,  Louisiana:  Louisiana  State  University  Press,  1965),  p. 
158. 
135 In  the  delicatest  ear  of  the  mind,  repeat, 
Exactly,  that  which  it  wants  to  hear,  at  the  sound 
Of  which,  an  invisible  audience  listens, 
Not  to  the  play,  but  to  itself,  expressed 
In  an  emotion  as  of  two  people,  as  of  two 
Emotions  becoming  one.  The  actor  is 
A  metaphysician  in  the  dark,  twanging 
An  instrument,  twanging  a  wiry  string  that  gives 
Sounds  passing  through  sudden  rightnesses,  wholly 
Containing  the  mind,  below  which  it  cannot  descend, 
Beyond  which  it  has  no  will  to  rise. 
It  must 
Be  the  finding  of  a  satisfaction,  and  may 
Be  of  a  man  skating,  a  woman  dancing,  a  woman 
Combing.  The  poem  of  the  act  of  the  mind.  (CP  239-240) 
The  lines,  "it  has  to  find  what  will  suffice.  It  has  /  To  construct  a  new  stage",  are 
not  indicative  of  what  Heidegger  would  call  a  true  poet;  there  is  too  much 
intentionality  here,  too  much  emphasis  on  finding  and  constructing  rather  than  on 
discovering.  As  the  poet  struggles  to  find  what  will  suffice  he  misses  the  more 
subtle,  quiet  surprises  discovered  by  the  one  who  waits,  open  to  what  comes  his 
way.  We  could  say  that  there  lacks  a  spirit  of  `letting  be',  a  spirit  of  Gelassenheit 
in  these  poems  from  Ideas  of  Order. 
It  is  to  the  later,  longer  poems  that  we  look  for  a  more  mature  Stevens,  less 
concerned  with  finding  what  will  suffice  and  more  open  to  discovering  the 
possibilities  inherent  in  living  without  a  grounding  metaphysic.  Poems  such  as 
Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction  (1942)  and  The  Auroras  of  Autumn  (1948) 
suggest  that  the  poet  is  more  at  ease  with  himself  and  with  living  within  that 
question  that  hangs  ever  in  the  balance:  "What  am  I  to  believe?  "  (CP  404)  By 
these  later  years,  Stevens'  "whole  being  and  vocation"  have  indeed  become  "a 
poetic  question  for  him,  "  enabling  him,  like  Hiilderlin,  to  "gather  in  poetry  the 
nature  of  poetry.  " 
136 Once  again,  we  turn  to  the  opening  of  Notes  with  its  rhetorical  question:  "And 
for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love?  "  The  "you"  of  the  first  stanza,  as  we 
have  already  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter,  is  undefined,  unnamed.  Stevens  is 
careful  here  to  allow  this  subject  of  his  affections  to  remain  unnamed  precisely 
because  it  is  that  which  resists  all  naming,  that  which  has  no  name,  and  he  wishes 
to  respect  its  namelessness-to  let  it  be. 
And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love? 
Do  I  press  the  extremest  book  of  the  wisest  man 
Close  to  me,  hidden  in  me  day  and  night? 
In  the  uncertain  light  of  single,  certain  truth, 
Equal  in  living  changingess  to  the  light 
In  which  I  meet  you,  in  which  we  sit  at  rest, 
For  a  moment  in  the  central  of  our  being, 
The  vivid  transparence  that  you  bring  is  peace. 
Nowhere  in  this  stanza  do  we  hear  the  urgency  and  anxiety  of  "Of  Modem 
Poetry".  Stevens  demonstrates  that  he  is  no  longer  in  a  hurry  to  "find  what  will 
suffice";  for,  he  has  discovered  the  joy  that  results  in  not  finding  and  in  not 
needing  to  find.  It  is,  he  has  finally  learned,  enough  to  live  within  the  uncertainty 
brought  about  by  certain  change.  Everywhere  in  the  poem  there  is  evidence  of  a 
lack,  of  an  absence,  whether  it  be  the  lack  of  a  referent  as  in  the  first  stanza  or  the 
acknowledged  absence  of  singular  truth,  singular  truth  being  "poisonous  / 
...  so 
fatal  to  /  The  truth  itself...  "  (CP  381).  The  whole  poem,  it  can  be  said,  depends 
upon  a  lack,  a  lack  exposed  by  the  death  of  "Phoebus",  "a  name  for  something 
that  never  could  be  named". 
The  death  of  one  god  is  the  death  of  all. 
Let  purple  Phoebus  lie  in  umber  harvest, 
Let  Phoebus  slumber  and  die  in  autumn  umber, 
Phoebus  is  dead,  ephebe.  But  Phoebus  was 
A  name  for  something  that  never  could  be  named. 
137 Michael  Davidson  in  his  chapter  "Wallace  Stevens  and  Contemporary  Poetics" 
comments  at  length  on  this  poem,  noting  its  postmodern  qualities. 
As  a  text,  "Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction"  (so  the  reading  might  go) 
proposes  no  strategies  of  closure,  no  consistent  pattern  of  rhetorical  figures, 
no  mythological  centers  of  sustaining  narratives.  In  fact,  as  the  opening 
cantos  indicate,  the  very  lack  of  such  formal  cultural  signs  inaugurates  the 
poem:  `Phoebus  is  dead,  ephebe.  But  Phoebus  was  /A  name  for  something 
that  never  could  be  named.  '  The  poet  is  thus  able  to  step  beyond  the  closed, 
spatial  text  of  high  Modernism  into  a  more  speculative,  temporarily  generative 
text  whose  end  is  not  literary  history  but  existential  disclosure.  As  a 
philosophical  project,  the  authentically  Postmodern  poem  dis-covers 
(aletheia)  or  uncovers  the  temporal  nature  of  Being,  not  by  reference  to  some 
cultural  cyclicity  of  the  order  of  Yeats  or  Pound,  but  through  its  momentary, 
wandering  interrogation.  This  `endlessly  elaborating  poem,  '  as  Stevens  calls 
it,  is  able  to  work  out  the  fullest  implications  of  its  subject  by  constantly 
exposing  it  to  change.  198 
Again,  the  entire  poem  is  driven  by  lack-lack  of  strategies  of  closure,  lack  of 
narrative  form,  lack  of  consistent  rhetorical  figures....  Also,  this  poem  which 
Davidson  believes  to  be  "authentically  Postmodern"  "dis-covers"  (he  draws  upon 
Heidegger's  term  aletheia  here  to  clarify)  or  "uncovers  the  temporal  nature"  of 
. 
That  is,  it  operates  by  unnaming  or  refusing  to  name  in  any  final  sense  that 
which  has  no  name.  Rather  than  asserting  the  need  to  `find  an  order'  or  to  nail 
down  `the  first  idea',  the  poem  offers  a  "wandering  interrogation",  an 
interrogation  that  never  comes  to  rest. 
... 
As  its  title  implies,  the  poem  does  not  propose  completion  or  closure.  It  is 
tentative,  accumulative,  speculative.  The  preposition  in  its  title  stresses  the 
series'  projective  stance.  Where  in  an  earlier  period  Stevens  might  have  made 
notes  `on'  the  theme  of  a  supreme  fiction,  this  poem  may  only  point  `toward'. 
In  his  tentative,  speculative  approach  toward  `a  supreme  fiction',  the  poet  allows 
for  the  gap  to  remain  open.  He  holds  open  the  space  for  the  emergence  of  the 
poem,  and  by  holding  open  this  space,  he  not  only  allows  for  the  emergence  of  the 
poem,  but  for  the  emergence  of  truth.  Says  Davidson, 
138 Both  subject  and  method  are  concisely  embodied  in  the  opening  lines  of  Canto 
VII  of  the  opening  section: 
It  feels  good  as  it  is  without  the  giant, 
A  thinker  of  the  first  idea.  Perhaps 
The  truth  depends  on  a  walk  around  a  lake, 
A  composing  as  the  body  tires,  a  stop 
To  see  hepatica,  a  stop  to  watch 
A  definition  growing  certain  and 
A  wait  within  that  certainty  (CP  386) 
This  passage  described  what  Heidegger  might  call  the  `forestructure' 
(Vorhabe)  of  Stevens'  metaphysics.  The  truth  may  no  longer  be  grounded  in  a 
first  cause,  a  `thinker  of  the  first  idea.  '  In  the  desultory  way  of  the  poem  itself, 
the  truth  `depends  on  a  walk  around  a  lake.  '  Stevens  resists  analogy;  the  truth 
is  not  `like'  a  walk  but  depends  upon  the  natural  circumstance-the  weather, 
water,  hepatica  to  be  viewed-as  well  as  those  acts  of  pausing,  observing,  and 
meandering  by  which  the  natural  is  absorbed.  The  definition  of  a  supreme 
fiction  never  becomes  certain;  it  grows  toward  certainty.  199 
With  these  lines  we  are  brought  back  to  the  nature  of  truth,  a  subject  we 
abandoned  at  the  end  of  the  last  chapter.  For  Stevens,  like  Heidegger,  truth 
happens;  indeed  it  is  a  happening  that  occurs  in  poetry. 
198  Michael  Davidson,  "Wallace  Stevens  and  Contemporary  Poetics"  in  Wallace  Stevens:  The 
Poetics  of  Modernism,  ed.  Albert  Gelpi  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1985),  p.  146. 
Emphasis  added. 
199  Ibid,  p.  147.  Davidson  also  addresses  the  gradual  change  in  Stevens'  style:  "If  poetry  is  a 
destructive  as  well  as  instructive  force,  it  is  all  the  more  so  in  Stevens'  later  work,  where  the 
pursuit  of  a  supreme  fiction  is  merged  with  an  increasingly  interrogative  and  discursive  style. 
Whereas  in  the  lyrics  and  exercises  of  Harmonium  the  poet  wrote  brilliant,  often  witty  variations 
on  philosophical  matters,  from  the  mid-1930s  on  his  method  was  to  dramatize  the  mind  in  its 
speculative  acts.  As  Roy  Harvey  Pearce  points  out,  the  change  in  Stevens'  later  style  is  not  a 
radical  departure  but  represents  a  logical  evolution  from  the  problems  advanced  in  his  early  lyrics. 
In  perspectivist  exercises  like  `Thirteen  Ways  of  Looking  at  a  Blackbird'  or  `  Sea  Surface  Full  of 
Clouds,  '  the  thing  itself-whether  a  jar,  a  landscape,  or  a  flock  of  pigeons-constellates  senses  of 
order  for  the  perceiver.  Each  poem  illustrates  the  poet  discovering,  as  does  the  avuncular  figure  in 
'Le  Monocle  de  Mon  Oncle,  '  'that  fluttering  things  have  so  distinct  a  shade.  '  (CP  18).  It  was 
perhaps  inevitable  that  this  discovery  should  incur  the  consequences  of  its  own  relativism.  No 
longer  could  Stevens  continue  to  illustrate  the  `maker's  rage  to  order  words  of  the  sea'  out  of  a 
barren  reality.  He  had  to  'be  /  In  the  difficulty  of  what  it  is  to  be'  (CP  381),  "  p.  145.  And 
regarding  the  long  poems,  he  says:  "Unlike  their  Romantic  precursors  ('Dejection,  An  Ode', 
'Alastor,  '  'Tintern  Abbey'),  Stevens'  long  poems  do  not  appeal  to  some  ultimate  value  (Joy, 
Truth,  Beauty)  to  resolve  the  contrarieties  introduced,  even  though  they  may  utilize  such 
abstractions  as  polemical  centers  for  meditation.  This  form  of  long,  exploratory  poem  has  become 
one  of  the  primary  models  for  contemporary  poets  in  their  attempt  to  move  beyond  the  single,  self- 
sufficient  lyric  to  the  'poem  of  a  life,  "'p.  146. 
139 At  this  point  it  seems  appropriate  to  interrupt  our  discussion  of  Notes  Toward  a 
Supreme  Fiction  and  return  to  our  previous  discussion  of  truth  and  ask  what  does 
Heidegger  mean  when  he  makes  such  statements  as:  "In  the  work  of  art  the  truth 
of  an  entity  has  set  itself  to  work,  "201  and  "In  the  work,  the  happening  of  truth  is 
at  work"202  and  also,  "The  work's  becoming  a  work  is  a  way  in  which  truth 
becomes  and  happens"203? 
Heidegger  clears  the  way  for  a  discussion  of  the  term  by  first  addressing  the 
difficulty  in  using  such  a  commonplace  word  as  `truth': 
How  slight  and  stunted  our  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  truth  is,  is  shown  by 
the  laxity  we  permit  ourselves  in  using  this  basic  word.  By  truth  is  usually 
meant  this  or  that  particular  truth.  That  means:  something  true.  A  cognition 
articulated  in  a  proposition  can  be  of  this  sort.  However,  we  call  not  only  a 
proposition  true,  but  also  a  thing,  true  gold  in  contrast  with  sham  gold.  True 
here  means  genuine,  real  gold.  What  does  the  expression  `real'  mean  here? 
To  us  it  is  what  is  in  truth.  The  true  is  what  corresponds  to  the  real,  and  the 
real  is  what  is  in  truth.  The  circle  has  closed  again.  2  4 
Heidegger  wants  to  escape  the  closed  circle  of  this  idea  of  truth  and  open  truth  up 
to  possibility.  By  adopting  the  Greek  word  aletheia  ('showing'  or 
`unconcealment'),  he  proposes  another  way  of  thinking  about  truth.  By  aletheia, 
Heidegger  means  `unconcealment',  specifically  "the  unconcealment  by  which  all 
beings  show  themselves  to  be.  "205  Thus,  truth  has  to  do  with  `self-showing'  or  the 
way  beings  show  themselves  to  be.  Truth  is  defined  as  the  way  beings  self- 
display. 
Truth  is  not  produced  but  shown;  neither  is  truth  a  production,  something 
produced,  but  rather  a  happening,  an  active  showing-forth  of  the  truth  of  an  entity. 
201  Heidegger,  PLT,  p.  36. 
202  Ibid,  p.  58. 
203  Ibid,  p.  60. 
204  Ibid,  p.  50. 
205  David  Farrell  Krell  in  Basic  Writings:  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  18. 
140 So...  "the  truth  is  there  is  no  truth",  or  at  least  not  in  the  traditional  sense.  206  Truth 
is  not  about  whether  or  not  something  is  `real'  or  `genuine'  as  determined  by 
some  external  measure;  rather,  truth  is  in  the  way  a  thing  self-presents.  Thinking 
of  truth  as  the  unconcealment  of  beings  operates  within  the  spirit  of  Gelassenheit 
insofar  as  beings  themselves  are  allowed  or  permitted  to  self-display.  They  are 
`let  be'  to  show  forth  in  their  style.  Therefore,  "what  is  brought  into  the  light  is 
not  the  subjectivity  or  personal  world  of  the  artist"  nor  is  it  "a  representation  of 
some  real  or  ideal  entity,  but  the  truth  of  the  being  of  the  entity.  ,  207  In 
Heidegger's  thinking  of  truth,  beings  are  treated  with  a  "certain  reverence  and 
respect  for  the  mystery"  of  their  being;  they  are  allowed  to  show-forth  in  the  work 
of  art  in  such  a  way  as  to  retain  their  mystery,  their  otherness.  208  This  means  that 
in  the  unconcealment  of  beings  there  remains  something  concealed.  This  mystery 
that  is  allowed  to  remain  a  mystery  is  crucial  for  Heidegger  as  he  understands  the 
relationship  between  aletheia  and  Gelassenheit.  He  claims,  "we  never  know  a 
mystery  by  unveiling  or  analyzing  it  to  death,  but  only  in  such  a  way  that  we 
preserve  the  mystery  as  mystery.  "209  Therefore,  in  the  happening  of  poetry,  truth 
happens.  And  in  the  happening  of  truth  beings  show-forth  the  mystery  of  their 
being.  Truth  is  this  showing-forth  of  the  mystery  or  otherness  of  beings. 
To  illustrate  what  he  means  by  art  allowing  the  mystery  of  the  other  to  self- 
display,  Heidegger  provides  the  example  of  the  temple-work  in  "The  Origin  of  the 
Work  of  Art".  The  temple-work  might  be  said  to  "gather  in  poetry  the  nature  of 
poetry". 
206  Caputo,  Radical  Hermeneutics,  p.  185. 
207  Frank  Lentricchia,  After  the  New  Criticism  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1980),  pp. 
89-90. 
208  Ibid. 
209  Heidegger  as  quoted  in  Clark's  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  119. 
141 A  building,  a  Greek  temple,  portrays  nothing.  It  simply  stands  there  in  the 
middle  of  the  rock-cleft  valley.  The  building  encloses  the  figure  of  the  god, 
and  in  this  concealment  lets  it  stand  out  into  the  holy  precinct  through  the 
open  portico.  By  means  of  the  temple,  the  god  is  present  in  the  temple.  This 
presence  of  the  god  is  in  itself  the  extension  and  delimitation  of  the  precinct  as 
a  holy  precinct.  The  temple  and  its  precinct,  however,  do  not  fade  away  into 
the  indefinite.  It  is  the  temple-work  that  first  fits  together  and  at  the  same 
time  gathers  around  itself  the  unity  of  those  paths  and  relations  in  which  birth 
and  death,  disaster  and  blessing,  victory  and  disgrace,  endurance  and  decline 
acquire  the  shape  of  destiny  for  human  being.... 
Standing  there,  the  building  rests  on  the  rocky  ground.  This  resting  of  the 
work  draws  up  out  of  the  rock  the  mystery  of  the  rock's  clumsy  yet 
spontaneous  support.  Standing  there,  the  building  holds  its  ground  against  the 
storm  raging  above  it  and  so  first  makes  the  storm  itself  manifest  in  its 
violence.  The  luster  and  gleam  of  the  stone,  though  itself  apparently  glowing 
only  by  the  grace  of  the  sun,  yet  first  brings  to  light  the  light  of  the  day,  the 
breadth  of  the  sky,  the  darkness  of  the  night.  The  temple's  firm  towering 
makes  visible  the  invisible  space  of  air.  The  steadfastness  of  the  work 
contrasts  with  the  surge  of  the  surf,  and  its  own  repose  brings  out  the  raging  of 
the  sea.  Tree  and  grass,  eagle  and  bull,  snake  and  cricket  first  enter  their 
distinctive  shapes  and  thus  come  to  appear  as  what  they  are.  The  Greeks 
called  this  emerging  and  rising  in  itself  and  in  all  thing  phusis.  It  clears  and 
illuminates,  also,  that  on  which  and  in  which  man  bases  his  dwelling.... 
This  temple-work,  in  its  standing  there,  first  gives  to  things  their  look  and  to 
men  their  outlook  on  themselves.  This  view  remains  open  as  long  as  the  work 
is  a  work,  as  long  as  the  god  has  not  fled  from  it.  It  is  the  same  with  the 
sculpture  of  the  god,  votive  offering  of  the  victor  in  the  athletic  games.  It  is 
not  a  portrait  whose  purpose  is  to  make  it  easier  to  realize  how  the  god  looks; 
rather,  it  is  a  work  that  lets  the  god  himself  be  present  and  thus  is  the  god 
himself.  209 
By  its  very  presence,  the  temple-work  lets  be  and  permits  the  god  to  dwell.  It 
clears  the  way  and  opens  the  space  for  the  god  to  emerge.  Moreover,  the  temple 
provides  the  limits  that  allow  for  the  god  to  appear,  that  permit  it  to  show-forth. 
For  as  long  as  the  temple-work  remains  open  to  this  self-showing  of  the  god  it 
will  continue  to  give  "to  things  their  look  and  to  men  their  outlook  on 
themselves.  "  But  should  the  temple-work  cut  off  the  possibility  for  this  showing- 
forth,  should  it  no  longer  respect  this  self-showing  by  denying  the  mystery,  the 
209  Heidegger,  PLT,  pp.  41-43. 
142 otherness  of  the  god,  it  will  no  longer  be  of  use  to  the  community  it  serves.  The 
god  will  no  longer  appear;  it  will  flee  and  the  community  will  experience 
bereavement  in  the  wake  of  its  disappearance. 
We  want  to  pay  particular  attention  to  the  last  line  quoted  from  the  passage 
above:  "it  is  a  work  that  lets  the  god  himself  be  present  and  thus  is  the  god 
himself.  "  Stevens  says  similarly:  "There  is  no  difference  between  god  and  his 
temple"  (OP  191).  What  could  Heidegger  (and  Stevens)  mean  by  this?  How  is 
the  temple-work,  which  allows  for  the  god's  self-display,  one  with  the  god 
himself?  By  stating  that  the  statue  of  the  god  in  the  temple  is  not  a  portrait  or 
representation  of  the  god  but  a  work  that  lets  the  god  itself  come  to  appearance 
and  therefore  is  the  god  itself,  Heidegger  recognises  the  ontological  status  of  the 
work.  It  is  not  a  mere  model,  a  representation  of  the  god,  but  the  god  itself,  the 
god  who  calls  on  the  artist  to  permit  its  self-display.  The  god,  then,  manifests 
itself  in  the  work,  bringing  the  `truth'  of  its  being  into  appearance. 
To  understand  how  this  work  which  permits  this  self-showing  of  the  god  is  one 
with  the  god  himself,  we  need  to  think  about  the  traditional  notions  of  form  and 
content.  More  precisely,  we  need  to  think  how  to  overcome  traditional  notions  of 
form  and  content.  The  idea  that  these  can  be  separated  in  the  artwork  is  precisely 
what  Heidegger  is  working  against  in  "The  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art".  He 
declares:  "Form  and  content  are  the  most  hackneyed  concepts  under  which 
anything  and  everything  may  be  subsumed.  s1211  We  recall  from  the  last  chapter 
that  Heidegger  and  Stevens  both  postulate  the  poem  as  a  thing  in  itself.  The 
Z1'  Heidegger  as  quoted  by  George  Pattison  in  Art,  Modernity  and  Faith:  Restoring  the  Image 
(London:  Macmillan,  1991),  p.  139.  Says  Pattison,  "Heidegger  also  remarks  that  the  Christian 
tradition  of  thinking  of  God  as  Creator  reinforces  the  prevalent  role  of  this  matter  /  form 
distinction  in  Western  thought.  For  it  all  too  easily  leads  to  us  seeing  the  whole  of  creation,  the 
whole  of  the  material  world,  as  being  no  more  than  a  means  by  which  God  aims  to  accomplish  his 
spiritual  end.  The  whole  creation  is  the  matter  on  which  the  divine  craftsman  impresses  the 
143 poem  is,  we  argued,  not  about  something;  it  does  not  represent  something.  Its 
content  does  not  stand  apart  from  or  outside  its  form;  nor  does  the  work  point  to 
some  meaning  external  to  itself.  It  is,  rather,  a  self-sufficient  presence,  an 
argument  that  stands  in  direct  opposition  to  the  duality  of  form  and  content. 
Both  Heidegger  and  Stevens  offer  ways  of  overcoming  this  duality.  For 
Heidegger  it  is  the  notion  of  Grundstimmung  or  `fundamental  tone'  and  for 
Stevens  it  is  `style'.  Common  to  both  Heidegger's  Grundstimmung  and  Stevens' 
`style'  is  the  idea  that  they  are  not  chosen  by  the  poet.  The  poet  has  no  choice  in 
selecting  his  tone,  according  to  Heidegger,  or  in  choosing  his  style,  according  to 
Stevens.  They  come  to  the  poet. 
In  "Two  or  Three  Ideas"  the  poet  explains, 
Style  is  not  something  applied.  It  is  something  inherent,  something  that 
permeates.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  that  in  which  it  is  found,  whether  the  poem, 
the  manner  of  a  god,  the  bearing  of  a  man.  It  is  not  a  dress.  It  may  be  said  to 
be  a  voice  that  is  inevitable  (OP  263). 
The  style  of  a  thing  for  Stevens,  is  the  thing  itself.  The  way  something  appears, 
how  it  shows  itself  is  the  thing  itself. 
It  is  possible  that  to  seem-it  is  to  be, 
As  the  sun  is  something  seeming  and  it  is. 
The  sun  is  an  example.  What  it  seems 
It  is  and  in  such  seemings  all  things  are.... 
Such  seemings  are  the  actual  ones:  the  way 
Things  look  each  day,  each  morning,  or  the  style 
Peculiar  to  the  queen,  this  queen  or  that...  (CP  339-340). 
Thus,  things  are  in  their  seeming,  in  the  way  that  they  self-display.  We  cannot 
talk  about  form  and  content,  which  really  means  `form  vs.  content'.  Stevens'  idea 
that  a  thing  (or  being)  is  its  style  negates  this  duality. 
particular  form  he  desires  to  give  it.  And  if  that  is  how  things  are  with  the  Creator  and  his  world, 
what  more  can  we  expect  from  a  human  artist?  ",  pp.  139-140. 
144 Now  turning  to  Heidegger's  notion  of  Grundstimmung,  Timothy  Clark 
explains, 
The  poet  is  essentially  passive  in  relation  to  the  tone.  It  comes  to  the  poet,  as 
in  classical  theories  of  inspiration,  as  an  apprehension  of  the  world....  In  that 
revelation  the  poet  responds  to  something  that  comes  from  the  outside.  On  the 
other  hand  (and  this  seems  at  first  a  contradiction),  neither  is  the  tone 
something  merely  there  already  in  the  world  and  which  the  poet  must 
subsequently  translate  into  words.  It  resonates  from  out  of  the  poet's  listening 
to  the  language  and  it  needs  the  act  of  the  poet  to  sound  out  and  be 
apprehensible.  Where  does  this  leave  us  then?  Does  the  revelation  come  first 
or  the  words?  The  answer  is  that  there  is  only  a  contradiction  here  on  the 
surface,  for  linear  thinking.  The  revelation  of  the  world  in  the  resonance  of 
the  ground  tone  and  its  coming  to  language  for  the  poet  are  simultaneous  or 
equi-primordial.  It  all  takes  place  too  holistically-too  non-foundationally- 
to  be  disentangled  in  terms  of  any  one  element  being  the  `cause'  and  the  other 
an  'effect'.  212 
Clark  makes  the  connection  between  the  Grundstimmung,  the  tone  that  comes  to 
the  poet,  and  inspiration  and  revelation,  though  as  always  he  is  quick  to  deny  the 
religious  nature  of  this  idea:  "Heidegger's  notion  of  the  Grundstimmung  helps  us 
read  these  episodes  of  `inspiration'  without  the  evasions  of  a  religious 
terminology....  "213  Although  it  is  not  entirely  clear  here,  it  seems  that  the 
revelations  that  come  to  the  poet  through  the  Grundstimmung,  are  reliant  upon  the 
poet's  capacity  for  listening  to  what  we  might  call  `the  spirit'  or  `style'  of  the  age. 
The  Grundstimmung,  as  the  fundamental  tone  of  the  age,  is  not  something  chosen 
by  the  poet  but  rather  something  that  pervades,  or  as  Stevens  says,  "something 
that  permeates". 
With  this  in  mind  we  turn  again  to  Heidegger's  (and  Hölderlin's)  question, 
"...  and  what  are  poets  for  in  a  destitute  time?  "  True  poets  living  in  a  destitute 
time  allow  for  the  time's  destitution  `to  be'  in  language.  They  do  not  attempt  to 
cover  over  or  cover  up  the  Grundstimmung,  the  fundamental  tone  of  the  age; 
rather  they  open  up  a  space  for  it  to  dwell.  For  Heidegger,  HSlderlin's  poetry 
145 does  just  this:  it  allows  for  the  showing-forth  of  the  `truth'  of  the  Grundstimmung 
of  the  age.  Clark  asks,  "What  emerges  as  the  fundamental  tone  of  Hölderlin's 
`Germania'?  " 
It  is  `the  oppression  which  holds  itself  in  readiness  in  sacred  mourning'-a 
summary  statement,  in  effect,  of  the  tone  of  the  opening.  This  phrase 
becomes  almost  a  refrain  in  Heidegger's  reading.  The  distinction  of  Hölderlin 
for  Heidegger  is  the  penetration  of  the  Grundstimmung  of  his  poetry  of  poetry, 
its  making  explicit  of  the  disenchantment  of  European  humanity.... 
This  fundamental  tone  is  not  then  something  which  Hölderlin  makes  up:  it  is 
attuned  to  a  disenchantment  which  is  already  there,  all  pervasively  but 
unthought,  and  it  makes  it  resonate  unignorably  in  language.  21 
Every  epoch  has  its  gods;  the  Greeks  had  their  gods,  we  have  ours-though  they 
appear  as  an  absence.  The  spirit  of  this  age  is  one  of  destitution  and 
disenchantment;  the  God  and  the  gods  have  fled  and  it  is  the  poet's  vocation  to 
allow  for  this  destitution,  this  absence,  to  be. 
Central  to  both  Stevens'  `style'  and  Heidegger's  Grundstimmung  is  the 
necessity  for  listening  and  for  letting  be.  Though  Stevens  claims  that  style  is  "a 
voice  that  is  inevitable",  there  must  be  a  harkening  to  this  voice  that  beckons  to 
the  poet.  As  this  voice  comes  to  the  poet  who  strains  to  hear,  it  is  set  forth  in  the 
work  of  art,  allowing  its  `truth'  to  shine-forth.  It  comes  `to  be'  in  its  style  as  the 
poet  `lets  be'.  `Letting  be'  is  precisely  what  Stevens  learns  to  do  in  his  later 
years.  Releasing  his  active  desire  for  finding  "the  poem  of  the  mind  that  will 
suffice",  he  comes  to  adopt  an  "active  passivity".  He  accepts  "desire  as  a  capacity 
for  reception  rather  than  an  agitated  seeking  of  desirable  objects.  "  215  In  his  own 
words,  he  comes  to  know  "desire  without  an  object"  (CP  358)  and  eventually 
Zit  Clark,  Martin  Heidegger,  p.  114. 
21  Ibid,  p.  112. 
214  Ibid,  p.  113. 
eis  Frank  Lentricchia,  Modernist  Quartet  (Cambridge:  University  of  Cambridge  Press,  1994),  p. 
173. 
146 accepts  that  "The  cancellings,  /  The  negations  are  never  final"  (CP  414).  In 
short,  Stevens  develops  `a  poetics  of  Gelassenheit'. 
Though  the  departure  of  the  gods  initially  causes  a  sense  of  urgency  in 
Stevens,  an  urgency  for  "finding  what  will  suffice"  in  their  absence,  he  gradually 
comes  to  accept  the  destitution  of  the  age,  becoming  a  true  poet,  "gathering  in 
poetry  the  nature  of  poetry".  In  fact,  in  time  there  is  every  indication  that  he 
comes  to  embrace  this  absence,  even  love  it:  "And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I 
feel  love?  " 
There  is  one  further  point  that  we  wish  to  make  when  considering  Stevens 
alongside  of  Heidegger.  In  the  preceding  pages  we  have  demonstrated  the  affinity 
between  the  two  men;  however,  there  is  one  important  distinction  suggested  by 
their  poetics.  We  recall  that  Heidegger  asserts  the  need  for  the  `true  poet'  to  live 
in  authenticity,  that  is,  for  the  poet  to  expose  herself  to  the  potentiality  for  her 
own  non-existence,  an  exposing  that  brings  about  feelings  of  awe  and  wonder. 
Only  by  living  authentically  can  she  be  open  to  the  voice  of  silence  and  allow  for 
the  self-showing  of  . 
According  to  Heidegger,  the  mundane  `everydayness' 
of  life  does  not  open  up  the  space  necessary  for  this  showing-forth. 
`Everydayness'  is,  for  him,  the  inauthentic.  216  Stevens'  poetics,  on  the  other 
hand,  does  not  work  from  this  kind  of  dualism;  it  does  not  elevate  moments  of  the 
beautiful  above  the  ordinary  everydayness  of  our  lives.  In  fact,  as  we  have 
already  seen  in  the  first  chapter,  Stevens  makes  much  of  embracing  the  mundane 
and  he  rejects  the  idea  that  `mid  summer  moments'  are  in  some  way  more 
147 valuable  than  all  the  rest  of  our  days.  For  Stevens,  unlike  Heidegger,  the  `true 
poet'  is  one  who  discovers  poetry  in  everydayness.  Stevens  firmly  believed  that 
"the  whole  world  is  material  for  poetry"  (OP  189)  and  that  the  "poet  feels 
abundantly  the  poetry  of  everything"  (OP  190).  If  Stevens  is  a  `true  poet'  it  is 
precisely  because  he  does  not  make  a  distinction  between  `authenticity'  and 
`inauthenticity';  for  him,  all  moments-be  they  beautiful,  anxiety-ridden,  ugly,  or 
seemingly  inconsequential-are  gifts  and  are  to  be  accepted  by  the  poet  as  such. 
216  Frank  Lentricchia  notes  that  "in  the  time-honored  nineteenth-century  fashion  of  the  German 
idealists,  [Heidegger]  fights  dualism  with  the  weapons  of  a  dualistic  and  aestheticized  terminology  that 
148 Conclusion:  The  World  as  Meditation 
"And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love?  "  All  his  life,  Stevens  was  in 
love  with  an  absence.  He  had  a  life-long  relationship  with  a  lack,  a  relationship 
that  led  to  the  writing  of  his  best  poetry.  Among  his  greatest  poems  inspired  by 
this  lack  is  "The  World  as  Meditation"  written  some  three  years  prior  to  the  poet's 
death  and  an  appropriate  work  with  which  to  conclude  our  study  of  Stevens.  In 
"The  World  as  Meditation"  the  poet  is  like  Homer's  Penelope  who  actively  awaits 
the  return  of  her  lover,  Ulysses.  But  unlike  in  the  Homeric  epic,  in  Stevens'  poem 
Ulysses  does  not  return;  he  is  perpetually  absent.  In  Stevens'  poem  Ulysses  is  an 
absence. 
There  is  an  expectancy,  an  anticipation  in  Penelope's  waiting  as  she  prepares 
for  her  lover's  return  by  composing  "a  self  with  which  to  welcome  him.  "  She 
does  not  attempt  to  force  the  arrival  of  Ulysses;  she  merely  prepares  herself  for 
the  possibility  of  his  coming.  Likewise,  the  poet  waits  for  his  lover  in  a  "passive 
receptivity".  The  poem  opens  with  the  (uncertain)  approach  of  Ulysses: 
Is  it  Ulysses  that  approaches  from  the  east, 
The  interminable  adventurer?  The  trees  are  mended. 
That  winter  is  washed  away.  Someone  is  moving 
On  the  horizon  and  lifting  himself  up  above  it. 
A  form  of  fire  approaches  the  cretonnes  of  Penelope, 
Whose  mere  savage  presence  awakens  the  world  in  which  she  dwells. 
She  has  composed,  so  long,  a  self  with  which  to  welcome  him, 
Companion  to  his  self  for  her,  which  she  imagined, 
Two  in  a  deep-founded  sheltering,  friend  and  dear  friend. 
The  trees  had  been  mended,  as  an  essential  exercise 
In  an  inhuman  meditation,  larger  than  her  own. 
would  divide  human  experience  into  the  beautiful  and  the  mundane,  "  in  After  the  New  Criticism,  p.  81. 
149 No  winds  like  dogs  watched  over  her  at  night. 
She  wanted  nothing  he  could  not  bring  her  by  coming  alone. 
She  wanted  no  fetchings.  His  arms  would  be  her  necklace 
And  her  belt,  the  final  fortune  of  their  desire. 
But  was  it  Ulysses?  Or  was  it  only  the  warmth  of  the  sun 
On  her  pillow?  The  thought  kept  beating  in  her  like  her  heart. 
The  two  kept  beating  together.  It  was  only  day. 
It  was  Ulysses  and  it  was  not.  Yet  they  had  met, 
Friend  and  dear  friend  and  a  planet's  encouragement. 
The  barbarous  strength  within  her  would  never  fail. 
She  would  talk  a  little  to  herself  as  she  combed  her  hair, 
Repeating  his  name  with  its  patient  syllables, 
Never  forgetting  him  that  kept  coming  constantly  so  near.  (CP  520-521) 
Like  the  sun,  Ulysses  approaches  from  the  east,  lifting  himself  above  the  horizon. 
But  is  it  Ulysses?  The  change  in  surroundings  suggests  so:  the  trees  are  mended, 
that  winter  is  washed  away.  There  are  signs  of  spring's  renewal  everywhere.  His 
approach  like  the  morning  sun  "awakens  the  world".  Anticipating  his  arrival, 
Penelope  sheds  all  of  her  desires  except  for  one,  her  desire  for  their  union.  She 
wants  "no  fetchings",  nothing  "he  could  not  bring  her  by  coming  alone.  "  But  in 
spite  of  her  desire,  there  is  no  consummation.  "Yet",  she  insists,  "they  had  met,  / 
Friend  and  dear  friend....  "217  This  `friend'  "that  kept  coming  constantly  so  near" 
never  makes  a  final  arrival.  The  "final  fortune  of  their  desire"  is  just  out  of  reach. 
Yet  Penelope  experiences  the  effects  of  Ulysses'  approach  in  the  accelerated 
beating  of  her  heart,  in  the  "barbarous  strength"  which  she  knew  would  never  fail, 
in  the  world  awash  in  imagination. 
217  Charles  Murphy  notes,  "the  phrase  `friend  and  dear  friend'  is  repeated  with  tenderness  and 
warmth  as  the  poem  nears  its  conclusion.  "  He  says  it  "immediately  reminds  the  religious 
reader  of  St  Teresa  of  Avila's  famous  definition  of  contemplative  prayer": 
Contemplative  prayer  in  my  opinion  is  nothing  else  than  a  close  sharing  between  friends;  it 
means  taking  time  frequently  to  be  alone  with  him  who  we  know  loves  us. 
Murphy,  p.  33. 
150 Frank  Lentricchia  comments,  "Penelope's  meditative  process  is  `so  long' 
because  its  object  is  absent-and  though  in  the  end,  in  Homer's  story,  Ulysses  is 
brought  home,  in  Stevens's  version  he  is kept  away;  in  Stevens's  version  there  is 
no  plot,  no  culmination  of  touch.  "218  The  love  affair  thrives  precisely  because 
desire  is  never  fully  satiated.  The  lover  approaches,  he  comes  near,  but  he  does 
not  `arrive'.  It  was  Ulysses  and  it  was  not.  In  the  sustained  absence  of  her  lover, 
Penelope's  love  grows  ever  stronger  and  his  "name"  is  always  on  her  lips. 
Ulysses,  like  "Phoebus"  of  Notes  Toward  a  Supreme  Fiction,  is  a  name  for 
something  that  has  no  name;  its  namelessness  inspires  endless  naming. 
And  for  what,  except  for  this  absence,  this  lack,  does  Stevens  feel  love? 
Lentricchia  rightly  comments,  "The  poet  has  been  in  love,  illicitly,  for  a  very  long 
time.  He  can't  remember  when  he  wasn't.  s219  Like  Penelope  who  "has 
composed,  so  long,  a  self  with  which  to  welcome"  her  lover,  Stevens  has  spent  a 
lifetime  composing  poetry  in  relationship  with  this  absence.  We  note  in  the  third 
stanza  how  carefully  Stevens  suggests  this  absent  lover;  he  allows  it  to  `appear'  as 
an  absence: 
She  has  composed,  so  long,  a  self  with  which  to  welcome  him, 
Companion  to  his  self  for  her,  which  she  imagined, 
Two  in  a  deep-founded  sheltering,  friend  and  dear  friend. 
She  has  composed  a  self  that  is  a  companion  to  his  self  for  her.  The  friend  and 
dear  friend  sheltering  together  are  not,  as  we  might  first  assume,  Penelope  and 
Ulysses  but  Penelope  and  the  companion  she  has  spent  so  long  composing  in  her 
lover's  absence.  Penelope  enjoys  the  comfort  of  this  companion  that  she  has 
created  while  waiting  expectantly. 
218  Lentriccia,  Modernist  Quartet,  p.  175. 
219  Ibid,  p.  178. 
151 In  the  mystical  meeting  of  friend  and  dear  friend,  of  Penelope  and  the 
companion  she  has  created  in  relationship  with  this  lack,  the  world  is  renewed, 
refreshed,  but  only  momentarily: 
The  trees  had  been  mended,  as  an  essential  exercise 
In  an  inhuman  meditation,  larger  than  her  own. 
No  winds  like  dogs  watched  over  her  at  night. 
Already  by  the  fourth  stanza  the  experience  has  begun  to  pass.  In  the  first  stanza 
the  trees  are  mended  but  here  the  trees  had  been  mended.  It  becomes  subject  to 
reflection  as  Penelope  wonders,  "But  was  it  Ulysses?  "  The  experience  seems  to 
have  been  more  than  what  she  herself  is  capable:  "an  inhuman  meditation,  larger 
than  her  own.  "  But  Stevens  insists,  "No  winds  like  dogs  watched  over  her  at 
night",  that  is,  there  were  no  external  spirits  (pneuma),  nothing  from  outside 
watching  over  her  bringing  her  this  inhuman  meditation.  In  this  way,  the  poem  is 
reminiscent  of  "Tea  at  the  Palaz  of  Hoon": 
Not  less  because  in  purple  I  descended 
The  western  day  through  what  you  called 
The  loneliest  air,  not  less  was  I  myself. 
What  was  the  ointment  sprinkled  on  my  beard? 
What  were  the  hymns  that  buzzed  beside  my  ears? 
What  was  the  sea  whose  tide  swept  through  me  there? 
Out  of  my  mind  the  golden  ointment  rained, 
And  my  ears  made  the  blowing  hymns  they  heard. 
I  was  myself  the  compass  of  that  sea: 
I  was  the  world  in  which  I  walked,  and  what  I  saw 
Or  heard  or  felt  came  not  but  from  myself; 
And  there  I  found  myself  more  truly  and  more  strange.  (CP  65) 
Like  Hoon,  Penelope's  creations  are  her  own;  they  are  the  gifts  that  are  forged  out 
of  her  never-ending  rendezvous  with  a  perpetually  absent  lover.  And  yet  they  are 
"not  less"  because  they  come  not  but  from  herself. 
152 In  the  penultimate  stanza  Penelope  believes  that  "It  was  Ulysses  and  it  was 
not.  Yet  they  had  met,  /  Friend  and  dear  friend  and  a  planet's  encouragement.  " 
For  Stevens  such  mystical  meetings  are  reliant  upon  the  planet's  encouragement. 
That  is  to  say,  they  are  possible  only  in  a  world  of  endless  change,  in  a  world  that 
never  stands  still,  where  desire  cannot  be  fully  satiated. 
Over  the  years,  by  revelling  in  the  changing  climates  of  a  planet  in  perpetual 
motion,  Stevens  composed  a  self  with  which  to  welcome  poetry. 
153 After-Thoughts 
Finally,  in  the  last  year  of  her  age, 
Having  attained  a  present  blessedness, 
She  said  poetry  and  apotheosis  are  one. 
--from  "A  Pastoral  Nun"  (CP  378) 
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Appendix  A. 
Chronology* 
1879  Wallace  Stevens  born  2  October  in  Reading,  Pennsylvania. 
1897  Enrolls  in  Harvard  as  a  special  student 
1900-01  Moves  to  New  York  to  be  a  journalist.  Works  as  a  reporter  for  the 
New  York  Tribune  and  as  an  assistant  editor  for  World's  Work. 
1903  Attends  New  York  Law  School;  graduates  10  June. 
1904  Admitted  to  New  York  State  bar.  Meets  Elsie  Viola  Moll  in 
Reading. 
1905-07  Works  briefly  for  three  New  York  law  firms  in  succession. 
1908  Joins  the  legal  staff  of  the  American  Bonding  Company.  Writes 
"A  Book  of  Verses,  "  a  collection  of  poems  for  Elsie. 
1909  Marries  Elsie  Moll  on  21  September.  Writes  "The  Little  June 
Book,  "  a  collection  of  poems  for  Elsie. 
1911  Father  dies  14  July. 
1912  Mother  dies  16  July. 
1914  First  mature  poems  published,  in  Trend  (September)  and  in  Poetry 
(November). 
1916  Joins  the  legal  staff  of  the  Hartford  Accident  and  Indemnity 
Company.  Moves  permanently  to  Hartford,  Connecticut. 
1923  Harmonium  published  by  Alfred  A.  Knopf. 
1924  Daughter,  Holly  Bright  Stevens,  born  10  August. 
1934  Promoted  to  vice-president  of  Hartford  Accident  and  Indemnity. 
1935  Ideas  of  Order  published  by  Alcestis  Press  in  a  limited  edition. 
161 1936  Ideas  of  Order  published  by  Knopf.  Owl's  Clover  published  by 
Alcestis  Press. 
1937  The  Man  with  the  Blue  Guitar  published  by  Knopf. 
1942  Parts  of  a  World  published  by  Knopf.  Notes  toward  a  Supreme 
Fiction  published  by  Cummington  Press  in  a  limited  edition. 
1945  Elected  to  the  National  Institute  of  Arts  and  Letters.  Esthetique  du 
Mal  published  by  Cummington  Press  in  a  limited  edition. 
1947  Transport  to  Summer  published  by  Knopf.  Grandson  Peter  Reed 
Hanchak  born  26  April. 
1949  Awarded  Bollingen  Prize  in  Poetry. 
1950  The  Auroras  ofAutumn  published  by  Knopf. 
1951  Receives  1950  National  Book  Award  for  Poetry.  Receives  Gold 
Medal  of  the  Poetry  Society  of  America.  The  Necessary  Angel: 
Essays  on  Reality  and  the  Imagination  published  by  Knopf. 
1953  Selected  Poems  published  by  Faber  and  Faber  in  England. 
1954  Receives  1954  National  Book  Award  for  The  Collected  Poems. 
Exploratory  operation  on  26  April  results  in  diagnosis  of  incurable 
stomach  cancer.  Receives  Pulitzer  Prize  for  Poetry.  Dies  2  August 
in  Hartford. 
1957  Opus  Posthumous  published  by  Knopf. 
1963  Elsie  Stevens  dies  19  February. 
1967  Letters  of  Wallace  Stevens,  edited  by  Holly  Stevens,  published  by 
Knopf. 
1992  Holly  Bright  Stevens  dies  4  March. 
*Adapted  from  Janet  McCann's  Chronology  of  Stevens  in  Wallace  Stevens 
Revisited:  The  Celestial  Possible  (New  York:  Twayne  Publishers,  1995) 
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Wallace  Stevens's  Alleged  Deathbed  Conversion 
The  following  is  taken  from  a  letter  from  Father  Arthur  Hanley  to  Professor  Janet 
McCann  (Texas  A&  M  University),  dated  July  24,1977,  with  line  breaks, 
punctuation,  spelling,  etc.  exactly  as  in  the  typescript. 
Dear  Janet: 
The  First  time  he  [Wallace  Stevens]  came  to  the  hospital,  he  expressed  a  certain 
emptiness  in  his  life.  His  stay  then  was  two  weeks. 
Two  weeks  later,  he  was  in,  and  he  asked  the  sister  to  send  for  me.  We  sat  and  talked  a 
long  time.  During  his  visit  this  time,  I  saw  him  9  or  10  times.  He  was  fascinated  by  the 
life  of  Pope  Pius  X.  He  spoke  about  a  poem  for  this  pope  whose  family  name  was 
Sartori---  (Meaning  tailor).  At  least  3  times,  he  talked  about  getting  into  the  fold-- 
meaning  the  Catholic  Church.  The  doctrine  of  hell  was  an  objection  which  we  later 
got  thru  that  alright. 
He  often  remarked  about  the  peace  and  tranquility  that  he  experienced  in  going  into  a 
Catholic  Church  and  spending  some  time.  He  spoke  about  St.  Patrick's  Cathedral  in 
N.  Y.  I  can't  give  you  the  date  of  his  baptism.  I  think  it  might  be  recorded  at  the 
hospital.  He  said  he  had  never  been  baptized.  He  was  baptized  absolutely. 
Wallace  and  his  wife  had  not  been  on  speaking  terms  for  several  years.  So  we  thought 
it  better  not  to  tell  her.  She  might  cause  a  scene  in  the  hospital. 
Archbishop  at  the  time  told  me  not  to  make  his  (Wallace's)  conversion  public,  but  the 
sister  and  the  nurses  on  the  floor  were  all  aware  of  it  and  were  praying  for  him. 
At  the  time--I  did  get  a  copy  of  his  poems  and  also  a  record  that  he  did  of  some  of  his 
poems. 
We  talked  about  some  of  the  poems.  I  quoted  some  of  the  lines  of  one  of  them  and  he 
was  pleased.  He  said  if  he  got  well,  we  would  talk  a  lot  more  and  if  not--he  would  see 
me  in  heaven. 
That's  about  all  I  can  give  you  now. 
[Signed]  God's  Blessing 
Father  Hanley 
Source:  Document  URL:  http:  //www.  english.  upenn.  edu/-afilreis/Stevens/conversion.  html 
Last  modified:  Wednesday,  26-Nov-1997  15:  21:  42  EST 
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Selected  Poems 
The  following  poems  are  referred  to  at  length  in  the  thesis  and  are  quoted  here  for 
the  reader's  convenience. 
Sunday  Morning 
I 
Complacencies  of  the  peignoir,  and  late 
Coffee  and  oranges  in  a  sunny  chair, 
And  the  green  freedom  of  a  cockatoo 
Upon  a  rug  mingle  to  dissipate 
The  holy  hush  of  ancient  sacrifice. 
She  dreams  a  little,  and  she  feels  the  dark 
Encroachment  of  that  old  catastrophe, 
As  a  calm  darkens  among  water-lights. 
The  pungent  oranges  and  bright,  green  wings 
Seem  things  in  some  procession  of  the  dead, 
Winding  across  wide  water,  without  sound. 
The  day  is  like  wide  water,  without  sound. 
Stilled  for  the  passing  of  her  dreaming  feet 
Over  the  seas,  to  silent  Palestine, 
Dominion  of  the  blood  and  sepulchre. 
2 
Why  should  she  give  her  bounty  to  the  dead? 
What  is  divinity  if  it  can  come 
Only  in  silent  shadows  and  in  dreams? 
Shall  she  not  find  in  comforts  of  the  sun, 
In  pungent  fruit  and  bright  green  wings,  or  else 
In  any  balm  or  beauty  of  the  earth, 
Things  to  be  cherished  like  the  thought  of  heaven? 
Divinity  must  live  within  herself: 
Passions  of  rain,  or  moods  in  falling  snow; 
Grievings  in  loneliness,  or  unsubdued 
Elations  when  the  forest  blooms;  gusty 
Emotions  on  wet  roads  on  autumn  nights; 
All  pleasures  and  all  pains,  remembering 
The  bough  of  summer  and  the  winter  branch. 
These  are  the  measure  destined  for  her  soul. 
3 
Jove  in  the  clouds  had  his  inhuman  birth. 
No  mother  suckled  him,  no  sweet  land  gave 
Large-mannered  motions  to  his  mythy  mind. 
He  moved  among  us,  as  a  muttering  king, 
Magnificent,  would  move  among  his  hinds, 
Until  our  blood,  commingling,  virginal, 
With  heaven,  brought  such  requital  to  desire 
The  very  hinds  discerned  it,  in  a  star. 
Shall  our  blood  fail?  Or  shall  it  come  to  be 
The  blood  of  paradise?  And  shall  the  earth 
164 Seem  all  of  paradise  that  we  shall  know? 
The  sky  will  be  much  friendlier  then  than  now, 
A  part  of  labor  and  a  part  of  pain, 
And  next  in  glory  to  enduring  love, 
Not  this  dividing  and  indifferent  blue. 
4 
She  says,  "I  am  content  when  wakened  birds, 
Before  they  fly,  test  the  reality 
Of  misty  fields,  by  their  sweet  questionings; 
But  when  the  birds  are  gone,  and  their  warm  fields 
Return  no  more,  where,  then,  is  paradise?  " 
There  is  not  any  haunt  of  prophecy, 
Nor  any  old  chimera  of  the  grave, 
Neither  the  golden  underground,  nor  isle 
Melodious,  where  spirits  gat  them  home, 
Nor  visionary  south,  nor  cloudy  palm 
Remote  on  heaven's  hill,  that  has  endured 
As  April's  green  endures;  or  will  endure 
Like  her  remembrance  of  awakened  birds, 
Or  her  desire  for  June  and  evening,  tipped 
By  the  consummation  of  the  swallow's  wings. 
5 
She  says,  "But  in  contentment  I  still  feel 
The  need  of  some  imperishable  bliss.  " 
Death  is  the  mother  of  beauty;  hence  from  her, 
Alone,  shall  come  fulfillment  to  our  dreams 
And  our  desires.  Although  she  strews  the  leaves 
Of  sure  obliteration  on  our  paths, 
The  path  sick  sorrow  took,  the  many  paths 
Where  triumph  rang  its  brassy  phrase,  or  love 
Whispered  a  little  out  of  tenderness, 
She  makes  the  willow  shiver  in  the  sun 
For  maidens  who  were  wont  to  sit  and  gaze 
Upon  the  grass,  relinquished  to  their  feet. 
She  causes  boys  to  pile  new  plums  and  pears 
On  disregarded  plate.  The  maidens  taste 
And  stray  impassioned  in  the  littering  leaves. 
6 
Is  there  no  change  of  death  in  paradise? 
Does  ripe  fruit  never  fall?  Or  do  the  boughs 
Hang  always  heavy  in  that  perfect  sky, 
Unchanging,  yet  so  like  our  perishing  earth, 
With  rivers  like  our  own  that  seek  for  seas 
They  never  find,  the  same  receding  shores 
That  never  touch  with  inarticulate  pang? 
Why  set  pear  upon  those  river-banks 
Or  spice  the  shores  with  odors  of  the  plum? 
Alas,  that  they  should  wear  our  colors  there, 
The  silken  weavings  of  our  afternoons, 
And  pick  the  strings  of  our  insipid  lutes! 
Death  is  the  mother  of  beauty,  mystical, 
Within  whose  burning  bosom  we  devise 
Our  earthly  mothers  waiting,  sleeplessly. 
7 
Supple  and  turbulent,  a  ring  of  men 
Shall  chant  in  orgy  on  a  summer  morn 
165 Their  boisterous  devotion  to  the  sun, 
Not  as  a  god,  but  as  a  god  might  be, 
Naked  among  them,  like  a  savage  source. 
Their  chant  shall  be  a  chant  of  paradise, 
Out  of  their  blood,  returning  to  the  sky; 
And  in  their  chant  shall  enter,  voice  by  voice, 
The  windy  lake  wherein  their  lord  delights, 
The  trees,  like  serafin,  and  echoing  hills, 
That  choir  among  themselves  long  afterward. 
They  shall  know  well  the  heavenly  fellowship 
Of  men  that  perish  and  of  summer  morn. 
And  whence  they  came  and  whither  they  shall  go 
The  dew  upon  their  feel  shall  manifest. 
8 
She  hears,  upon  that  water  without  sound, 
A  voice  that  cries,  "The  tomb  in  Palestine 
Is  not  the  porch  of  spirits  lingering. 
It  is  the  grave  of  Jesus,  where  he  lay.  " 
We  live  in  an  old  chaos  of  the  sun, 
Or  old  dependency  of  day  and  night, 
Or  island  solitude,  unsponsored,  free, 
Of  that  wide  water,  inescapable. 
Deer  walk  upon  our  mountains,  and  the  quail 
Whistle  about  us  their  spontaneous  cries; 
Sweet  berries  ripen  in  the  wilderness; 
And,  in  the  isolation  of  the  sky, 
At  evening,  casual  flocks  of  pigeons  make 
Ambiguous  undulations  as  they  sink, 
Downward  to  darkness,  on  extended  wings. 
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To  Henry  Church 
And  for  what,  except  for  you,  do  I  feel  love? 
Do  I  pres  the  extremest  book  of  the  wisest  man 
Close  to  me,  hidden  in  me  day  and  night? 
In  the  uncertain  light  of  single,  certain  truth, 
Equal  in  living  changingness  to  the  light 
In  which  I  meet  you,  in  which  we  sit  at  rest, 
For  a  moment  in  the  central  of  our  being, 
The  vivid  transparence  that  you  bring  is  peace. 
It  Must  Be  Abstract 
I 
Begin,  ephebe,  by  perceiving  the  idea 
Of  this  invention,  this  invented  world, 
The  inconceivable  idea  of  the  sun. 
You  must  become  an  ignorant  man  again 
And  see  the  sun  again  with  an  ignorant  eye 
And  see  it  clearly  in  the  idea  of  it. 
Never  suppose  an  inventing  mind  as  source 
Of  this  idea  nor  for  that  mind  compose 
A  voluminous  master  folded  in  his  fire. 
How  clean  the  sun  when  seen  in  its  idea, 
Washed  in  the  remotest  cleanliness  of  a  heaven 
That  has  expelled  us  and  our  images... 
The  death  of  one  god  is  the  death  of  all. 
Let  purple  Phoebus  lie  in  umber  harvest, 
Let  Phoebus  slumber  and  die  in  autumn  umber, 
Phoebus  is  dead,  ephebe.  But  Phoebus  was 
A  name  for  something  that  never  could  be  named. 
There  was  a  project  for  the  sun  and  is. 
There  is  a  project  for  the  sun.  The  sun 
Must  bear  no  name,  gold  flourisher,  but  be 
In  the  difficulty  of  what  it  is  to  be. 
II 
It  is  the  celestial  ennui  of  apartments 
That  sends  us  back  to  the  first  idea,  the  quick 
Of  this  invention;  and  yet  so  poisonous 
Are  the  ravishments  of  truth,  so  fatal  to 
The  truth  itself,  the  frist  idea  becomes 
The  hermit  in  a  oet's  metaphors. 
j,  o  comes  and  goes  and  comes  and  goes  all  day. 
May  there  be  an  ennui  of  the  first  idea? 
What  else,  prodigious  scholar,  should  there  be? 
The  monastic  man  is  an  artist.  The  philosopher 
Appoints  man's  place  in  music,  say,  today. 
But  the  priest  desires.  The  philosopher  desires. 
167 And  not  to  have  is  the  beginning  of  desire. 
To  have  what  is  not  is  its  ancient  cycle. 
It  is  desire  at  the  end  of  winter,  when 
It  observes  the  effortless  weather  turning  blue 
And  sees  the  myosotis  on  its  bush. 
Being  virile,  it  hears  the  calendar  hymns. 
It  knows  that  what  is  has  is  what  is  not 
And  throws  it  away  like  a  thing  of  another  time, 
As  morning  throws  off  stale  moonlight  and  shabby  sleep. 
III 
The  poem  refreshes  life  so  that  we  share, 
For  a  moment,  the  first  idea...  It  satisfies 
Belief  in  an  immaculate  beginning 
And  sends  us,  winged  by  an  unconscious  will, 
To  an  immaculate  end.  We  move  between  these  points: 
From  that  ever-early  candor  to  its  late  plural 
And  the  candor  of  them  is  the  strong  exhilaration 
Of  what  we  feel  from  what  we  think,  of  thought 
Beating  in  the  heart,  as  if  blood  newly  came, 
An  elixir,  an  excitation,  a  pure  power. 
The  poem,  through  candor,  brings  back  a  power  again 
That  gives  a  candid  kind  to  everything. 
We  say:  At  night  an  Arabian  in  my  room, 
With  his  damned  hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how, 
Inscribes  a  primitive  astronomy 
Across  the  unscrawled  fores  the  future  casts 
And  throws  his  stars  around  the  floor.  By  day 
The  wood-dove  used  to  chant  his  boobla-hoo 
And  still  the  grossest  iridescence  of  ocean 
Howls  hoo  and  rises  and  howls  hoo  and  falls. 
Life's  nonsense  pierces  us  with  strange  relation. 
IV 
The  first  idea  was  not  our  own.  Adam 
In  Eden  was  the  father  of  Descartes 
And  Eve  made  air  the  mirror  of  herself, 
Of  her  sons  and  of  her  daughters.  They  found  themselves 
In  heaven  as  in  a  glass;  a  second  earth; 
And  in  the  earth  itself  they  found  a  green- 
The  inhabitants  of  a  very  varnished  green. 
But  the  first  idea  was  not  to  shape  the  clouds 
In  imitation.  The  clouds  preceded  us 
There  was  a  muddy  centre  before  we  breathed. 
There  was  a  myth  before  the  myth  began, 
Venerable  and  articulate  and  complete. 
From  this  the  poem  springs:  that  we  live  in  a  place 
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And  hard  it  is  in  spite  of  blazoned  days. 
We  are  the  mimics.  Clouds  are  pedagogues 
The  air  is  not  a  mirror  but  bare  board, 
Coulisse  bright-dark,  tragic  chiaroscuro 
And  comis  color  of  the  rose,  in  which 
Abysmal  instruments  make  sounds  like  pips 
Of  the  sweeping  meanings  that  we  add  to  them. 
V 
The  lion  roars  at  the  enraging  desert, 
Reddens  the  sand  with  his  red-colored  noise, 
Defies  red  emptiness  to  evolve  his  match, 
Master  by  foot  and  jaws  and  by  the  mane, 
Most  supple  challenger.  The  elephant 
Breaches  the  darkness  of  Ceylon  with  blares, 
The  glitter-goes  on  surfaces  of  tanks, 
Shattering  velvetest  far-away.  The  bear, 
The  ponderous  cinnamon,  snarls  in  his  mountain 
At  summer  thunder  and  sleeps  through  winter  snow. 
But  you,  ephebe,  look  from  your  attick  window, 
Your  mansard  with  a  rented  piano.  You  lie 
In  silence  upon  your  bed.  You  clutch  the  corner 
Of  the  pillow  in  your  hand.  You  writhe  and  press 
A  bitter  utterance  from  your  writhing,  dumb, 
Yet  voluble  dumb  violence.  You  look 
Across  the  roofs  as  sigil  and  as  ward 
And  in  your  centre  mark  them  and  are  cowed... 
These  are  the  heroic  children  whom  time  breeds 
Against  the  first  idea-to  lash  the  lion, 
Caparison  elephants,  teach  bears  to  juggle. 
VI 
Not  to  be  realized  because  not  to 
Be  seen,  not  to  be  loved  nor  hated  because 
Not  to  be  realized.  Weather  by  Franz  Hals, 
Brushed  up  by  brushy  winds  in  brushy  clouds, 
Wetted  by  blue,  colder  for  white.  Not  to 
Be  spoken  to,  without  a  roof,  without 
First  fruits,  without  the  virginal  of  birds, 
The  dark-blown  ceinture  loosened,  not  relinquished. 
Gay  is,  gay  was,  the  gay  forsythia 
And  yellow,  yellow  thins  the  Northern  blue. 
Without  a  name  and  nothing  to  be  desired, 
If  only  imagined  but  imagined  well. 
My  house  has  changed  a  little  in  the  sun. 
The  fragrance  of  the  magnolias  comes  close, 
False  flick,  false  form,  but  falseness  close  to  kin. 
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Invisible  or  visible  or  both: 
A  seeing  and  unseeing  in  the  eye. 
The  weather  and  the  giant  of  the  weather, 
Say  the  weather,  the  mere  weather,  the  mere  air: 
An  abstraction  blooded,  as  a  man  by  thought. 
VII 
It  feels  good  as  it  is  without  the  giant, 
A  thinker  of  the  first  idea.  Perhaps 
The  truth  depends  on  a  walk  around  a  lake, 
A  composing  as  the  body  tires,  a  stop 
To  see  hepatica,  a  stop  to  watch 
A  definition  growing  certain  and 
A  wait  within  that  certainty,  a  rest 
In  the  swags  of  pine-trees  bordering  the  lake. 
Perhaps  there  are  times  of  inherent  excellence, 
As  when  the  cock  crows  on  the  left  and  all 
Is  well,  incalculable  balances, 
At  which  a  kind  of  Swiss  perfection  comes 
And  a  familiar  music  of  the  machine 
Sets  up  its  Schwärmerei,  not  balances 
That  we  achieve  but  balances  that  happen, 
As  a  man  and  woman  meet  and  love  forthwith. 
Perhaps  there  are  moments  of  awakening, 
Extreme,  fortuitous,  personal,  in  which 
We  more  than  awaken,  sit  on  the  edge  of  sleep, 
As  on  an  elevation,  and  behold 
The  academies  like  structures  in  a  mist. 
VIII 
Can  we  compose  a  castle-fortress-home, 
Even  with  the  help  of  Viollet-le-Duc, 
And  set  the  MacCullough  there  as  major  man? 
The  first  idea  is  an  imagined  thing. 
The  pensive  giant  prone  in  violet  space 
May  be  the  MacCullough,  an  expedient, 
Logos  and  logic,  crystal  hypothesis, 
Incipit  and  a  form  to  speak  the  word 
And  every  latent  double  in  the  word, 
Beau  linguist.  But  the  MacCullough  is  MacCullough. 
It  does  not  follow  that  major  man  is  man. 
If  MacCullough  himself  lay  lounging  in  the  sea, 
Drowned  in  its  washes,  reading  in  the  sound, 
About  the  thinker  of  the  first  idea, 
He  might  take  habit,  whether  from  wave  or  phrase, 
170 Or  power  of  the  wave,  or  deepened  speech, 
Of  a  leaner  being,  moving  in  on  him, 
Of  greater  aptitude  and  apprehension, 
As  if  the  waves  at  last  were  never  broken, 
As  if  the  language  suddenly,  with  ease, 
Said  things  it  had  laboriously  spoken. 
IX 
The  romantic  intoning,  the  declaimed  clairvoyance 
Are  parts  of  apotheosis,  appropriate 
And  of  its  nature,  the  idiom  thereof. 
They  differ  from  reasons'  click-clack,  its  applied 
Enflashings.  But  apotheosis  is  not 
The  origin  of  the  major  man.  He  comes, 
Compact  in  invincible  foils,  from  reason, 
Lighted  at  midnight  by  the  studious  eye, 
Swaddled  in  revery,  the  object  of 
The  hum  of  thoughts  evaded  in  the  mind, 
Hidden  from  other  thoughts,  he  that  reposes 
On  a  breast  forever  precious  for  that  touch, 
For  whom  the  good  of  April  falls  tenderly, 
Falls  down,  the  cock-birds  calling  at  the  time. 
My  dame,  sing  for  this  person  accurate  songs. 
He  is  and  may  be  but  oh!  he  is,  he  is, 
This  foundling  of  the  infected  past,  so  bright, 
So  moving  in  the  manner  of  his  hand. 
Yet  look  not  at  his  colored  eyes.  Give  him 
No  names.  Dismiss  him  from  your  images. 
The  hot  of  him  is  purest  in  the  heart. 
X 
The  major  abstraction  is  the  idea  of  man 
And  major  man  is  its  exponent,  abler 
In  the  abstract  than  in  his  singular, 
More  fecund  as  principle  than  particle, 
Happy  fecundity,  flor-abundant  force, 
In  being  more  than  an  exception,  part, 
Though  an  heroic  part,  of  the  communal. 
The  major  abstraction  is  the  communal, 
The  inanimate,  difficult  visage.  Who  is  it? 
What  rabbi,  grown  furious  with  human  wish, 
What  chieftain,  walking  by  himself,  crying 
Most  miserable,  most  victorious, 
Does  not  see  these  separate  figures  one  by  one, 
And  yet  see  only  one,  in  his  old  coat, 
His  slouching  pantaloons,  beyond  the  town, 
Looking  for  what  was,  where  it  used  to  be? 
Cloudless  the  morning.  It  is  he.  The  man 
171 In  that  old  coat,  those  sagging  pantaloons, 
It  is  of  him,  ephebe,  to  make,  to  confect 
The  final  elegance,  not  to  console 
Nor  sanctify,  but  plainly  to  propound. 
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